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…What measure is there of the relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and 
defect, which means that they become greater and smaller, and more and fewer, and 
differ in degree? For if one says: “Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs 
widely from future pleasure and pain”—to that I should reply: And do they differ in 
anything but pleasure and pain? There can be no other measure of them. And do 
you, like a skillful weigher, put into the balance of the pleasures and the pains, and 
their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the 
other. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you of course take the more and the 
greater; or if you weigh pains, then you take the fewer and the less; or if pleasures 
against pains, then you choose that course of action in which the painful is exceeded 
by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant; and you 
avoid that course of action in which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would 
you not admit, my friends, that this is true?  
 
—Socrates 
 
 
 
When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you 
know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express 
it in numbers, your knowledge of it is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind; it may be 
the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced it to 
the stage of science. 
 
—Sir William Thompson, Lord Kelvin 
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ABSTRACT 
ON THE MEASURABILITY OF PLEASURE AND PAIN 
MAY 2009 
JUSTIN ALLEN KLOCKSIEM 
B.A., WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman 
 
The topic of my dissertation is the hedonic calculus. The hedonic calculus 
presupposes that pleasure and pain come in amounts amenable to addition, subtraction, and 
aggregation operations. These operations are ones that utilitarianism and related normative 
ethical theories treat as central to moral phenomena. The first chapter is an introduction to 
the problem—in it, I explain what the hedonic calculus is, why it is important, and why it has 
recently come under disfavor.  
The second chapter explores the nature of hedonic phenomena, arguing that 
pleasure and pain are propositional attitudes; they are not feelings or feeling-tones, nor are 
they fundamentally a matter of desire or motivation.  
The third and fourth chapters concern the nature of quantitative phenomena. I argue 
that quantities are determinate properties whose determinables enter into greater-than, less-than, 
or equal-to relationships that are homomorphic with the structure of the real number line. 
These structures include the presence of a unique order; the possibility of equal intervals; 
and a natural, non-arbitrary zero point. The fifth chapter is a defense of the thesis that there 
are exactly three relations of quantitative comparison from a recent attack. I argue that 
x 
apparent instances of being on a par are in fact instances of vagueness or complexity and do 
not threaten the truth of the trichotomy thesis.  
The sixth chapter addresses arguments that pleasure and pain fail to meet these 
formal conditions. One argument stems from the observation that pleasures and pains are 
essentially transient and ephemeral. Another argument proceeds from the observation that 
interpersonal comparisons of pleasure and pain appear to be impossible. A third, closely 
related to the first two, argues that pleasure and pain are too heterogeneous to be 
quantitative. A final argument holds that, for a variety of reasons, the various mathematical 
operations constitutive of quantitativeness are not applicable to pleasure or pain. I argue that 
each argument suffers from at least one fatal flaw. Some arguments crucially involve a failure 
to distinguish between the existence of a quantity and our ability to perform reliable 
measurements of it. Others involve false analogies between hedonic and other sorts of 
phenomena.  
The seventh chapter addresses arguments in favor of the legitimacy of the calculus. 
Many philosophers, such as Bentham, Mill, Ross, and Plato, seem to assume, without any 
serious argument, that pleasure and pain are quantitative. Others attempt to argue that, for 
example, two people enjoying something must involve more pleasure than if just one person 
were enjoying it. A third type of argument rests on the claim that it is sometimes rational to 
be indifferent between a longer lasting, less intense episode of pleasure and a more intense 
but shorter episode. This suggests that since duration is clearly quantitative, intensity must be, 
too, because if it were not, there could be no equivalence between the brief but intense and 
the lengthy but mellow episodes. Several of these arguments are unsound or question-
begging. Finally, I present an argument in favor of the hedonic calculus that I endorse, along 
with possible objections and my replies. I begin by acknowledging the central point of the 
xi 
“hedonic trade-offs” argument, and then proceed, via reductio, by pointing out the various 
absurd or unpalatable consequences of the denial of the thesis that pleasure and pain are 
quantitative.  
xii 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Hedonic Calculus 
 The topic of this dissertation is the hedonic calculus. The traditional debate 
concerning the hedonic calculus concerns whether or not pleasure and pain are susceptible 
to various mathematical functions, such as addition and subtraction. Although the idea is 
very old—in the Protagoras, Plato has Socrates propose something very much like it—the 
contemporary discussion can be traced to Bentham’s Principles of Morals and Legislation. In it, 
Bentham devotes considerable space to the question of how the value of “a lot” of pleasure 
and pain is to be measured. This is the project of this dissertation. 
 This project is philosophically important for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the most 
prominent reason is that the thesis that pleasure and pain are quantitative is at the 
foundation of one of the most significant moral theories in the history of philosophy: 
utilitarianism. The precise formulation of the theory is a matter of some controversy, but all 
versions of utilitarianism combine the following two insights: a) that the sole criterion for 
moral evaluation is the goodness and badness of consequences in comparison to the relevant 
alternatives;1 and b) that the sole basis for the evaluation of a consequence is the amount of 
pleasure and pain it contains. This second prong of the utilitarian insight clearly presupposes 
that pleasure and pain are quantitative.  
                                                
1 This way of putting it leaves open what, precisely, is to be evaluated. The best-known 
forms of utilitarianism evaluate actions in terms of permissibility, but other forms, such as 
rule utilitarianism, take rules as their primary object of evaluation and evaluate actions only 
derivatively. What is unique to all forms of utilitarianism is that consequentialism is 
combined with hedonism.  
2 
 However, as we will see in later chapters, a wide variety of non-utilitarian theories 
about right and wrong presuppose that pleasure and pain are quantitative. According to 
several prominent moral philosophers, every plausible theory of ethics entails that the 
promotion of pleasure and diminution of pain are at least prima facie duties, and this 
presupposes that pleasure and pain have a quantitative structure. So the hedonic calculus is 
important not just according to utilitarianism; the bulk of viable normative ethical theories 
presuppose it.  
 Furthermore, pleasure and pain have been thought to be tied closely to motivation. 
The thesis that pleasure and pain are the only things that affect motivation is, of course, 
deeply controversial and is probably false; however, it seems plausible and intuitive to think 
that pleasure and pain are at least relevant to motivation in typical cases. And since it is also 
plausible and intuitive to think that greater quantities of pleasure or pain carry greater 
motivational force, the hedonic calculus is important in the context of the study of 
motivation, as well.  
2: Overview of the Chapters 
 The second chapter concerns the nature of pleasure and pain—we cannot determine 
whether there is a hedonic calculus without first determining what such a calculus would be 
a calculus of. That is, in order to determine whether pleasure and pain are legitimate, 
measurable quantities, we must first what pleasure and pain are. In this chapter, I consider a 
variety of influential theories about the nature of pleasure and pain, including the distinct 
feeling view, according to which pleasure and pain are distinct, individual sensations, the hedonic 
tone view, according to which pleasure and pain are features of sensations and not sensations 
themselves, the desire-based view, according to which pleasure and pain are fundamentally a 
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matter of intrinsic desire and aversion, and the propositional attitude view, according to which 
pleasure and pain are sui generis propositional attitudes and do not depend in any essential or 
fundamental way on desires. I reject the distinct feeling and hedonic-tone views for two 
reasons. First, the phenomenology of pleasure and pain are inconsistent with these views: 
there is no distinctive feeling or feeling-tone common to all pleasant sensations. Second, 
some pleasures and pains are not sensory in nature. Some pleasures or pains are emotional, 
or intellectual, or aesthetic in nature, and therefore have nothing to do with sensations per se.  
 My reasons for rejecting the desire-based view are more complicated, but rest on the 
contention that pleasure and pain vary in a manner independent of desire and aversion. Even 
controlling for the various caveats and restrictions placed on the relevant desires and 
aversions, I contend that there exist pleasures we do not desire; pains to which we are not 
averse; objects of desire we do not enjoy; and objects of aversion we are not pained by. This 
is enough to show that the desire-based theory of pleasure is false.  
 I endorse the propositional attitude-based theory of pleasure and pain. It is 
consistent with hedonic phenomenology, as well as the independence of pleasure and desire. 
Although there are problems with the theory—it leaves the fact that pleasure and pain are 
diametric opposites unexplained, for example—these problems should not compel us to 
reject the theory in favor of one of its competitors.  
 The third chapter proposes a metaphysical theory of quantitative properties. 
According to the theory I endorse, quantities are properties, conceived of as universals that 
fit into a version of the determinate/determinable structure according to which something 
has a determinable (e.g.) volume by having some particular determinate volume (e.g. 4 ml), 
and these determinate properties are arranged into a structure that is isomorphic in various 
ways to the structure of the number line. The details of this numerical structure are 
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presented in chapter four. The quantitatively important structures of the number line include 
ordinality, the presence of intervals, and the presence of a natural, non-arbitrary zero point. 
When there exists a suitably structured network of determinate properties under the 
appropriate determinable, I say that the relevant property is quantitative. 
 The fifth chapter is a defense of the trichotomy thesis—the thesis that there are 
three mutually exclusive and exhaustive relations of quantitative comparison: greater than, less 
than, and equal to. Although this thesis is intuitively plausible and philosophically orthodox, it 
has come under attack, most notably in a series of articles by Ruth Chang. According to 
Chang, there are cases according to which there are two objects that are quantitatively related 
but not by any of the standard trichotomy of relations. On her view, a fourth sui generis 
relation, being on a par, holds in such situations. I argue that the trichotomy thesis is true, and 
that the apparent plausibility of Chang’s argument is an illusion, caused by vagueness and 
complexity in the cases that motivate her argument.  
In the sixth chapter I consider several popular or influential arguments for the 
conclusion that pleasure and pain are not quantitative. I criticize several of these arguments 
for drawing a theoretical conclusion—that there is no relevant quantitative structure with 
respect to pleasure and pain—from practical premises. Several such arguments are based on 
the fact that pleasures are difficult to focus on or attend to; or our inability to compare one 
person’s pleasures with those of another; or our inability to perform the relevant 
calculations; or our inability to construct a non-arbitrary scale for the measurement of 
pleasures and pains.  
 Another argument for the conclusion that pleasure and pain are not quantitative is 
based on their apparent heterogeneity. The idea is that some pleasures are different enough 
from some other pleasures that no legitimate comparison can be made between them. This 
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line of argument is specious: however different in character two episodes of pleasure may be, 
as long as they are pleasures, and not something else, then they must ipso facto be similar 
enough to guarantee that some quantitative comparison with respect to amount of pleasure 
is at least logically possible. If no such comparison were possible, then at least one of the 
episodes would have to be non-hedonic in nature.  
 Finally, I discuss several arguments for the conclusion that the relevant mathematical 
and statistical operations are not applicable in the right ways to pleasure and pain. In many 
cases, this type of argument proceeds by analogy, drawing a comparison between pleasure 
and pain on the one hand, and some allegedly analogous phenomenon that is not amenable 
to the relevant operations, on the other. In each case, I show that the putative analogy fails 
and that there is reason to believe that the relevant operations do, indeed, apply to pleasure 
and pain.  
 The seventh and final chapter concerns positive arguments for the thesis that 
pleasure and pain are quantitative. The oldest such argument is based on the remarks of 
Socrates during his discussion with Protagoras in the dialogue that bears his name. 
According to Socrates, everyone is always motivated so as to maximize pleasure and 
minimize pain; since maximization and minimization are quantitative concepts and only 
make sense to apply to quantitative properties, pleasure and pain must be quantitative. In a 
similar vein, Sidgwick remarks that the thesis that pleasure and pain are quantitative is an a 
priori assumption that is uncontradicted by all our experiences, even though he can give no 
positive argument that it is true. And Ross argues that the fact that pleasure and pain are 
subject to varying degrees of intensity entails that there exist precise degrees of varying 
intensity. I conclude that each of these arguments begs the question.  
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 A second class of arguments I discuss in this chapter is defensive in nature. 
According to arguments of this type, the fact that we lack some apparently important ability 
to quantify pleasure and pain is not a threat to the thesis that pleasure and pain are 
quantitative. Although I agree that there are serious practical difficulties surrounding the 
taking of measurements of pleasure, I deny that this has any direct bearing on the thesis that 
pleasure is a measurable quantity, in a certain sense of that term.  
 Finally, I present and defend a sound argument for the conclusion that pleasure and 
pain are quantitative. This argument is based on the idea that intensity and duration of 
pleasure and pain interact in such a way that it is possible to set up a hypothetical scale for 
intensity in terms of duration. Since intensity can be expressed by reference to duration, and 
duration is a paradigm example of a ratio-measurable quantity, intensity is therefore 
measurable on a ratio scale, too. I then argue that there is a natural, non-arbitrary hedonic 
zero point.  
3. An Approach to the History of Philosophy 
 Several sections of this dissertation make reference to historical sources—indeed, we 
consult some of the oldest surviving philosophical writings. Most of the philosophers whose 
writings predate the contemporary era endorse, either explicitly or implicitly, some version of 
the sensory- or feeling-tone views of pleasure, views which I explicitly reject in the next 
chapter. This presents an interpretational problem: a desire for fidelity to source material 
pulls us in one direction; a desire to understand how these historical texts figure into the 
contemporary debate surrounding the hedonic calculus pulls us in another.  
 In the end, I have decided to sacrifice fidelity to historical accuracy in favor of 
contemporary relevance in several places. This means that I have recast several arguments 
7 
for or against the thesis that sensory pleasure and pain are quantitative as arguments 
concerning the quantitativeness of attitudinal pleasure and pain. When this happens, it is the 
result not of misunderstanding, nor of lack of respect for the historical context in which this 
debate takes place. Rather, it is simply because this is a dissertation in ethics, not in the 
history of philosophy. Although we are aware of the history of our discipline and have 
attempted to learn as much as possible from it, our focus remains on the present.  
8 
CHAPTER II 
 
THEORIES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN 
1. Introductory Remarks 
Philosophically speaking, what is the nature of pleasure, and of pain? What kind of 
phenomena are they? Which properties are pleasantness and painfulness? What conditions must 
an event or object satisfy in order to deserve to be called “a pleasure” or “a pain”? The 
purpose of this section is to catalog the three major philosophical theories of pleasure and 
pain, and the arguments in favor and against each of them. I am not interested in 
psychological or neurological questions concerning pleasure and pain or their effects or 
natures. I am not interested in whether or not rational people always seek pleasure or avoid 
pain in themselves. I am interested in what pleasure and pain are. I am not interested in what 
any particular neural correlate to pleasure and pain might be. I am interested in what the 
phenomena that would be correlated to neural activity if that neuro-scientific project were 
complete.  
In order to be complete, a theory of hedonic phenomena would have to meet certain 
conditions. First, and most obviously, it would have to give an account of the nature of 
pleasure. It should attempt to explain, at the most fundamental level, what pleasure is. But 
just as importantly, a complete hedonic theory would have to give an account of the nature 
of pain, too. Many authors, however, completely omit all discussion of pain. When this 
occurs, I assume that what is said about pleasure applies, mutatis mutandis, to pain.  
Second, the theory must explain what it is for someone to “get” pleasure and pain. 
That is, it must explain what features a person must have at a time in order to undergo 
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pleasure or pain at that time. Does he have to be experiencing sensations with certain 
features? Or does it have to do with his attitude toward what is going on? If so, which 
attitude? Which things?  
Third, the theory must explain what it takes for something to be pleasant or painful. 
That is, it must explain what features must an object have to be an instance of the property 
pleasantness. It must explain what it takes for something to be “a pleasure.” But it is important 
distinguish between two possible interpretations of ‘being pleasant.’ On the one hand, 
something can be pleasant by causing or leading to pleasure. A long, moderately strenuous 
bike ride through smooth, empty, rural roads, teeming with birds and wildlife, on a cool 
summer morning is pleasant in this way. This type of pleasantness is derivative, and is 
therefore not philosophically interesting in a fundamental way.  
On the other hand, something can be pleasant “in itself,” or are “intrinsically 
pleasant.” These things are not pleasant because they cause pleasure, or because of any 
extrinsic, relational factors. They are pleasant because of how they are “in themselves”; 
because of how they are intrinsically. This second, more fundamental, way of being pleasant 
is the one we are interested in. The actual experiences a bike rider has on his long, bucolic 
ride are more likely candidates for being intrinsically pleasant.  The feeling of the cool 
breeze; the visual experiences of the barns, hayfields, and fieldstone walls zooming by; the 
thrill of the descent; the sense of accomplishment accompanying a tough climb. The theory 
of hedonic phenomena must explain what it is for an object to be intrinsically pleasant. It 
should say something about which ontological category the objects fall into. It should also 
do this for painfulness.  
Third, a complete theory of hedonic phenomena should explain what it takes for one 
thing to be more pleasant (or painful) than another. It should explain what it takes for a 
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person to be getting “more pleasure” at one time than another, or for one person to be 
getting more pleasure than another.2 We often make offhanded remarks that entail that one 
thing is more pleasant or less painful than some other thing. A theory of hedonic 
phenomena should explain how we can make these judgments, and why they sometimes 
seem to be true.  
So, the theory should tell us what it takes for someone to take pleasure in something; 
what property “pleasantness” is; what things “pleasures” are; and what features of the 
property or objects determine which quantitative relationships hold between the instances 
(or the things). It should also adequately explain any necessary technical terms, such as 
‘hedonic tone.’ 
The most basic of the philosophical theories of pleasure and pain is the “distinctive 
feeling” view, which is closely related to the “hedonic tone” theory. Because they are so 
closely related, I will consider these two theories as though they were the same theory. This 
kind of theory claims that there is a particular, distinctive feeling and that this feeling is the 
feeling of pleasure. Presumably, they stand or fall together. The second is the “intrinsic 
desire” theory. This theory claims that although there is no particular feeling of pleasure, a 
pleasure is a feeling that is desired for its own sake by the person who feels it. The third is 
the propositional attitude theory. This theory says that pleasure is a propositional attitude, 
akin to being pleased or enjoyment. An individual pleasure is a state of affairs consisting in 
someone taking propositional pleasure in some propositional object.  
 
                                                
2 I don’t want to beg any questions at this early date. However, it seems that our everyday 
thought about pleasure and pain makes reference to this type of quantitative relationship, 
and a complete theory of hedonic phenomena should make some attempt to explain the 
underlying nature of these relationships. It’s possible, however, that there is no theory such 
that this portion of it is true, or that these relationships are necessarily imprecise.  
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2. Hedonic Tone and The Distinctive Feeling Theory 
The most prominent adherents of the Hedonic Tone view are C. D. Broad and 
Moritz Schlick.3 In his Five Types of Ethical Theory, Broad writes: 
 
It seems to me that there is a quality, which we cannot define but are perfectly well 
acquainted with, which may be called “Hedonic Tone”. It has two determinate forms 
of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness… “A Pleasure” then is simply any mental event 
which has the pleasant form of hedonic tone, and “a pain” is simply any kind of 
mental event which has the unpleasant form of hedonic tone. There is not a special 
kind of mental events, called “pleasures and pains”; and to think that there is is as if 
one should solemnly divide human beings into men, women, and blondes. (Broad, 
1930, p. 229-30) 
 
According to Broad, pleasantness and unpleasantness are features of experience. 
Although they are not themselves sensations, they are particular features of sensations. 
Pleasantness, on Broad’s view, is a distinctive “tone” common to all pleasant experiences or 
feelings. Painfulness is its opposite. Broad claims that the feature or tone is indefinable, but 
that we are familiar enough with it to know what he’s talking about and to know when it’s 
there and when it’s not. He thinks that the non-hedonic features of the relevant mental event 
can play a role it its hedonic features. For example, the specific emotional character of 
remorse is sufficient to ensure that experiences of remorse are painful experiences. Similarly, 
the specific emotional character of hope is sufficient for the pleasantness of mental events 
characterized by hoping.4 Presumably, we are able to detect these forms of hedonic tone by 
introspection.  
                                                
3 See Broad and Schlick. G. E. Moore presents a theory of pleasure according to which it is a 
“certain definite feeling” in section 12 of Moore 1903. According to Broad and Schlick, 
pleasure is not itself a feeling, but is a feature of other feelings.  
4 Broad, p. 230. Broad doesn’t speculate about whether the sufficiency is necessary or merely 
contingent, or whether the necessity would have to be merely causal in nature, or if it could 
be logical in nature.  
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Broad claims that hedonic tone is normally taken to be a determinable property with 
two distinct determinate forms, just as being colored is a determinable property with a much 
wider variety of determinate forms—such as being red, or being blue, or being yellow. Broad 
wonders, without coming to a conclusion, whether “there may be several different 
determinate forms pleasantness and unpleasantness, just as there are several different shades 
of redness and several different shades of blueness”.5 
Finally, Broad claims that “it is logically impossible that an experience should have 
no characteristic except hedonic quality. It is as clear that no experience could be merely 
pleasant or painful as that nothing could be black or white without also having some shape 
and some size.”6 Without being too specific about which non-hedonic features he means, 
Broad’s point is that a mental event’s having some non-hedonic features is a necessary 
condition for the mental event’s having hedonic features.  
Moritz Schlick briefly presents a similar theory:  
 
Every idea, every content of our consciousness, as we learn from experience, 
possesses a certain tone. And this has the consequence that the content in question is 
not something completely neutral, or indifferent, but is somehow characterized as 
agreeable or disagreeable, attractive or repellant, joyful or painful, pleasant or 
unpleasant. …every experience has an emotional tone that is either pleasant or 
unpleasant… …the essence of these feelings is of course indescribable—every 
simple experience is beyond description—and one can only make clear what is meant 
by appropriate indications.  
 
Of course I have very different experiences when I stroke soft silk, when I attend a 
performance of Midsummer Night’s Dream, when I admire a heroic act, when the 
proximity of a beloved person makes me happy; but in a certain respect there is 
undoubtedly a similarity in the mental descriptions in all these cases, and we express 
                                                
5 Broad, p. 233. Broad raises the possibility that Mill might have had this type of view in 
mind when he claimed that pleasures differ in “quality” as well as intensity and duration. The 
idea would be that different “shades” of pleasure would have different intrinsic values, other 
things being equal. Broad doesn’t pursue this line of inquiry.  
6 Broad, p. 235.  
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this when we say that all of them have pleasant emotional tones, or that all of them 
are joyful.7  
 
 Schlick clearly has in mind a distinctive-feeling view. Like Broad, his idea is that 
pleasantness and painfulness are features of our experiences—“tones”—and are the features in 
virtue of which those experiences to count as pleasures and pains. He mentions several 
experiences, each of which is so different from the others that it is hard to see any 
similarities between them. But, according to Schlick, each of them is similar to all the others 
in just this way: each of them is pleasant.  
Schlick goes on to remark that “no definite emotional tone belongs to a specific 
experience as such; it depends on the whole situation, just as a white object can appear any 
color, depending on the lighting.”8 To take (a version of) his example, a violinist hitting a 
sour note may be painful or pleasant, depending on whether or not the violinist is 
performing one of Bach’s solo violin concertos at Carnegie hall, or merely missed the note 
for comedic effect. The specific hedonic tone had by a particular mental event can depend 
on extrinsic and relational features of the event.  
Karl Duncker also presents a hedonic tone theory of pleasure.9 Duncker claims that 
the feeling of pleasure is dependent upon and inseparable from the experience that is its 
source. It is impossible to consider the pleasure in isolation from the qualities of the 
experience.10 He goes on:  
 
Pleasure is an essentially incomplete experience. It exists only as a “side” or 
“property,” as an “abstract part” of a more comprehensive experience. It is 
                                                
7 Schlick, pp. 37-8. 
8 Schlick, p. 38.  
9 Duncker, pp. 398-412.  
10 Duncker, p. 399. 
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pleasantness of something, more precisely: a tone of pleasantness or hedonic tone pervading an 
experience. The flavor of the wine is, as it were, “aglow with pleasantness.”11  
 
But the pleasantness is not an “attribute” of the experience in the way that its 
intensity, duration, and qualitative character are. Each of these attributes, unlike pleasure, is 
an essential constituent of the experience—to annihilate any of them would annihilate the 
experience.12 The hedonic tone is a subjective, inessential, perhaps relational, feature of the 
experience. He goes on: “…the pleasantness of an experience does not indicate a feature of 
the external object, but a way in which it affects me, i.e., a way I “feel.” In other words: 
pleasure is a feeling tone.”13 But, “although it pervades, or issues from, this or that experience, 
it also seems, in a singular fashion, to extend to and to affect the very center of the field of 
experience, the self.”14  
Duncker’s idea seems to be that although pleasant hedonic tone (and presumably 
painful hedonic tone, as well) is inessential to the experience that has it and does not 
represent any intrinsic features of the object of the experience, the hedonic tone pervades, 
saturates, and suffuses the experience. The experience is “tinged” with emotion. Like 
Schlick, Duncker notes that either type of hedonic tone may be possessed by any type of 
experience.15  
Duncker goes on to say that 
 
…the feeling-tone of pleasantness shares the quality, depth, and dignity of its 
immediate objective correlate. Being merely the tone of something, it has no 
properties of its own aside from its “algedonic” character and its intensity ranging 
from extreme pleasantness through indifference to extreme unpleasantness. The 
degrees of intensity are often more accurately described as degrees of saturation (of 
                                                
11 Duncker, pp. 399-400. 
12 Duncker, p. 400.  
13 Duncker, P. 400. 
14 Duncker, p. 400.  
15 Duncker, p. 401.  
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an experience with pleasantness) that are characteristic of the experience in 
question.16 
 
Again, Duncker claims that pleasure and pain are merely “tones” or inessential features of 
other, more complete experiences, and are not experiences in and of themselves. They may, 
however, saturate and pervade the experiences that have them.  
We may now state the hedonic tone theory, based on the remarks of Broad, Schlick, 
and Duncker:  
 
1) A mental event, e, is a pleasure (or “is pleasant”) iff e has or instantiates the 
pleasant determinate form of hedonic tone. 
 
2) A mental event, e, is a pain (or “is painful”) iff e has or instantiates the unpleasant 
determinate form of hedonic tone.  
 
3) F is the pleasant form of hedonic tone iff: 
 
a) F is a feature of mental events such as experience, emotion, or desire. 
b) For any mental event, e, if e has F, then e also has some other features G1 – 
Gn, such that none of the Gs are hedonic in nature. 
c) For any mental event, e, if e has F, then there is some degree to which e is 
“saturated” with F-ness; F-ness comes in degrees of intensity.17  
                                                
16 Duncker, p. 408. 
17 Following Duncker, the “saturation” clause and the “intensity” clause of (3c) are meant to 
be equivalent.  
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d) For any mental event, e1, if e1 has F, then it is possible that there exists some 
other mental event, e2, such that e1 and e2 are qualitatively identical and it is 
not the case that e2 has F.  
e) F is the determinate form of hedonic tone that is the opposite of the painful 
form of hedonic tone (i.e. painfulness). 
f) For any pleasant mental event, e, F is the specific feature of e in virtue of 
which e is pleasant.  
g) The above list exhausts the features of F.  
 
4) F is the painful form of hedonic tone iff 
 
a) F is a feature of mental events such as experience, emotion, or desire. 
b) For any mental event, e, if e has F, then e also has some other features G1 – 
Gn, such that none of the Gs are hedonic in nature. 
c) For any mental event, e, if e has F, then there is some degree to which e is 
“saturated” with F-ness; F-ness comes in degrees of intensity.18  
d) For any mental event, e1, if e1 has F, then it is possible that there exists some 
other mental event, e2, such that e1 and e2 are qualitatively identical and it is 
not the case that e2 has F.  
e) F is the determinate form of hedonic tone that is the opposite of the pleasant 
form of hedonic tone (i.e. pleasantness). 
f) For any painful mental event, e, F is the specific feature of e in virtue of 
which e is painful.  
                                                
18 Following Duncker, the “saturation” clause and the “intensity” clause of (3c) are meant to 
be equivalent.  
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g) The above list exhausts the features of F.  
 
5) x is an episode of pleasure =df x is an event consisting of some subject S 
experiencing a sensation that has or instantiates the pleasant form of hedonic tone. 
 
6) x is an episode of pain =df x is an event consisting of some subject S experiencing 
a sensation that has or instantiates the pleasant form of hedonic tone. 
 
7) x is more pleasant than y at t iff the pleasant form of the hedonic tone of x is 
more intense or is saturated to a greater degree than the hedonic tone of y at t. 
 
8) x is more painful than y at t iff the painful form of the hedonic tone of x is more 
intense or is saturated to a greater degree than the hedonic tone of y at t. 
 
The “hedonic tone” theory of pleasure (HTTP) is the theory that has (1), (2), (3), (4), 
(5), (6), (7), and (8) as its components. According to the HTTP, pleasures—that is, things 
that are genuinely pleasant in themselves, or are intrinsically pleasant—are sensations. 
Someone is experiencing pleasure at a time if and only if he is having a pleasant sensation at 
that time. One sensation is more pleasant than another at a time if and only if its hedonic 
tone is more intense than that of the other at that time, or, if you prefer, if and only if it is 
saturated to a greater degree with the pleasant form of the hedonic tone than its competitor 
at that time.  
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3. Problems for the Hedonic Tone Theory 
Several apparently decisive arguments against HTTP have been discussed in the 
literature. The current consensus is that the HTTP is hopelessly misguided and wrong. The 
first objection concerns the implausibility of there being a single, unified hedonic type of 
experience. The second concerns the implausibility of hedonic phenomena being exclusively 
sensory in nature. Another, less pressing objection concerns the fact that pleasure and pain 
are opposites, a fact which the HTTP leaves unexplained. 
3.1. Heterogeneity 
Henry Sidgwick was among the earliest critics of the HTTP.19 His criticism is simple, 
devastating, and has been endorsed by many of the philosophers who have been interested 
in the nature of pleasure since his time.20 Sometimes called the “heterogeneity problem,” it 
says that there is no single feature possessed by all pleasant mental events. Some pairs of 
pleasures are so dissimilar to one another that there are no features that they share. Ipso facto, 
there is no hedonic tone shared by all pleasant sensations. Similarly, there are some pairs of 
pains so dissimilar that they share no features. Sidgwick writes:  
 
…for my own part, when I reflect on the notion of pleasure,—using the term in the 
comprehensive sense which I have adopted, to include the most refined and subtle 
intellectual and emotional gratifications, no less than the coarser and more definite 
sensual enjoyments,—the only common quality that I can find in the feelings so 
designated seems to be that relation to desire and volition expressed by the general 
term “desirable” in the sense previously explained.21  
 
For example, as I write this, I am drinking a cup of strong, hot coffee. I am also sitting in the 
air stream of my electric fan. The coffee is producing a warm, bold and assertive, slightly 
                                                
19 Sidgwick 1907, pp. 125-31. 
20 See, for example, Brandt, Heathwood, Feldman 2004, and Perry. 
21 Sidgwick 1907, p. 127.  
19 
bitter, full-bodied sensation (or set of sensations). The stream of air from the fan, on the 
other hand, is creating a cool, refreshing, breezy sensation (or set of sensations). Both 
sensations are remarkably pleasant. Sidgwick’s claim is that this pair of sensations are so 
different from one another that they share no features in common, qualitative or otherwise. 
There’s no detectable-yet-indefinable hedonic tone shared by the feelings. Or compare the 
olfactory sensations involved in the way coffee smells to the auditory sensations involved in 
listening to Muddy Waters play the guitar. Or compare the tactile sensations involved with 
petting a soft, purring kitten to the enjoyment of finishing a satisfying novel. Or compare the 
pleasure of winning a big hand at the poker table with the pleasure of being startled, scared, 
or horrified by a scary movie. Each of these sources of pleasure is so different from its 
counterpart (indeed, from any of the others mentioned) as to cast doubt on the hedonic tone 
theory of pleasure.  
The heterogeneity objection is suggested by Fred Feldman in the following passages:  
 
One thing to notice about pleasure is its apparent heterogeneity. The man on the 
beach enjoys some pleasurable smells as well as some pleasurable feelings of warmth. 
Each of these sensations is pleasant, pleasurable, ‘pleasure-giving’… Nevertheless, 
from the strictly phenomenological perspective, they seem to have very little in 
common. One is an olfactory sensation—it is the smell of fresh, salty air. The other 
is an all-over bodily feeling of warmth. Aside from the fact that they are experience 
simultaneously and by the same person in the example, they seem to be utterly 
unalike.22  
 
It must be admitted that the [hedonic tone] view is suggested by a number of 
ordinary language expressions… [but] …the [hedonic tone] view is not popular. The 
central difficult is straightforwardly phenomenological. The alleged sensation of 
pleasure itself has proven extremely elusive. No matter how carefully they scrutinize 
their feelings, phenomenological researchers fail to locate the indefinable feeling 
[supporters of the view] attempted to indicate.23 
 
                                                
22 Feldman 1988, p. 83.  
23 Feldman 1988, p. 87. Feldman is concerned in these passages with the particular version of 
the “distinctive feeling view” formulated and endorsed by G. E. Moore.  
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When we look for the relevant pleasant feeling-tone, we do not seem to find it. It 
does not seem to be there. If I feel some sensation and know that I find it to be pleasant, it 
is hard to understand why I would have trouble attending to the feeling-tone with which its 
pleasantness is supposed to be identified. If the pleasantness of some sensation just is its 
pleasant feeling-tone, then we should be able to identify this feeling tone whenever we are 
experiencing something pleasant.24 If clauses (1) through (4) of the HTTP were true, then 
there would be some feature that all pleasures share in common. But none of the pleasures 
mentioned seems to have any sensory quality, or “tone,” in common with any of the others. 
This objection seems to be fatal to the hedonic tone theory of pleasure.  
3.2. Non-Sensory Pleasures 
Another problem for the hedonic tone theory is that there exist pleasures that are 
non-sensory in nature. This problem was suggested by a type of example that arose in the 
discussion of the heterogeneity phenomenon: the enjoyment of finishing a satisfying novel; 
the pleasure of winning a big hand at the poker table; the amusement that accompanies a 
good scare at a horror film. Each of these examples involves pleasure or enjoyment, but 
none of them seem to involve pleasant sensations, per se. The pleasures involved with finishing a 
good novel seem to be related to the contemplation of certain propositions or states of 
affairs suggested by the text of the novel. Though there are certain sensations involved—the 
way the letters look on the page; their shapes; the whiteness of the paper; the blackness of 
the ink—the sensations are not particularly pleasant in themselves. It is the contemplation of 
the propositions that the letters collectively express that gives rise to the pleasure and 
enjoyment.  
                                                
24 Pains are similarly heterogeneous.  
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Similarly, the pleasure of winning at the poker table does not seem to be sensory in 
nature. The player is pleased that he won, but it’s not as though there is some pleasant 
sensation that is involved with winning. He might even say that it “feels good” to win, but it 
seems clear that this is not meant to be taken as talk about actual sensory feelings.  
A final example concerns a scientist working on a “sensation anesthetic.” The drug, 
if it works, will deprive the recipient of all sensation—but it will not cause the recipient to go 
to sleep. The scientist administers the chemical to himself. It works; he has no sensations. 
He is immensely pleased: he’s made an outstanding contribution to medical science; he’s 
going to be rich; his in-laws will stop bothering him about his meager ability to support their 
daughter. In spite of the fact that he has no sensations whatsoever, he is experiencing a lot 
of pleasure. But suppose that the drug doesn’t wear off. In that case, he might start to 
experience displeasure. If the drug never wears off, he might start to experience outright 
pain.25 All this is compatible with his not experiencing any sensations of any kind.  
If any of these examples correctly describes a possible situation, then at least some 
hedonic phenomena are not identical to sensory phenomena. And if that’s right, then there 
are two serious problems with the hedonic tone theory: that the existence of a distinctively 
pleasant feeling is dubious; and that some episodes of pleasure do not essentially involve any 
sensations whatsoever.26 I think that we can conclude that the hedonic tone theory is a dead-
end.  
 
                                                
25 I owe this example to Fred Feldman.  
26 Some philosophers have attempted to explain how non-sensory hedonic phenomena can 
be analyzed in terms of sensory hedonic phenomena. For a rich discussion of this move and 
why it fails, see Feldman 1997a, section 7.  
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3.3. Oppositeness 
The HTTP also leaves unexplained the fact that pleasure and pain are opposites. 
According to HTTP, pleasure and pain are types of sensation. But how could a pair of 
sensation types be opposites? Many pairs of sensations are quite different from one another 
without being opposite each other. But if HTTP is true, then at least some sensations are 
suitably opposite one another. But how could that be? What explains this fact? The 
phenomenon is left mysterious.27 
4. Desire-Based Theories of Pleasure 
Like many philosophers,28 Sidgwick responds to the heterogeneity objection by 
abandoning the hedonic tone theory. According to Sidgwick, the nature of pleasure is 
intimately connected to desire: 
 
Let, then, pleasure be defined as feeling which the sentient individual at the time of 
feeling it implicitly or explicitly apprehends to be desirable;—desirable, that is, when 
considered merely as feeling, and not in respect of its objective conditions or 
consequences, or of any facts that come directly within the cognizance and judgment 
of others besides the sentient individual.29  
 
                                                
27 For a slightly more developed discussion of this issue, see Heathwood 2007. For what it’s 
worth, I’m unconvinced that the oppositeness phenomenon represents a damaging objection 
to HTTP. Although Heathwood’s example (F# on a banjo and middle C on a piano) is 
clearly an example of sensation types that are not opposites, it seems to me that there are 
examples of sensation types that are. Harmony and dischord seem to be opposite sensation 
types, as do hot and cold. What explains the fact that these pairs are opposites? Presumably 
the case of hot and cold can be explained by appeal to physiology, though I am in no way 
qualified to suggest precisely what the explanation would be. The case of harmony and 
dischord is more mysterious. Though one sounds “good” and the other “bad,” it is not easy 
to why, on any deep level, this should be the case. Perhaps this mysteriousness should cause 
us to be suspicious of any claim that pairs of sensation types can be opposite one another.  
28 For example, see Brandt 1979, Carson 2000, Heathwood 2007, and Parfit 1984. 
29 Sidgwick 1907, p. 131.  
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Sidgwick seems to be expressing a view according to which for any sensory pleasure, it is a 
pleasure in virtue of its being “apprehended to be desirable in itself” apart from its 
consequences or extrinsic connections by the person who feels it. Its “objective conditions 
and consequences” are irrelevant, as are the opinions and judgments of persons other than 
the subject of the feeling. Whether or not the feeling of pleasure will lead to feelings of pain 
later is irrelevant, as are questions about what is causing the feeling, as well as questions 
about the larger context surrounding the sensation.  
So, if some sensation, f, felt by some person, S, is a sensory pleasure at time, t, then S 
desires at t to be feeling f at t because of the intrinsic nature of f, and not (just) because of 
any of the extrinsic features of f. It is possible that S could also desire f because of its 
extrinsic features, but that desire would not have anything to do with whether f is pleasant. 
And whether S desires at times other than t not to be feeling f at t has no effect on whether f 
is pleasant.  
Richard Brandt also gives an account of “intrinsic desires.” He claims that a desire 
for an object O is intrinsic at a time if and only if the agent’s central nervous system is such 
that if he were to judge that some alternative of his was more likely to bring about O than 
any of his other alternatives, then there would be an increase in the probability that the agent 
would perform that alternative—and this increase in probability is not related to other facts 
about O that are not “part of the concept” of O, such as its further effects.30 Couched in 
quasi-behaviorist terms, Brandt’s idea is that if the agent has an intrinsic desire, rather than 
an extrinsic one, then he is more likely to behave in ways that are likely to bring it about that 
O obtains, and this increase in probability is the result of how O is in itself, not because of 
its relations to other states of affairs.  
                                                
30 Brandt 1979, p. 32. I’ve removed references to ‘valences’ and other stylistic variations in 
the text.  
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Chris Heathwood gives a similar account. He writes that “you have an intrinsic desire 
for something [at a time] when you just want it—when there is no reason you can five for 
wanting it, no further thing you want that you think it will bring you, no end for which it is a 
means. You just want it—for its own sake.”31 To illustrate the point, he gives an example 
about a young man who wants to go into a bar. But he doesn’t want to go into the bar just 
for the sake of going into the bar. He wants to go into the bar so that he can order a beer. 
But he doesn’t want to order the beer just for the sake of ordering the beer, either. There’s 
something that he thinks ordering the beer will lead to, and that’s why he wants to order the 
beer. He wants to order the beer, that is, so that he can drink it. But he only wants to drink 
the beer so that he can taste the beer. So his desire to drink the beer is still not intrinsic. He 
wants to drink it so that he can taste the flavor of the beer. But this time his desire is 
intrinsic. There’s no further thing he wants such that tasting the flavor of the beer is a means 
to that end. (In particular, in this example, the young man is not after the feeling of 
drunkenness.) He wants to taste the beer for the sake of tasting the beer.32  
Based on these remarks, we can introduce a definition of ‘intrinsic desire’: 
 
S’s desire for x is intrinsic at t=df S desires x at t, and S’s desire for x at t depends on 
what x is like in itself, because of the intrinsic nature of x, and does not depend on 
any features extrinsic to x, nor on any of x’s merely relational features at t.  
 
S’s desire for x is extrinsic at t =df it is not the case that S’s desire for x is intrinsic at 
t.   
 
                                                
31 Heathwood 2007, p. 30. 
32 Heathwood 2007, p. 30. 
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Are some pleasures more intense than others? Although he clearly thinks that some 
pleasures are more or less intense than others, and that it is possible for one pleasure to be 
equal in intensity to another,33 Sidgwick does not directly discuss the nature of these intensity 
ratings. It is natural, given his approach, to suppose that the intensity of a pleasure or 
pleasant experience is determined by the strength of the relevant desire for the relevant 
experience. 34 
Like Sidgwick, Brandt takes pleasantness of an experience to be a matter of the 
subject’s desire for the experience. Brandt disagrees with Sidgwick about which is the 
relevant desire:  
 
… we have the following definition of ‘the experience E of the person P is pleasant 
for P at t’: ‘an experience of the kind E is going on in the person P at t; and the 
experience E is the differential cause at t of an increment in the positive valence of 
the continuation of E beyond t, or at the neonate level, of the occurrence of 
tendencies to act in a way likely to result in the continuation of E.’ In short, an 
experience is pleasant if and only if it makes its continuation more wanted. The 
transposition for being unpleasant will be obvious.35  
 
Brandt’s idea is that the pleasantness of an experience is analyzable in terms of the subject’s 
desire for the experience to continue.36 Brandt claims that something, O, is positively 
valenced for someone (that is, someone has an intrinsic desire for something) when his 
central motivational state is such that if he were to realize that behaving in a certain way 
                                                
33 Sidgwick 1907, p. 131. 
34 In a trilogy of articles, Wayne Davis takes a similar approach. In his 1981a, he claims that 
occurrent happiness at a time is a function of the subject’s belief that he is getting what he 
wants at that time. In 1981b and 1982, Davis identifies occurrent happiness with pleasure. 
Davis does not appear to have understood the importance of the restriction to intrinsic 
desires. Parfit takes a similar approach to pain which suffers from a similar problem. See 
Parfit 1984, pp. 493-4, and Feldman 1997a for criticism.  
35 Brandt 1979, pp. 40-1.  
36 Psychologist Daniel Kahneman endorses a similar picture in his 2003b. On page 6 he says, 
“When I say ‘pleasant,’ it doesn’t mean anything more than I would smell it more if I could.”  
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would bring it about that O, the probability of his so behaving is increased.37 This tendency 
to behave can be overridden, and must somehow be psychologically “lawlike”. He says that 
this positive valence involves a disposition to refrain from behavior that would extinguish 
the relevant experience, and to engage in behavior that would prolong it. These dispositions 
to prolong the experience must be caused by the experience itself. Saying that an experience 
is a differential cause of an increased valence means that it plus certain background 
conditions are sufficient for the increase in valence; it is not to say that the experience by 
itself is either necessary or sufficient.38 And according to Brandt, the intensity of the 
pleasantness of a pleasure to be a function of the intensity of the subject’s desire for the 
object of his pleasure.39 
Brandt also relies on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic desires. He is 
careful to stress the importance of the distinction between something being valenced “in 
itself” and being valenced because of its relationship to something else that is valenced in 
itself. His use of the expression ‘valence’ should be understood to indicate intrinsic desire 
unless otherwise noted. 
Based on the remarks of these philosophers, we can formulate the desire-based (or 
“motivational”) theory of pleasure in the following way:  
 
1) A person, S, experiences pleasure at t iff there is some experience, e, such that S is 
experiencing e at t, S believes himself to be experiencing e at t, and S intrinsically 
desires to be experiencing e at t. 
 
                                                
37 Brandt 1979, p. 26.  
38 Brandt 1979, p. 40 n.  
39 Brandt 1979, p 253.  
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2) A person, S, experiences pain at t iff there is some experience, e, such that S is 
experiencing e at t, S believes himself to be experiencing e at t, and S intrinsically 
desires not to be experiencing e at t..  
 
3) An experience, e, had by a person, S, is a pleasure (or is pleasant) at t iff S is 
experiencing e at t, S believes himself to be experiencing e at t, and S intrinsically 
desires to be experiencing e at t.  
 
4) An experience, e, had by a person, S, is a pain (or is painful, or unpleasant) at t iff 
S is experiencing e at t, S believes himself to be experiencing e at t, and S intrinsically 
desires not to be experiencing e at t.  
 
5) The intensity of the pleasantness of a pleasant experience, e, experienced by 
person S at t is a function of the intensity of S’s intrinsic desire to be experiencing e 
at t.  
 
6) The intensity of the painfulness of a painful or unpleasant experience, e, 
experienced by person S at t is a function of the intensity of S’s intrinsic desire not to 
be experiencing e at t.  
 
The desire theory of pleasure (DTP) is the theory that has (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) as its 
components. According to it, the things that are capable of being genuine pleasures or are 
capable of being intrinsically pleasant are “experiences.” A person is getting or undergoing 
pleasure at a time if and only if he has an intrinsic, de re desire to have a certain experience, 
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and believes that he is experiencing it, and he is actually experiencing it at that time. A 
pleasant experience is more pleasant than some other experience at a time if and only if its 
subject’s intrinsic desire for it is stronger or more intense than that of its competitor at that 
time.  
The DTP is clearly superior to the HTTP. It has the resources to solve both the 
heterogeneity problem and the problem of non-sensory pleasures. First, according to the 
DTP, there is no intrinsic, unifying feature shared by all sensory pleasures. Sensory pleasures 
are pleasant because they are desired by their subjects, not because of some indefinable 
“feeling-tone” they all share. Similarly, the possibility of non-sensory hedonic phenomena 
pose no special difficulty for the DTP. Although the theory concerns experiences as it is 
written, potentially any state of affairs, whether it consists of some person experiencing 
some sensation or not, could count as a pleasure (or as “pleasant,” or as an object of 
pleasure) as long as someone has an intrinsic, de re desire for it. The DTP also solves the 
oppositeness problem: the fact that pleasure and pain are opposites is explained by the fact 
that desire and aversion are opposites. Taking pleasure in a state of affairs is equivalent to 
having an intrinsic, de re desire for it to be true and believing that it is true; taking pain in a 
state of affairs is having an intrinsic de re desire for it to be false and believing that it is true. 
It is easy to see why the two desire-states are opposites. The fact that the hedonic states are 
opposites is explained in terms of the oppositeness of the relevant desire states.  
5. Problems for Desire Theories of Pleasure 
The DTP has had its detractors, however. I will survey some of the main problems 
for it that have been mentioned in the literature, as well as a new problem that seems to have 
gone unnoticed.  
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5.1. Undesired Pleasures 
One problem for DTP concerns the possibility of desired non-pleasures and 
undesired pleasures. Because DTP says that facts about pleasure and pain are fundamentally 
facts about desire and aversion, if DTP is true, then certain facts about what things are 
pleasant entail facts about what things are desired. If it could be shown that a person enjoys 
or takes pleasure in something without having a corresponding desire for it, there would be 
trouble for DTP. Several examples of this kind of hedonic phenomena are proposed by 
Feldman.40  
In Feldman’s first example, a scientist is researching feelings of dizziness. He spins 
himself around on purpose so as to induce the sensation of being dizzy. At first his desire to 
become dizzy and to experience the related sensations is merely extrinsic: he’s interested in 
them because of his research. Soon, however, he becomes interested in the sensations for 
themselves, for their own sake. He continues to cause himself to be dizzy long after his 
research project has concluded. He may not find the sensations to be particularly pleasant, 
though. He may not find them to be pleasant at all, even though he has an intrinsic desire to 
be having them at times when he does have them.  
Another example proposed by Feldman is about a devoted, fully indoctrinated 
ascetic.41 The ascetic is so thoroughly devoted to his asceticism that he is convinced that 
pleasure is worthless and has managed to divest himself of all desire for it. When he feels 
some pleasant sensation, he has an intrinsic desire not to be feeling it. That is, considered in 
itself, in isolation from its effects and causes and relationships to other objects, the ascetic is 
averse to the pleasant sensation. This is not merely a second-order desire about his first-
                                                
40 Feldman 1997a, p.  
41 Also, see Perry, p. 200.  
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order desire for the object of his pleasure; it is a first-order desire not to be feeling the 
sensation in which he takes pleasure. He desires (intrinsically and de re)42 not to be feeling the 
pleasant sensation. He has no desire for the sensation in itself. In spite of all this, it is 
pleasant.  
If either of these examples correctly describes a possible situation, then the DTP is 
in trouble. If the first example is possible, then it is possible to intrinsically desire a sensation 
when that sensation is not pleasant. And if the second example is possible, then it is possible 
to take pleasure in a sensation without any intrinsic, de re desire for it.  
Heathwood has proposed an answer to this type of objection to the DTP. 
Heathwood claims that the dizziness researcher would have to enjoy or like the sensation of 
dizziness in order to be willing to agree that he had an intrinsic desire for it. He puts the 
following words in the mouth of the researcher: 
 
I think I must say that I liked it. After all, I was in favor of it, I would give it a 
thumbs up, I was attracted to it. Does it make any sense to accept all of this but then 
to deny that I liked feeling the sensation (for its own sake)?... doesn’t that just mean 
the same as that I took pleasure in it?43  
 
Heathwood’s claim is that there is a “conceptual slide” (as he puts it) from desire to pleasure. 
That I have an intrinsic desire for a sensation entails that I am attracted to the sensation. 
That I am attracted to the sensation entails that I like it. That I like the sensation entails that 
I take pleasure in it. By a succession of hypothetical syllogisms, we get that the fact that I 
have an intrinsic desire for a sensation entails that I take pleasure in it.44 Therefore, the 
                                                
42 According to Heathwood 2007, it is important to include the “de re” clause because it is 
important that the subject desire the object of his pleasure in particular; it is not enough that 
I desire some sweet-flavor-sensation or other, I must desire the particular sensation I’m 
getting. See pp. 31 
43 Heathwood 2007, p. 35.  
44 Heathwood 2007, p. 35.  
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researcher’s sensation of dizziness is pleasant. There’s no reason why it couldn’t be pleasant, 
after all. There is a wide diversity from person to person concerning what sensation types are 
thought to be pleasant. For example, I do not like the taste of coconut. Many people seem to 
find this hard to believe. One colleague has suggested that I must not get the same sort of 
sensation he does when he eats coconut, otherwise I would like it. But this is an unnecessary 
inference. It’s equally possible that we get the identical sensation type, and that I just don’t 
enjoy it. Similarly, perhaps the researcher’s tastes are just as bizarre as mine.  Perhaps the 
researcher likes sensations that other people dislike, such as dizziness.   
However, it seems that Heathwood is overplaying his hand. Although the possibility 
that the researcher enjoys the sensation isn’t ruled out by anything Feldman says in his 
description of the story, but it certainly is not entailed by any details of the story, either. The 
researcher might like the dizziness sensations, sure. But he might also have an intrinsic desire 
without really liking it. Why should he have to like it? “Liking” something is not identical to 
or entailed by being attracted to it. A person could be attracted to something or someone 
without thereby liking it. Sometimes, for example, I get very tired when I should be working. 
I am attracted to a state of affairs that involves me sleeping for a few hours, but I don’t like 
that state of affairs.  I would much rather be working than napping, but I can’t help but be 
attracted to the state of affairs in which I nap.    
5.2. Are Pleasures Desired Because They Are Pleasant? 
Another problem for DTP is patterned after the Euthyphro problem for the divine 
command theory: just as Socrates asked Euthyphro whether an act is pious because it is 
loved by the Gods or loved by the Gods because it is pious, we might ask the friend of DTP 
whether e is pleasant because it is wanted, or is e wanted because it is pleasant. If for any 
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pleasant experience e, e is desired in virtue of its pleasantness, then it can’t be the case that e 
is pleasant in virtue of its being desired. Such a circularity would be fatal to the DTP.  
Heathwood attempts to respond to this objection by pointing out an ambiguity in 
the way the objection was expressed. His claim is that e is pleasant because it is desired, 
because that’s what the theory reveals about the nature of pleasure. And he claims that in 
many cases e is desired because it is pleasant, because it is desired “in advance” because its 
subject knows that he will desire it when he is experiencing it, and this concurrent, de re 
desire for e is what makes e a pleasure, not the other way around. This second sort of desire, 
however, is inessential. Some pleasures are desired in this way, but others are not. It is a 
merely contingent feature of any pleasure that has it.  
Heathwood acknowledges that this seems less plausible than the alternative, 
according to which we desire pleasure because it is pleasant, but argues that the theoretical 
utility of the DTP mitigates the implausibility.  This does not seem to me to be the case.  
Particularly in light of the plausibility the DTPs main alternative—the attitudinal view, which 
we will discuss shortly—this reply to the Euthyphro-type objection seems to be inadequate.   
5.3. A Problem Concerning Intrinsic Desires 
Finally, there is a problem for DTP that concerns the existence of the correct 
intrinsic desires at the right times. The reason is that the friend of DTP is committed to an 
incorrect taxonomy of the desires associated with hedonic phenomena. The friend of DTP 
has noticed that many of our actual, immediate desires are extrinsic in nature: we only desire 
this because we need it to get that, and that’s what we really want. But although many of our 
actual, all-things-considered desires are undergirded in a straightforward way by a set of 
intrinsic desires, many of our intrinsic desires are not actual and many do not support our 
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actual desires in any straightforward way. Some of our intrinsic desires are merely 
counterfactual in nature, so a person may have an intrinsic desire for a state of affairs 
without having any actual desire for that state of affairs. It’s not just that the intrinsic desire 
is present but overridden by a competing desire, rather, the intrinsic desire is not present. If 
things were different, perhaps it would be, but they’re not. There may be no particularly 
close possible world in which the agent has the relevant intrinsic desire.  
The following example illustrates the point: on Christmas day I was having a big 
dinner with my family. I was eating the green bean casserole that my mom always makes. It’s 
very good. I was really enjoying myself. My desire to be eating the casserole during the 
casserole-eating period was quite strong; by anyone’s lights, my pleasure was quite intense. 
Then my mom brought out the cornbread stuffing I learned how to make from my wife’s 
grandmother, who is from Manning, South Carolina, where they know how to make good 
stuffing. I like the flavor of that stuffing even more than I like the flavor of the green bean 
casserole. Though I continued to enjoy the flavor of that last bite of casserole, my desire for 
my the then-current experience fell to zero, as did my desire to continue it, and my desire to 
interrupt the experience in favor of another became quite strong. It is not that I stopped 
enjoying my food and started feeling displeasure or pain; rather, there was simply something 
else I knew I would enjoy more. And that is compatible with continuing to enjoy myself.  
At this point, the friend of the DTP might attempt to exploit the distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic desires. He might reply that his theory doesn’t have the consequence 
that my enjoyment stopped as soon as the stuffing emerged from the kitchen because my 
desire to discontinue the casserole experience was merely extrinsic, and according to clause 
(1) of the DTP, the pleasantness of an experience depends on the subject’s intrinsic desires 
concerning it. He could ask me a series of questions designed to elicit my intrinsic desires at 
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the appropriate moment (call it time t): considered in isolation, apart from its contingent 
features, its causes and effects, and other extraneous facts, do you want to keep experiencing 
your current experiences? And since my desire to discontinue the casserole-related 
experience was caused by the fact that there was some other experience for which I had a 
stronger desire, I would have to answer that the desire to discontinue the casserole-related 
experience at t was not intrinsic. According to the friend of DTP, my intrinsic desire 
concerning the casserole-related experience at t was for it to continue. He might ask me to 
notice that I do not abruptly spit the casserole out. That fact is evidence that, on some basic 
level, I desire the casserole-related experience.45  
I argue that this type of reply will not work. The way I describe the case entails that I 
have two desires at t: 1. a desire for a cornbread-stuffing-related experience; and 2. a desire 
to not to continue a green-bean-casserole-related experience. Desire (1) is intrinsic; desire (2) 
is merely extrinsic. Desire (1) is intrinsic because my desire for the stuffing-related 
experience is based on its intrinsic character, and is not based on any extrinsic factors. Desire 
(2) is extrinsic because I only desire to discontinue the green-bean-casserole-related 
experiences because I know that there is an alternative that I prefer, which explains why I 
still enjoy the experiences associated with my last bite of green bean casserole. The friend of 
the DTP claims that at t I still have an intrinsic desire for the casserole-related experience, 
and that’s why I continue to enjoy it at t. I have no all-things-considered desire for the 
casserole-related experience at t. But that’s not all: I don’t think that I have any desire at all for 
the casserole-related experience. Though my desire to discontinue it is extrinsic, it is also 
complete. It does not merely “cover up” my desire for the experience, it replaces it. So, 
although I like the casserole-related experiences at t, I do not desire them at t. I’m not averse to 
                                                
45 For ease of exposition, I have couched the reply in the terms of the Brandtian DTP. The 
reply is available to the Sidgwickian, and can easily be restated in those terms.  
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the casserole-related experience, so I don’t spit the casserole out,46 but I attempt to finish as 
quickly as possible.  I’m not tempted to take another bite of the casserole. All I want is to 
start eating the stuffing.   
If, at t, you were to ask me a series of questions designed to elicit my intrinsic 
desires, I'd answer in the way described by the friend of the DTP. But I don't think that the 
truth of this answer has any implications for my actual desires. That is, the fact that at t, if 
some special counterfactual conditions were satisfied, I would have some desire for some 
casserole has no implications for my actual desires. Given this “intrinsic desire,” I might 
have an actual desire for the casserole, but I might not. I might be averse to the casserole. So 
if DTP is true, then my enjoyment of the casserole necessarily depends on my intrinsic desire 
for the associated experiences. I would have such a desire if certain conditions were met, but 
those conditions are not satisfied, and I have no such desire.  
It seems to me that the concept of "intrinsic desires" is somewhat tricky—trickier 
than the friends of DTP seem to have acknowledged. If DTP is true, then the underlying 
system of desires on which hedonic phenomena are based would have to be more 
complicated than its advocates appear to have spelled out in detail, and are essentially 
counterfactual in nature. A person may “have” an intrinsic desire without having any 
corresponding actual desire. Whether I am undergoing pleasure in this world, then, depends 
on what intrinsic desires I have at some other, non-actual world. I think that this has 
implications for the plausibility of the view, especially in relation to its main competitor—the 
attitudinal view. I discuss this theory in the following section.  
                                                
46 Besides, spitting the casserole out would be deeply insulting to my mother, who has been 
serving that casserole for thirty-five years.   
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6. The Propositional Attitude View 
In The Concept of Pleasure, David Perry attempts to state and to argue for a theory 
according to which a set of propositional attitudes are at the heart of hedonic phenomena. 
He begins his project by distinguishing enjoyment from being pleased.47 Perry states his account 
of enjoyment as follows:  
 
S enjoys x at t =df S bears an intrinsic, non-evaluative, non-desiring or striving, pro-
attitude toward x, and x is something S does, undergoes, or experiences at t, or is 
intimately connected with something that S does, undergoes, or experiences at t.48  
 
Enjoyment, according to Perry, is an intrinsic pro-attitude. A person enjoys something for 
what it is in itself, not for its effects or other contingent connections. It is not a desire, and 
does not involve “striving” or “attempting to acquire” in any essential way. It is non-
evaluative because it is compatible with positive, negative, or neutral evaluations, and does 
not entail any particular evaluation. For example, I can enjoy a cheesy B-movie without 
thinking that the movie is good—I can enjoy it without thinking that the world is better with 
the movie in it, or that watching it has increased my welfare, or that it has increased anyone’s 
welfare, or that it ought to have been made. Similarly, I can enjoy the misfortunes of others 
while thinking that their misfortunes are bad. It is a synchronous relation; a person can’t 
enjoy an activity after it is over (one is restricted to enjoying the memory of the activity). The 
subject must also be aware of what you’re enjoying.49  
Perry’s account of being pleased is as follows: 
                                                
47 Perry, p. 192. 
48 Perry, p. 214. 
49 Perry, p. 215. 
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S is pleased about x at t =df S bears a non-desiring or striving, positively evaluative 
pro attitude toward x at t, and x is a matter of S’s recent knowledge or belief at t, and 
x is of personal interest to S at t.50  
 
Though S might have a desire for x in addition to being pleased about it, to be pleased is not 
in itself to have a desire. Being pleased is evaluative, unlike enjoyment. If S is pleased about 
x, then S must be favorably disposed to x, “not as the lesser of two evils, but as a positive 
good.”51 The state of affairs does not have to be actual or true, but it does have to be 
something that S knows or believes. Perry’s remarks leave it unclear what the ontological 
category of the objects of pleasure is supposed to be. The best candidate category is 
probably that of states of affairs. Perry also does not directly address the topic of pain. He 
presumably intends his remarks to imply that pain is also a propositional attitude and is 
opposed to pleasure in the appropriate way. Perhaps he would claim that there are both 
evaluative and non-evaluative painful attitudes.  
Feldman has also proposed an attitude-based theory of the nature of pleasure. 
According to Feldman, like Perry, there is no distinct feeling of pleasure, nor can the full 
range of hedonic phenomena be explained in terms of desire. Unlike Perry, however, 
Feldman does not see a reason to distinguish sharply between the attitudes of enjoyment and 
being pleased. In one example, Feldman asks us to suppose that he is reading an insightful 
philosophy paper:  
 
Suppose I find the paper to be enlightening and entertaining. In such a case, it 
makes sense to say that I am enjoying various facts about the paper. More 
ponderously, we might say that as I read the paper, I take attitudinal pleasure in 
the fact that the paper is so well written, or in the fact that it is filled with such 
                                                
50 Perry, p. 216. 
51 Perry, p. 219. 
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interesting arguments and insights. Perhaps I take pleasure in the fact that the 
examples are so apt. To enjoy some state of affairs is to take attitudinal 
pleasure in this way in it.52  
 
Attitudinal pleasure is, then, a propositional attitude. It is a relation of enjoyment that holds 
between a person (whom we’ll call the “agent”) and a state of affairs (which we’ll call the 
“object”). Instances of this relation have intensity and duration. The object may or may not 
actually obtain. A person who mistakenly thinks she has won an election could enjoy the fact 
that she won, even though she hasn’t really won.53  
Echoing Ryle and Williams, who argue that pleasure or enjoyment is a way of being 
aware of something,54 Feldman goes on to say that  
 
Attitudinal pleasure is a mode of consciousness. It is a way of being aware of a state 
of affairs. It takes its place among such attitudes as hope and fear, belief and doubt, 
and recollection and anticipation. In order to take up any of these attitudes toward 
some state of affairs, one must be able to conceive that state of affairs. This is not to 
suggest that one must be able to express the state in words – even an inarticulate 
person can hope for a drink of water, or fear that there might be something under 
the bed. As I see it, it does not take tremendous intellectual sophistication to have 
such attitudes. By the wagging of her little tail, my dog Pippin indicates that she takes 
pleasure in the fact that we are about to take a ride in the truck.55 
 
In Pleasure and the Good Life, Feldman says more: 
 
A person takes attitudinal pleasure in some state of affairs if he enjoys it, is pleased 
about it, is glad that it is happening, is delighted by it…. Attitudinal pleasures are 
always directed onto objects, just as beliefs and hopes and fears are directed onto 
objects. This is one respect in which they are different from sensory pleasures. 
Another difference is that attitudinal pleasures need not have any “feel”. We know 
we have them not by the sensation, but in the same way (whatever that may be) that 
we know when we believe something or hope for it, or fear that it might happen.56  
 
                                                
52 Feldman 2002, p. 607. 
53 Feldman 2002, p. 608. See Chisholm.  
54 See Ryle, and Williams.  
55 Feldman 2002, p. 607. 
56 Feldman 2004, p. 56.  
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Feldman’s claim is that pleasure is a particular type of propositional attitude, of a kind with, 
but distinct from, belief, hope, fear, and desire. Unlike Perry, Feldman claims that there is 
just one relevant attitude. Though there are many names for it, enjoyment, being glad about, 
taking pleasure, being pleased, etc, all name the same attitude according to Feldman.57 Although 
Feldman also does not directly address the topic of pain, he claims in a footnote that pain is 
also a propositional attitude, and that whatever he says about pleasure applies, mutatis 
mutandis, to pain.58  
 Christine Korsgaard endorses an attitudinal theory of pain, according to which the 
horribleness of apparently intrinsically horrible sensations is actually a function of our 
attitudes toward them. She writes,  
 
You may want to ask: why are we inclined to fight [painful sensations] if they are not 
horrible in themselves? In some cases we are biologically wired this way; pain could 
not do its biological job if we are not inclined to fight it. When nature equipped us 
with pain she was giving us a way of taking care of ourselves, not a reason to take care 
of ourselves… Pain really is less horrible if you can curb your inclination to fight it. 
This is why it helps, in dealing with pain, to take a tranquilizer or to lie down. Ask 
yourself how, if the painfulness of pain rested just in the character of the sensations, 
it could help to lie down? The sensations do not change. Pain wouldn’t hurt if you 
could just relax and enjoy it. 
 
If the painfulness of pain rested in the character of the sensations rather than in our 
tendency to revolt against them, our belief that physical pain had something in 
common with grief, rage, and disappointment would be inexplicable. For that matter, 
what physical pains have in common with each other would be inexplicable, for the 
sensations are of many different kinds. What do nausea, migraine, menstrual cramps, 
pinpricks, and pinches have in common, that makes us call them all pains? (Don’t say 
they’re all horrible; that’s just repeating yourself.) What emotional pains have in 
common with physical ones is that in these cases too we are in the grip of an 
                                                
57 Perhaps some of these words require special conditions to be met in order for it to be 
appropriate to use it. For example, perhaps ‘enjoyment’ is only appropriate if the subject of 
the pleasure is sufficiently involved in the object of the pleasure, and the object of the 
pleasure is occurring at the same time as the attitude. That is, you can’t enjoy something that 
you’re not directly acquainted with, and you can’t enjoy something if it’s not going on as 
you’re enjoying it. Merely “taking pleasure” does not have either of these restrictions. But 
these conditions do not affect the fact that the basic attitude is the same in both cases.  
58 Feldman 2004, p. 55.  
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overwhelming urge to do battle, not now against our sensations, but against the 
world.59 
 
 
Drawing from the remarks of Perry, Feldman, and Korsgaard, we might formulate 
the attitudinal theory of pleasure (ATP) as follows: 
 
1) A person, S, takes pleasure in P at t iff P is a proposition such that S bears the 
attitude of enjoyment (or, “taking pleasure in”) toward P at t. 
 
2) A person, S, takes pain in P at t iff P is a proposition such that S bears the attitude 
of pain (or, “taking displeasure in”) toward P at t. 
 
3) An experience, e, had by a person, S, is a pleasure (or is pleasant) at t iff S is 
experiencing e at t and S takes intrinsic attitudinal pleasure in the proposition that he 
is experiencing e at t.  
 
4) An experience, e, had by a person, S, is a pain (or is painful, or unpleasant) at t iff 
S is experiencing e at t, and S takes intrinsic attitudinal pain in the proposition that he 
experiencing e at t.  
 
5) The intensity of the pleasantness of a pleasant experience, e, experienced by 
person S at t is a function of the intensity of S’s intrinsic attitudinal pleasure in P at t.  
 
                                                
59 Korsgaard 1996, pp. 147 – 148.  
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6) The intensity of the painfulness of a painful or unpleasant experience, e, 
experienced by person S at t is a function of the intensity of S’s intrinsic desire not to 
be experiencing e at t.  
 
ATP is the theory that has items (1) through (6) as its components. According to it, the 
things that are capable of being pleasant in themselves are states of affairs. Some state of 
affairs is pleasant at a time if and only if some person bears the propositional attitude of 
enjoyment toward it at the time. A person is getting pleasure at a time if and only if he bears 
the attitude of enjoyment toward some state of affairs at that time. One pleasure is more 
pleasant than another at a time if and only if its subject’s attitude of enjoyment is more 
intense or longer lasting than that of its competitor at that time.  
ATP is not vulnerable to the heterogeneity problem. Although hedonic phenomena 
are fundamentally a matter of just a few propositional attitudes, the objects of those attitudes 
may be as varied as you wish. You might take pleasure in the sounds of a Bob Dylan record. 
Or you may take pleasure in the smells of a tulip farm. Or you take pleasure in the sensations 
of drunkenness. Or you may take pain in any of these phenomena. One’s capacity for 
pleasure and pain are limited only by one’s capacity to be aware of or consider propositions. 
ATP is also not vulnerable to the problem of non-sensory pleasures. Although 
propositions that involve the relevant person experiencing some sensation at a time are often 
the objects of the attitude of enjoyment, they are far from the only ones. ATP is therefore 
compatible with the anesthesiologist taking pleasure in the fact that his anesthetic works, and 
then pain in the fact that it will not wear off. Again, one’s capacity for pleasure and pain are 
limited only by one’s capacity to consider or be aware of propositions. 
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ATP is also not vulnerable to the problems of undesired pleasures and of desired 
non-pleasures. Because ATP says that pleasure and desire are distinct attitudes that are not 
closely related, the theory is compatible with the dizziness researcher desiring the dizziness 
sensations without enjoying them; it is also compatible with the ascetic taking pain in his 
sensory pleasures: whenever the ascetic experiences a sensation that he enjoys, he takes pain 
in the fact that he is enjoying that sensation.  
Finally, ATP is not vulnerable to the objection based on the case of the 
Thanksgiving dinner. Because there is no close conceptual relationship between pleasure and 
desire, I can continue to enjoy the casserole-related sensations even after I cease to desire 
those sensations. According to ATP, the attitudes relevant to my enjoyment of the casserole-
related experiences are intrinsic, but are not counterfactual. The relevant attitudes are my 
actual attitudes of pleasure and pain. I may or may not have any actual or counterfactual 
intrinsic or extrinsic desires for the experiences.  
7. Problems for the Propositional Attitude View 
ATP is vulnerable to the oppositeness problem. According to ATP, the fact that 
pleasure and pain are opposites is explained by the fact that there are two relevant hedonic 
attitudes, taking pleasure and taking pain. The fact that taking pleasure and taking pain are 
opposites is not explained by the theory. It’s part of the theory’s conceptual bedrock. One 
could claim that taking pain in a proposition is somehow related to taking pleasure in its 
negation. I’m not sure how this would work, because, at least in a central range of cases, 
taking either hedonic attitude in some state of affairs involves believing that the state of 
affairs is true. This isn’t always the case. For example, I can take pleasure in the fact that 
Cool Hand Luke managed to eat all fifty eggs in the allotted time without believing that any 
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such thing ever happened. However, this is not a significant criticism. I am inclined to 
suspect that, all things considered, the attitudinal view is the strongest of the three main 
theories of pleasure and pain, and it what follows, I will largely presuppose it. However, 
nothing I say will hinge on any of the details of the attitudinal view, and so neither will my 
conclusions regarding the quantitative nature of pleasure and pain. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE METAPHYSICS OF QUANTITY AND COMPARISON 
 
1. Introductory Remarks; Examples of Quantitative Phenomena 
 
The following list is an example of what has been called “nominal” measurement:  
 
46: Ellsbury.  
15: Pedroia.  
34: Ortiz.  
24: Ramírez.  
25: Lowell  
7: Drew.  
20: Youkilis.  
33: Varitek.  
23: Lugo.  
 
In this example, the numbers are being used as identifying marks—the actual 
numerical value of each number is irrelevant for this purpose. Their order does not matter. 
Intervals are irrelevant—the distances between the numbers does not matter. The ratios 
between the numbers do not matter. The numbers here function in much the same way 
names do, which is why it is called a “nominal” scale. Other nominal-type scales include the 
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assignment of numbers to individuals based on their political or religious affiliation, or 
marital status, etc. This type of scale measures equality and difference—items receive the 
same number if they are the same with respect to the relevant property and receive different 
numbers if they are different. In the above example, a player receives number 46 if and only 
if he is Ellsbury. On another scale, a person might receive the number 1 if he is married, 2 if 
divorced, 3 if widowed, and so on.  
The following two lists are examples of “ordinal” measurement:  
 
2: Gypsum.  
3: Calcite.  
7: Quartz.  
8: Topaz. 
 
*** 
 
1: Alberto Contador.  
2: Cadel Evans.  
3: Levi Leipheimer.  
4: Carlos Sastre.  
5: Haimar Zubeldia.  
6: Alejandro Valverde. 
 
The first example consists of minerals according to their rank on the Mohs hardness scale. 
This scale ranks minerals in order of hardness, as determined by which mineral can scratch 
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the other: if A scratches B, then A > B on the scale. The second example consists of (the 
first several entries in) the overall final results of the 2007 Tour de France. This list ranks 
cyclists in order of their adjusted total accumulated time from least to greatest. If A had 
more adjusted total accumulated time than B, then A > B.  
In these examples, the numbers are being used to express the order of the objects 
listed, with respect to some way of ranking them. In particular, nothing can be inferred from 
the “distances” between the numbers. The difference in hardness between quartz and topaz 
is much greater than that between gypsum and calcite, though the Mohs scale does not 
represent these facts. For all the information contained in the results as expressed above, the 
difference in adjusted accumulated time between first-place Contador and second-place 
Evans might be mere seconds, or hours. This ordering does entail that there is no person 
with an adjusted accumulated time between Contador and Evans. However, this is 
inessential; the Mohs scale does not share this feature. There might well be minerals in 
between e.g. gypsum and calcite with respect to hardness. The essential feature of the ordinal 
scale is that it ranks the relevant items in the relevant order. We could express the results of 
the Tour de France just as well substituting [4; 4.45; 5.1; 6; 271; 1,000] for [1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6], 
since the new numbers preserve the order.  
The following list is an example of “interval” measurement:  
 
0: the temperature at which water freezes at sea level.  
36: the temperature of a normal, healthy, living human body.  
39: the temperature of the body of a normal, healthy, living house cat.  
100: the temperature at which water boils at sea level.  
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These numbers are on the Celsius scale of temperature, according to which A > B if and 
only if A has a higher temperature than B. This way of ranking temperatures—assigning 
numbers to them—makes use not only of the ordinal properties of the numbers, but also of 
the relative distances between them. That is, these numbers are to be thought of not just of 
spots on an order, but as endpoints of intervals. The temperature of the body of a house cat 
is three intervals higher than that of a human body; the boiling temperature of water is 64 
intervals above that of a human body. The distance of each interval is constant up and down 
the scale. On this type of scale, the size of the unit and the location of the zero point are 
arbitrary, as is evidenced by the fact that the Fahrenheit scale conveys the same information 
equally well with a smaller unit and a different zero point.  
Finally, the following list is an example of “ratio” measurement:  
 
1: a paperclip.  
5: an 8-by-10 sheet of paper.  
200: a cup of flour.  
484: an unopened box of Raisin Nut Bran.  
 
In this example, the numbers are being used to rank the items according to their mass, 
according to which A > B if and only if A has more mass than B. In addition to determining 
an order and constant intervals, the SI scale, which measures mass in grams, determines 
mass-ratios between objects, such that the paperclip has one fifth the mass of the sheet of 
paper and the sheet of paper has one fortieth the mass of the cup of flour. These ratios are 
possible because although the unit is arbitrary, the zero point is not—zero grams 
corresponds to no mass. 
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Each of these examples is an instance of quantitative comparison; that is, they are 
examples of the comparison on the basis of various quantities.60 The topic of this chapter is 
the nature of quantities and the comparisons that are based on them. After a brief 
introduction in which I state my views and explain the vocabulary I will use to express them, 
I will present and explain my reasons for holding them.  
In this chapter I will articulate and defend the view that quantities are determinable 
properties (or “families” in Swoyer’s parlance), which (according to Bigelow and Pargetter—
there’s a dispute in the literature concerning how best to understand the relationship 
between determinates and determinables) are second-order properties—properties of 
properties. So, for example, being a color is a determinable property, because it is a feature of 
other individual properties, not of concrete objects. It is shared by redness and blueness. 
Redness (or, being a shade of red) is also a determinable property family, since UMass 
Maroon and Harvard Crimson are both red, by being particular shades of red. (So, at least 
sometimes, a determinate can be a determinable. Or, alternatively, some property names are 
ambiguous between determinate and determinable. Or, alternatively, some property names 
are shorthand for a range of related determinate properties.) On this view, an object has 
mass by having some particular determinate mass property; the property having mass is 
therefore a derivative property and is distinct from the determinable property being a mass 
property. The determinable property families that count as quantities are ones whose first-
order determinate properties are related to each other in a manner such that they exhibit a 
structure homomorphic (i.e. identical in structure) in certain respects to the real number line. 
As we will see in section four, the degree of homomorphism determines which type of scale 
is most appropriate or best represents the structure of the quantity, and this, in turn, 
                                                
60 Not quite, actually. As we will see, nominal measurement is clearly not quantitative. There 
is controversy as to whether ordinal measurement is quantitative.  
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determines which types of mathematical or statistical operation can sensibly be applied to 
numbers representing the quantity. We will say that quantity is a determinable property whose 
instances exhibit this structure. When some determinable property (family) exhibits this 
structure, we will say it is quantitative. 
Unfortunately, the term ‘quantity’ is somewhat ambiguous in actual usage. Although 
it can be used as a predicate to express the property of being quantitative, as in “mass is a 
quantity,” sometimes it is used as a noun to refer to a determinate property, as in “a quantity 
of mass,” of in “the gravitational attraction between an object and the earth depends upon 
the quantity of mass present.” This seems coherent, if a little unnatural, and seems to make 
reference to a specific determinate mass property.  
We will assume a moderate platonic realism about properties, according to which 
properties are universals—multiply-instantiable entities wholly located at each of their 
instances—and that genuine similarity relations are explained by the sharing of a universal. I 
assume that properties are abundant. I assume that there are uninstantiated properties. (I will 
not assume that there are “levels” of reality, or that properties are “more real” than concrete 
objects, or that properties are “ontologically more basic” than concrete objects.) 
What are the objects of quantitative comparison—the relata of the relations of 
quantitative comparison? This is more complicated. Sometimes people talk in a way that 
suggests that these relations hold between determinate properties. Stevens writes that, “there 
is a certain isomorphism between what we can do with the aspects of objects and the 
properties of the numeral series.”61 His use of the term ‘aspects’ here strongly suggests that 
he takes the objects of quantitative comparison to be properties of objects, not the objects 
themselves. For example, people will often talk in the following manner: 6 grams > 5 grams. 
                                                
61 Stevens, p. 677. 
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Sometimes people talk as thought he relata are the concrete objects that instantiate the 
properties, which leads them to say things such as, for some particular bowling ball and 
some particular basketball, ‘the bowling ball is greater than the basketball.’ But any such 
expression is incomplete, because it fails to specify, either explicitly or implicitly, a basis for 
comparison. Although bowling balls are typically greater in mass than basketballs, they also 
tend to be smaller in volume. The greater-than claim is true when interpreted as making 
reference to mass, but false when interpreted as making reference to volume.  
So object-wise, quantitative comparison is a three-place relation holding between the 
two objects being compared and a determinable property that serves as the basis for the 
relevant comparison. But property-wise, quantitative comparison is just a two-place relation 
between two determinate properties within the relevant determinable, and any reference to 
the basis for comparison is redundant. The basis for comparison is determined by the fact 
that each determinate property is an element or instance of just one quantitative 
determinable property.  
I will make use of both types of locution. When the objects of comparison are things 
that instantiate the relevant determinate properties, I will include a reference to the 
determinable property that serves as the basis for comparison—the “covering value,” in 
Ruth Chang’s parlance.62 When the objects of comparison are the determinate properties 
themselves, we will omit reference to the covering value, since it will be clear from the 
context what the basis for comparison is.   
The properties of the real number line homomorphic to quantitative structure are a) 
ordinality (“samness of order”), b) the presence of interval (“sameness of interval”), and c) 
the presence of ratios (“sameness of ratio”). These are the properties in virtue of which it is 
                                                
62 See her “Introduction” in Chang 1997b.  
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particularly useful to use numbers to represent quantities.63 Each of these properties is 
independent of it successors but dependent of its predecessors. Each of these properties 
corresponds to a type of scale: property (a) corresponds to the ordinal scale; properties (a) 
and (b) together correspond to the interval scale; all three are necessary to generate the 
structure of the ratio scale. This explains why numbers on an ordinal scale just carry 
information about ordering relationships, but not intervals or ratios; numbers on an interval 
scale carry information about ordering relationships and interval relationships, but not ratios; 
numbers on a ratio scale carry information about ordering relationships, interval 
relationships, and ratios.  
Scales of measurement are ways of assigning numbers to represent quantitative 
structure. Each such scale is a function from “objects” to numbers. ‘Objects’ is in scare 
quotes because of the above-mentioned ambiguity in the literature: sometimes people seem 
to mean that a scale is a function from determinate properties to numbers, but sometimes 
they seem to mean that the function takes us from the bearers of those properties to 
numbers. So according to one way of speaking, the bowling ball gets a rating of 7kg, but on 
the other the bowling ball’s mass property is assigned a rating of 7kg. These are different but 
equivalent ways of talking—a bowling ball is 7 kg if and only if it is an instance of the 
property being 7kg in mass.  
There can be more than one scale per quantity, but typically not more than one 
quantity per scale.64 For example, the Celsius, Fahrenheit, and Kelvin scales are three distinct 
                                                
63 Although numbers are useful for the representation of sameness and difference, as in 
nominal scales, they are not particularly useful for that application. They are no more useful 
than non-numeric names. 
64 In baseball, there is a statistic called “on-base plus slugging,” or “OPS,” which is the sum 
of on-base percentage, which measures the frequency with which a batter reaches first base 
or farther without being responsible for an out, and slugging percentage, which measures the 
batter’s ability to hit for extra bases. To calculate a hitter’s OPS, determine his on-base and 
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scales for temperature. There are very few legitimate scales that simultaneously measure two 
independent quantities however, for the simple reason that when it makes sense to think that 
there exists a unique ordering relation satisfying the relevant formal constraints, it typically 
also makes sense to think that there exists a determinable property family that corresponds 
to and determines the order. 
2. The Nature of Quantities 
In an important book on the topic of measurement, Brian Ellis distinguishes 
between two types of property: qualities and quantities.65 He claims that properties that have 
an “all-or-none” character are qualities, whereas properties that admit of degrees are 
quantities. Redness, for example, seems to be quantitative: it makes sense to claim that fire 
engine red is very red, or that nantucket red is red, but not as red as fire engine red. However, it 
is not always so easy. It is hard to say which degree-admitting property is instantiated by 
wine, for example, in virtue of which there is such-and-such an amount of it in some bottle. 
It seems that in some cases it is a substance itself, and not any particular property of the 
substance, that is the relevant quantity. Although this idea is tempting, I think it is ultimately 
incorrect. One preliminary suggestion might be that volume is the relevant property, but 
suppose that wine, like water, is subject to thermal expansion, in which it increases in 
volume with increases in temperature and shrinks with decreases in temperature. Although 
we can increase the volume of wine by heating it, we do not thereby make more wine—we 
                                                                                                                                            
slugging percentages and then add them together. This means that, in effect, OPS is a scale 
that simultaneously measures two independent quantities: the frequency with which the 
hitter gets on base, and his ability to hit for power. That said, the meaningfulness of the 
statistic has been called into question for this very reason; rather than really measuring any 
one thing, it is just a “quick and dirty” way of collectively representing two very different 
aspects of offensive productivity in baseball.  
65 Ellis 1966, p. 24. 
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merely make the same amount of wine take up more space. So volume is not the relevant 
property. The relevant property, rather, is mass. An object’s mass tells us how much matter it 
contains—that is, how much of it there is; how substantial it is—and mass is undeniably a 
property. And the fact that the wine’s mass stays the same throughout the thermal 
expansions and contractions is what leads us to believe that the quantity of wine remains 
constant.  
There are other quantitative properties that seem problematic. Since motion is 
relative, objects have velocity only with reference to some other objects with respect to 
which an appropriate frame of reference may be established.66 However, it is not clear that 
velocity is particularly unusual in this regard. The property tallness comes in degrees, and a 
person’s tallness makes reference to the average height of the relevant population—perhaps 
even to the person’s gender. Five-foot-eleven is tall for an American woman, but not a 
Dutch man.  
3. Operationalism 
Herbert Dingle and P. W. Bridgman have advocated an “operationalist” theory of 
measurement, which is an extreme form of nominalism about quantities, and is based on an 
empiricist, positivist philosophical outlook.67 Dingle questions the assumption that quantities 
exist independent of measurements, and proposes a view according to which measurement 
processes are conceptually and ontologically prior to the quantities they are alleged to be 
measurements of.68 According to Dingle, we should begin with the specific operation of 
measurement an its result and define the quantity in terms of them. The result of each 
                                                
66 Ellis 1966, p. 24.  
67 See Dingle; Bridgman.  
68 Dingle, pp. 7 – 10.  
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operation should have its own quantity name. In the event that the results of certain 
operations are correlated to a high degree with one another, we may decide to give them a 
common quantity name, but this should be thought of as purely motivated by convenience, 
and not a tacit or explicit acknowledgement of any underlying property possessed by the 
relevant objects in themselves. The measurement operations are conceptually basic on 
Dingle’s view, and the “quantities” are not inherent in the objects said to possess them.  
He writes, 
 
Instead of supposing a pre-existing ‘property’ which our operation measures, we 
should begin with the operation and its result and then, if we wish to speak of a 
property (which I do not think we shall do), define it in terms of that. The result of 
each operation should initially have its own name, and if we find that different 
operations yield approximately the same result, then we have made the empirical 
discovery that the quantities represented by the different names are approximately 
equal. It may then be convenient to give them a common name, but it would be 
understood that it was merely for convenience and that it had an empirical and not a 
logical foundation which further experience might cause us to modify.69 
 
In perhaps the most significant and thoroughgoing defense of realism about 
measurement, Chris Swoyer writes of operationalism that “[t]he idea here is that terms like 
‘intelligence’, ‘length’, and ‘temperature’ do not stand for objective things in the world, but 
derive their meaning entirely from our measurement practices.”70 Dingle’s argument in favor 
of his operationalist approach is two-pronged: on the one hand, the traditional view results 
in confusion and ambiguity; on the other, operationalism is simpler and more elegant that 
the traditional view.71 He writes that the view is “forced up on is if we wish to give the 
simplest description of what we do, and not weave a fairy tale around it.”72 For example, 
suppose we employ a particular measurement procedure to a particular rod, AB, at a 
                                                
69 Dingle, p. 7.  
70 Swoyer, p. 236. 
71 Dingle, pp. 8 – 9. 
72 Dingle, p. 8.  
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particular time, and obtain a result of 3. Then suppose we employ the same procedure to the 
same rod, but this time obtain a different result, say, 4. “On the operational view,” Dingle 
writes, “what we have learnt is unambiguous. The length of the rod has changed, because 
‘the length of the rod’ is the name we give to the result of performing that particular 
operation, and this result has changed from 3 to 4.”73 Since the operation of measurement is 
conceptually prior to the quantity measured, and the rods “length” is not an intrinsic 
property of the object at all, but is rather just a name for the result of the particular 
measurement procedure we’re employing, operationalism clearly leaves room for just one 
understanding of the phenomenon: that the rod got longer.  
Dingle goes on to say that “on the traditional view… we are in a dilemma, because 
we do not know which has changed, the rod measured or the standard unit; a change in the 
length of either would give the observed result.”74 So, in addition to the fact that 
operationalism gives an unambiguous, unmysterious explanation of this sort of case, the 
traditional view results in confusion, since that view allows two possible but inconsistent 
interpretations of the data, with no way of determining which is the more correct (given the 
facts of the case). According to Dingle, we should therefore accept operationalism.  
However, it seems to me that Dingle is wrong about this. The case, as Dingle has 
described it, is genuinely ambiguous. If all we know about the case is that a particular 
measurement procedure was performed on a particular rod at a particular time, yielding a 
result of “3”, and then the same procedure was performed on the same rod at a later time 
and that this measurement yielded a different, higher, result, nothing in particular follows. 
                                                
73 Dingle, pp. 8 – 9. 
74 Dingle, p. 9. Dingle goes on to consider a more complicated case concerning a standard 
length-measuring rod, a nebula in another galaxy, and whether certain observations would 
entail that the universe is expanding or that the standard is shrinking. This case is more 
complicated and does not improve upon the first case, described in the text, in a way that 
justifies introducing it here.  
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Perhaps the original rod got longer, but perhaps the measuring device got shorter, or 
perhaps the discrepancy is due to operator error. Furthermore, there are steps we could take 
in order to discover which it was. If repeated applications of the same procedure tended to 
produce the original result, “3”, and not the second result, “4”, this would support the 
hypothesis that the inconsistent result was due to operator error. If the measurement 
procedure tended to consistently overvalue the lengths of other objects whose lengths were 
known, this would tend to support the hypothesis that the measuring device itself had been 
altered. And if other, independent procedures for the measurement of length tended to 
produce a result of “4” when applied to the original rod AB, this would tend to support the 
hypothesis that the rod had elongated. But the fact that operationalism directly entails that 
the rod has elongated with respect to the quantity defined in terms of the particular 
measuring procedure (though not necessarily in terms of “related” procedures) is in fact a 
count against it. It is not a useful, simplifying consequence; it is, rather, deeply implausible 
and introduces unnecessary complexity.  
Byerly and Lazara also take issue with Dingle’s form of operationalism. They argue 
that Dingle’s suggestion that we take each measurement procedure to define a logically and 
conceptually independent quantity is untenable. So, for example, according to 
operationalism, if we determine length using a yardstick then we are dealing with “yardstick 
length”; whereas if we determine length using optical triangulation then we are dealing with 
“optical length,” and there are no logical or conceptual relationships between the two 
quantities. Any similarities, including use of the world ‘length’ to describe both quantities is 
purely a matter of convenience and is not evidence that there is some property, length, such 
that there are at least two logically independent ways of measuring it.  
Byerly and Lazara write that  
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the position remains untenable because of the proliferation of concepts it spawns. A 
fragmentation of the concepts of length, mass, temperature, etc., would defeat one of 
the principal aims of science, namely, attaining unified theories of wide scope. 
Consider, for example, a law such as Newton’s second law in the simple form: F = 
ma. For the operationist, who entertains as many concepts of mass as there are 
significantly different procedures to measure mass, there are as many laws as there 
are kinds of mass, and each must be verified in its own right.75 
 
According to Byerly and Lazara, operationalism goes wrong in that it results in an 
unacceptable splintering of science and scientific concepts. Since one of the fundamental 
projects of science is the attempt to unify our understanding of the world, and since 
operationalism makes this impossible, operationalism is false. Similarly, Chris Swoyer writes, 
 
The use of different procedures to measure what we take to be the same magnitude 
is not a practical contrivance to avoid more magnitudes—ruler length, sonar length, 
etc.—then we can keep straight. It plays an important methodological and 
epistemological role in science, enabling us to obtain a general and unified picture of 
nature that minimizes the number of unrelated, brute facts by displaying the same 
laws and causal mechanisms at work behind apparently unrelated phenomena.76  
 
The idea is that operationalism robs us of two things: an important explanatory power in 
cases where different techniques for measuring the same magnitude yield relevantly similar 
results, leaving us with what must be thought of, at best, as stable coincidences; and an 
explanatory chore when different techniques for measuring the same magnitude yield 
conflicting results. Operationalism says that there is nothing to explain, since there’s no 
common quantity that both operations measure, but intuitively when we find ourselves in 
situations in which independent measurements agree, we take them to be mutually 
confirming, and we take conflicting measurements to be a sign that something has gone 
wrong in at least one of the procedures.  
                                                
75 Byerly and Lazara, p. 12.  
76 Swoyer, p. 238.  
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For example, suppose I am taking the internal temperature of a tenderloin on the 
grill using two devices: an electronic “instant-read” thermometer (which functions via a fuse, 
the element of which has different electrical resistances at different temperatures, and a 
computer that can accurately detect the electrical resistance of the fuse) and an old-fashioned 
meat thermometer (which functions via a metal spring that elongates when it heats up, 
turning an arrow relative to a dial face with calibrations drawn on it). If the two 
thermometers yield approximately similar results, we would take them to confirm each other, 
which only makes sense if the two operations measure the same quantity. And if the two 
thermometers yield inconsistent results, we take this to be a sign that one or the other device 
is broken or has malfunctioned, or that one or the other measurement was conducted 
improperly. Again, this only makes sense if there is a common magnitude that the two 
measurements are supposed to be measurements of. 
4. Formalism 
Ellis argues for a theory of measurement called “formalism,” according to which a 
scale of measurement is an interpretation or semantics of pure arithmetic. That is, 
measurement gives a way of interpreting numbers and the various mathematical functions 
that apply to them. This view is intended to provide a middle ground between the austere 
nominalism of Dingle and the less parsimonious realism of Byerly and Lazara, Mundy, and 
Swoyer. He writes that “arithmetic becomes applied by the recognition of similarities, and 
involves the substitution or use of arithmetical terms in place of terms designating physical 
objects or relationships.”77  
                                                
77 Ellis 1966, p. 12.  
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According to Ellis, quantities have an essentially relational character. A property, Q, 
is quantitative if and only if for any two of its instances, A and B, either i) A is greater than B 
with respect to Q, ii) B is greater than A with respect to Q, or iii) A is equal to B with respect 
to Q.78 He claims that these three relationships form an exhaustive group of mutually 
exclusive alternatives: if one holds, none of the others can in fact hold, but if one holds, it 
must be logically possible for the others to hold.79 The slogan for the formalist view might 
be stated as “only relations; not properties” or “merely relations, not universals,” because 
according to formalism quantities are dependent for their existence upon the ordering 
relations they are constituted by. According to Ellis, then, quantitative properties make 
essential reference to other instances of the same quantity. Mass, for example, is quantitative 
in virtue of the fact that instances of mass can be arranged in a linear order from least to 
greatest on the basis of their massiveness. If this were not possible, for example, if there 
were only one massive object in the universe, mass would not be a quantity.  
On Ellis’s view, the set of relationships is characteristic and constitutive of quantities. 
The relationships have primary ontological status.80 A property is quantitative if and only if 
its instances enter into some particular set of these relationships, each particular set of which 
identifies a particular quantity. This set of relationships determines a linear ordering, because 
it is always possible to arrange the objects connected by them in a linear order so that the 
                                                
78 Ellis 1966, p. 25. This way of understanding quantitativity, in terms of the Trichotomy 
Thesis, rules out the sort of “roughly equal” parity that Chang, Parfit, Griffin, and Raz argue 
for; according to this understanding, the Trichotomy Thesis analytically true. Chang et al. 
attempt to argue (e.g. Chang 2002, pp. 661 – 4) that this would be a mistake, and that there is 
room for a fourth quantitatively comparative relation. Although I do not wish to beg the 
question against these philosophers, I do want to emphasize the intuitive pull of the 
Trichotomy Thesis. Perhaps we should think of Ellis as proposing a substantive theory of 
quantitativity that includes the Trichotomy Thesis, while acknowledging that there is 
conceptual room for a competing theory that recognized four exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive relations of quantitative comparison. 
79 Ellis 1966, p. 26.  
80 Ellis 1992, p. 169. 
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actual relationships can be read off from their position in the order.81 Just as we think of the 
extension of a property as the set of its instances, we think of the extension of a quantity as 
an ordered set of its instances. Every relationship of quantitative equality is transitive, 
symmetrical, and reflexive. Quantitative inequality is non-transitive, symmetrical, and 
irreflexive. Greater-than and less-than relations are transitive, asymmetric, and irreflexive.82 
So, the existence of a quantity is logically dependent on the existence of a set of 
linear ordering relationships.83 
 
Q is a quantity =df Q admits of degrees; Q is inherent in its instances; Q has an 
essentially relational character in that for any two instances of Q, either one is greater 
than the other or they are equal with respect to Q; Q is logically dependent on the 
existence of a set of linear ordering relationships.  
 
If there exists a quantity then a corresponding set of quantitative relationships exists, and an 
object is an instance of the relevant a quantity if and only if it enters into the relevant set of 
quantitative relationships.84 This set of relationships is such that it is always possible to 
arrange the objects or property instances connected by them in a linear order, so that the 
actual relationships that they bear can be read off from their position in the order. (So the 
magnitudes of earthquakes, which are ranked on a nonlinear scale, satisfy the condition and 
related by a linear ordering relationship because it is possible to arrange them in a linear 
                                                
81 A proponent of the “tetrachotomy theory” of quantitativity must deny this principle. And 
although this denial provides a certain flexibility concerning which substances and properties 
may count as quantities, the corresponding scales and units of measurements are limited in 
their usefulness and in the amount of information they may provide.  
82 Ellis 1966, p. 26. 
83 Ellis 1966, p. 38. 
84 Ellis 1966, p. 26.  
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order, regardless of the fact that the units of the scale not proportional to one another in a 
linear way, since it is a logarithmic scale.)  
A formal system, such as arithmetic, has the following characteristics:  
 
a) There is an initial set of undefined terms. These terms have meaning only in the 
sense that they play a role in the formal system.  
b) There are rules for combining or arranging the terms into well-formed formulae. 
c) There are initial formulae that are considered to be the axioms of the system. 
d) There are rules for the derivation of new formulae from the axioms. 
e) There are rules for determining when one formula contradicts or is inconsistent with 
another.85  
 
According to Ellis, the following rules constrain the applications of arithmetic that can be 
considered measurement:86 
 
a) The application of arithmetic must be an interpretation of one or more formally 
defined classes of arithmetical propositions.  
b) The individual terms of a formula in the given class of formulae must have a fixed 
interpretation, so that the interpretation of a formula can be predicted from the 
interpretations of the terms it contains. 
c) Different terms should always be interpreted differently and same terms interpreted 
the same. 
                                                
85 Ellis 1966, p. 13. This last condition, (e), is not strictly a member of the set of conditions 
constitutive of a formal system; it is nevertheless necessary to include it because systems of 
arithmetic clearly do contain rules of contradiction and consistency.  
86 Ellis 1966, p. 15. 
62 
d) Numerical terms should always be interpreted in the same way (for example, if the 
numeral 4 is interpreted as “a two-by-four four feet in length” then the numeral 7 
should be interpreted as “a two-by-four seven feet in length.” 
e) The numerical terms should always be interpreted as the number of things in a group 
or as the measure of something in some respect.  
f) An interpreted formula is true if and only if its corresponding pure (that is, 
“unapplied”) formula is an arithmetical theorem.87  
 
When these conditions are met, there will be an isomorphism between various 
“pure” mathematical operations that are applicable to the numerals and various physical 
operations applicable to the individuals to which the numerals are assigned. So, for example, 
measuring electrical resistance in ohms gives us a way of interpreting, e.g., the numbers ‘3’ 
and ‘4’ as amounts of electrical resistance. It also gives us a way of interpreting the 
mathematical function denoted by ‘+’ as the splicing together of objects with the property of 
being resistant to electrical current to some degree. In this way, measuring electrical 
resistance in ohms gives us a way of interpreting ‘3 + 4 = 7’ in terms of amounts of 
resistance and perfect splicing operations: splicing a wire with three ohms of resistance, end-
to-end with a wire with four ohms of resistance yields a wire with seven ohms of resistance.88 
The conditions for the existence of a quantity are not identity conditions for 
quantities. There can be more than one set of linear ordering relationships for a quantity. It 
is the actual order that determines the identity of a quantity, not the ordering relationships. If 
two logically independent sets of ordering relationships always generate the same order 
                                                
87 Ellis attributes the distinction between pure and applied arithmetic to Plato, and to J. S. 
Mill. He does not cite any particular passages.  
88 Ellis 1966, pp. 14 – 5.  
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under the same conditions, then they are ordering relationships of the same quantity. For 
example, suppose I have two thermometers, each of which works perfectly, but such that 
one is calibrated on the Fahrenheit scale and the other is calibrated on the Celsius scale. The 
two thermometers are not logically dependent on one another and may generate different 
numbers at any given time (overlooking the special case of -40 degrees). But since the two 
thermometers would always generate the same order, we can infer that they measure the 
same quantity: temperature.  
According to Ellis, this account of measurement has several virtues. For one, it 
explains the apparent incorrigibility of pure arithmetic while accounting for its usefulness in 
describing the physical world. For another, it explains why pure arithmetic is so useful: any 
given arithmetical formula can be interpreted in an enormous variety of ways, each of which 
is (possibly) true and interesting. Furthermore, these interpretations of arithmetic permit us 
to make testable predictions and thereby help us to further our understanding of the 
empirical world.89 This last feature gives a certain amount of sense to the project of this 
dissertation. Our topic is to determine whether or not pleasure and pain are legitimate, 
measurable quantities. This is, at bottom, an attempt to discover whether or not, and to what 
degree, pleasure, pain and phenomena surrounding them are amenable to being interpreted 
as a semantics of arithmetic—to what degree do certain key arithmetical formulas make 
sense when interpreted as making reference to amounts of pleasure or pain. That is, which 
arithmetical and statistical operations can be sensibly applied to numbers that are interpreted 
as representing amounts of pleasure and pain?  
                                                
89 Ellis 1966, p. 16.  
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5. Problems for Ellis’s Formalism 
A preliminary problem with Ellis’s view, mentioned by Ellis himself, is that one can 
generate a linear ordering of persons by height, and of persons by age, and that seems to be 
acceptable, but it is also possible to generate a linear ordering of persons by (height × age), 
and that seems strange.90 However, it is clear that we should not be bothered by this. 
Believing in odd, disjunctive properties such as being an atmosphere or a coffee drinker, and in 
“Cambridge” properties, such as the property my computer has when I have brown hair are 
part of philosophical orthodoxy. That (height × age) turns out to be a quantity isn’t so 
strange in comparison, and should not be thought of as a serious problem for Ellis’s view. 
The fact that it permits the construction of such quantities is, in fact, a virtue of the view; if 
it lacked the resources necessary for the construction of the quantity hage, it is unclear how it 
could permit the construction of such paradigmatically real quantities as miles per hour for 
speed, miles per hour per hour for acceleration, or watts for energy.91  
Another problem for the formalist account of measurement is that arithmetic, even 
in its most pure form, is not a purely formal system. Criterion (a) is violated by the fact that 
arithmetical terms have meanings independent of their roles in the system. As Ellis says, “the 
numerical sequence is not a sequence of meaningless terms, or terms whose only meaning is 
given by the part they play in a formal system. We can be taught to use correctly such 
sentences as ‘here are 7 apples’ without knowing any formal arithmetic.”92 This is 
undoubtedly correct: the fact that children often learn the rules of arithmetic by counting on 
                                                
90 Ellis 1966, p. 31. 
91 Although I have used scale names as though they were the names of quantities, this use is 
innocent and should not be taken to indicate an identity between the quantity and the scale 
used to make measurements of it. In several instances, however, the scale name brings out 
the close relationship between the one quantity and its constituents.  
92 Ellis 1966, p. 18. 
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their fingers—and understand the formal rules in terms of their empirical application—
strongly suggests that arithmetical terms are not purely formal in their meanings. However, it 
is unclear just how damaging this fact is to the formalist position. Even if arithmetic is not a 
purely formal system, it is clearly at least semi-formal, as it satisfies criteria (b) through (e) for 
formality. The fact, if it’s a fact, that it is impossible for us to consider arithmetical concepts 
apart from their various applications does not detract from its status as a formal system with 
rules for combining its terms into well-formed formulae; initial axioms; rules for deriving 
theorems from the axioms; rules for determining when one formula is inconsistent with 
another; and amenable to a variety of interpretations.  
Forge considers and responds to several objections on Ellis’s behalf. One objection 
concerns the fact that if, as Ellis suggests, the mere presence of an order were sufficient for 
the existence of a quantity, then there would exist far more quantities than we might have 
pre-theoretically supposed. Forge considers and rejects a response to this criticism according 
to which only those orderings that exhibit an extensive structure should be recognized as 
legitimate quantities. Although it is not perfectly clear what Forge has in mind, a standard 
picture of extensive magnitudes could be stated in the following manner:  
 
Q is an extensive magnitude =df there exists a scale, S, for the measurement of Q 
and a concatenation relation that satisfy the following criteria: 
 
a) a p b iff S(a) < S(b) 
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b) S (a o b) iff S(a) + S(b)93 
 
This is perhaps best explained in terms of an example. Length is an extensive magnitude 
because, roughly speaking, for any two lengths, there is an addition operation on them such 
that it makes sense to claim that the value of their combined lengths is identical to a third 
length. In general, quantities that are subject to this sort of summation, such as length, 
volume, and mass, are extensive; quantities that do not, such as temperature and density, are 
not. Forge rejects this proposal because there are several legitimate quantities that fail to 
exhibit extensive characteristics, such as temperature and density. Forge is clearly correct 
about this. Any attempt to restrict or confine quantitative phenomena to those quantities 
with an extensive structure is ad hoc and is subject to counterexample.  
The response Forge endorses makes appeal to laws of nature. According to this 
response, laws of nature are correspondences between quantities, and only those orderings 
embedded in this network of correspondences should be recognized by the theory as 
defining legitimate quantities. That is, an ordering, O, is a quantity only if O is mentioned in 
some law of nature, L. As Armstrong puts it, “the orders that are quantities are constituted 
quantities by being embedded a systematic network of correlations and correspondences 
with other orders. These correlations are what we call laws of nature.”94 So, for example, 
Newton’s Second Law says that force is equal to mass times acceleration. This lawlike 
relationship between these three quantities confers legitimacy on all three of the 
corresponding orderings. As Forge notes, it is these correlations that make measurement 
                                                
93 Krantz, et al. (1971), pp. 1 – 5, 71 – 135. ‘p’ should be interpreted as a physical or 
empirical “less than” relation, ‘<’ as its numerical analogue, ‘o’ as a physical or empirical 
“concatenation” relation, and ‘+’ as its numerical analogue. See also Mundy, pp 30 – 1 and 
Swoyer, p. 246.  
94 Armstrong 1987, p. 311. He does not endorse the point.  
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possible, and the fact that there exist effective measurement procedures is at the center of 
our justification for believing in quantities. According to this view, it is not just the 
relationships instances of a quantity have to one another that is constitutive of quantities, but 
the relationships quantities have to other quantities. This view has its roots in what has been 
called Alexander’s Dictum, according to which there can be “no reality without causality.”95 
This view also seems to tie quantities, by their nature, to measurement, though not in such a 
naïve or primitive manner as the operationalist.  
However, it is unclear, on the face of it, why the presence or absence of a suitable 
law of nature should have such a profound effect on whether or not an ordering counts or 
functions as a quantity. Why should this network of relationships between various quantities 
be constitutive of quantitativeness? Suppose, for example, that there was an ordering of 
objects or property instances, O1, that satisfied all the formal criteria for quantitativeness, but 
which was causally isolated. Would we deny that O1 is represents a quantity based only on 
the purely extrinsic fact that it bears no causal relationships to other quantities? Such an 
ordering would be immeasurable and epistemically inaccessible to us, but these seem to be 
merely extrinsic features as well. Moreover, in a later article, Ellis himself points out that 
there are many quantitative concepts that occur in statements of laws of nature that clearly 
do not refer to real quantities, such as distance from Pittsburgh.96 I propose that we should think 
of quantitativeness as an intrinsic feature of an ordering: if the ordering in question satisfies 
the relevant formal constraints, it is a quantitiy; if not, not. The upshot of this, then, is that 
the orderings corresponding to “hage” and Social Security Numbers count as quantities.97  
                                                
95 See Kim. This way of understanding the dictum presupposes that the laws of nature 
determine the counterfactual-supporting causal relationships that hold in a given world. 
96 Ellis 1987, p. 320. 
97 Perhaps the friend of formalism could object that the ordering corresponding to Social 
Security Numbers is arbitrary, and that this arbitrariness explains why there is no quantity 
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Another problem with Ellis’s view, articulated by Forge, concerns the contention 
that quantities are essentially relational in character and that the relations between quantity 
instances are ontologically prior to the quantities themselves. The objection concerns a 
universe containing only one object, a round ball three feet in diameter, made of steel, 
colored yellow, and having a mass of five grams. Forge writes:  
 
Give [the ball] the name c… it would appear that c cannot possess quantities because 
there are no other objects in its universe with which it can stand in a [quantitative] 
relationship. There is no doubt that Ellis is right in that if x and y have q, then either 
they have the “same amount” of q or one has “more” q. Hence, if more than one 
object has q, then necessarily they stand in [quantitative relations]… No values can 
be assigned to c because there are no resources with which to set up and implement 
measurement procedures in c’s universe. So, as a matter of fact, 5 grams could not be 
assigned to c.98  
 
Because, according to Ellis, the existence of a quantity is essentially tied to the existence of a 
set of relations of quantitative comparison, if, as in the case of c, there are no other objects 
for c to stand in relation to then there can be no quantities. Armstrong argues that the 
trouble is deeper than Forge would have us believe. According to him, the fact that one 
thing is more massive than the other is not an arbitrary fact about where they fall with 
respect to some ordered class somewhere. An object has the mass it has because of its 
constitution and structure, and it is not clear that Ellis’s theory contains the resources 
necessary to account for this fact.99  
One possible response would be to employ objects in non-actual possible worlds to 
stand in the appropriate relations of quantitative comparison to c. For example, although 
there are no 6-gram objects in c’s world, there might have been some, and these objects 
                                                                                                                                            
associated with it. This response might seem to be more fruitful, but it raises the specter of 
natural class nominalism. For more about this view, see below.  
98 Forge 1987b, p. 296.  
99 Armstrong 1987, p. 312. 
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would have been more massive than c. It is possible that this solution would raise issues 
concerning how seriously we should take merely possible objects and uninstantiated 
properties, however, and may fly in the face of the nominalistic spirit in which Ellis’s 
formalism was proposed. So it is not clear that Ellis could help himself to this solution.  
To see the force of this objection, it is helpful to draw an analogy to c’s non-
quantitative properties, such as its steeliness. The fact that there are no other steel objects in 
c’s universe causes no analogous problems with the claim that c is made of steel, so why 
should the fact that there are no other massive objects in c’s universe cause a problem with 
the claim that c has a mass of five grams? It shouldn’t; even on the hypothesis that c is alone 
in its universe, there is no problem with the claim that c is an instance of the determinate 
property being five grams in mass. The problem is specifically with mass’s status as a quantitative 
property—with its status as a determinable property family with a quantitative structure. 
This exposes a serious flaw in the formalist framework: mass is a determinable property 
family irrespective of its actual instances, and this structure—this relationship between mass 
in general and individual, particular masses—is important not just because actual objects 
have different masses, each of which is still its mass, but also because there are lots of merely 
possible facts about objects and their masses, and each of these facts is a fact about mass. 
Without acknowledging this quantitative structure, independent of but consistent with the 
actual facts about which objects have which mass in the actual world, we are forced, as Ellis 
is, into saying that mass is quantitative only because there are actual objects standing in 
various relations of quantitative comparison with respect to mass. But, of course, this is only 
possible because of the property mass’s quantitative structure, not the other way around.  
Another interesting objection concerns the possibility that a quantity might have 
different extensions at different times. Take, for example, the ordered set that corresponds 
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to mass at a particular time, t. This set is the set of all massive objects at t ordered from least 
massive to most. But suppose that at t1, one of the objects breaks in half. If that happens, 
then the set of all the massive objects at t1 is not identical the set of all massive objects at t, 
because sets have their members essentially. This is a problem for Ellis’s view because he 
takes quantities to be defined by their extensions. So on Ellis’s view, mass is one quantity at 
time t, and another, distinct quantity at t1. This is counterintuitive.  
Forge attempts to solve this difficulty by appeal to sequences of ordered classes. In 
essence, we are to identify each quantity with an ordered set of ordered sets, one ordered set 
for each moment in time.100 So long as each set in the sequence is connected to its 
predecessors and successors in the appropriate way, it will make sense to claim that the 
quantity remains identifiably the same from moment to moment. In typical cases, the make-
up of successive sets from moment to moment will remain largely identical, for example. If 
no new objects are created and each existing object retains its precise mass over the interval 
t1 to t3, then the ordered set corresponding to the extension of mass will not change over 
that interval. Even if there are some changes in the extension of mass over an interval, there 
is likely to be substantial overlap between the ordered set that corresponds to the extension 
of mass at t1 and the set that corresponds to its extension at t3. Perhaps the difference is 
caused by some object breaking in two, or by two objects combining to form a larger 
composite object at t2. If either of those were the case, it would be clear how the successive 
ordered sets were related to one another, what justifies our thinking that the sets ought to be 
different, and why we should regard the sets as representing the same quantity at different 
times.  
                                                
100 Or, rather, one set for each moment t such that the extension of the quantity at t is not 
identical to its extension at the moment immediately preceding it.  
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However, it is not clear that this is completely innocent; it might be thought that this 
way of identifying sequences of ordered sets with quantities begs the question, because it 
makes implicit appeal to facts independent of the sets themselves to determine which set 
identifies a quantity at a time. This is a problem because Ellis does not endorse a 
“promiscuous” view of quantities, according to which there exists a quantity corresponding 
to every sequence of ordered sets. On the promiscuous view, the number of distinct 
quantitative properties is vast, but most of them are uninteresting to us. On Ellis’s view, 
however, there are not so many quantities, and each quantity that exists is of interest to us—
as is evidenced by his reluctance to admit “hage” or the Social Security numerical order as 
legitimate quantities. But without reference to some feature, logically independent of the 
sequence of ordered sets itself, with reference to which we can identify the sequence that 
correctly identifies our quantity mass, it is unclear how a theory like Ellis’s has the necessary 
machinery to direct us to the correct sequence, unless the fact that one sequence and not 
another identifies mass is an unexplained brute fact according to the theory. This step brings 
formalism perilously close to what has been called “natural class” nominalism, which is out 
of step with the parsimonious general philosophical program accepted by the proponents of 
formalism.101  
Another objection Forge considers is based on the possibility that there might be 
two distinct quantities that correspond to the same ordering. Forge doesn’t see this objection 
as being particularly serious, since he does not believe that there exist any two quantities that 
                                                
101 Natural class nominalism is a view according to which sameness of type is explicable in 
terms of sameness of class, but since there are indefinitely many classes not all of which 
suffice to explain sameness of type, a primitive, unexplained distinction according to which 
some classes are more “natural” than others is evoked. The more natural the class, the 
greater the degree to which membership in the class is an explanation of genuine similarity. 
Several commentators have found the appeal to primitive naturalness to be unpalatable. See, 
for example, Armstrong 1978a, Armstrong 1987b, Armstrong 1989, and Lewis 1983. 
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place all the same objects in the same order, although he admits that such a coincidence is 
possible. For example, in a world where everything is made of copper tubing of a certain 
diameter, “mass, length, resistance, conductivity, specific heat, volume, and much else 
besides, would be the same.”102 However, Forge claims that the mere possibility of the 
copper-tubing world is no threat to our theory of quantities, because this theory concerns this 
world and need not concern itself with other worlds. Furthermore, since no intelligent 
beings could be composed only of copper tubing, the massive quantitative coincidence at 
that world would go unnoticed by its inhabitants. This leads Forge to conclude that the 
objection is inconsequential.103 
Forge appears not to appreciate the value of ensuring that our theory of quantitative 
comparison be as broad in scope as possible, and that the goings-on in the copper-tubing 
world are therefore of great consequence to any such theory. He also places far too much 
emphasis on the actual capacities and procedures of measurement. The fact that nobody at 
the copper tubing world would notice that the ordering associated with mass is identical to 
that associated with electrical resistance is of no consequence—the force of the objection is 
that although these orderings coincide at that world, the quantities themselves remain 
distinct. The actual capacity of any inhabitants of the copper-tubing world to take the actual 
measurements is irrelevant, since the objection is metaphysical in nature, not 
epistemological. The fact that the theory conflates the two quantities in the world in question 
is of significance, not the beliefs of the world’s inhabitants.  
Furthermore, this failure to grasp the trans-world significance of the theory of 
quantities robs Forge of a plausible response: that although mass and electrical resistance 
coincide at the copper-tubing world, they nevertheless diverge in other possible worlds. The 
                                                
102 Forge, p. 306. 
103 Forge, p. 306.  
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possibility of such divergence is what makes mass a different quantity from electrical 
resistance, even in worlds where they coincide, there is no metaphysical significance to the 
coincidence. It is, in every sense of the word, just a coincidence.  
However, Forge and Ellis will not escape from this difficulty so easily, because there 
are, in fact, necessarily coextensive but distinct quantities. Just as triangularity and trilaterality 
are necessarily coextensive but distinct properties, n-angluarity and n-laterality with respect 
to closed regular polygons are necessarily coextensive but distinct, which Ellis’s formalist 
view therefore conflates. This conflation represents a devastating defect in the formalist 
position. The ontology of the realist is necessary to solve the difficulty.  
6. Realism About Quantities 
Byerly and Lazara, Chris Swoyer, and Brent Mundy have advocated broadly “realist” 
theories of quantitative phenomena. According to them, the properties measured are 
conceptually prior to any procedures or techniques of measurement. There are real, mind-
independent properties that are the objects of our measurements. This theory of quantitative 
phenomena is inspired by, consistent with, and draws much of its support from the now 
dominant set of realist theories about properties whose chief proponent has been D. M. 
Armstrong.104 On this view, quantitative comparisons take place between determinate 
members of a determinable property family. Mass is an example of one such determinable 
property family; 1 gram is a determinate member of that family; 1 kilogram is another. In 
general, an object has mass by having some particular mass or other. An object may 
                                                
104 The classic work in this tradition is Armstrong’s two-volume Universals and Scientific 
Realism, Amstrong 1978a and 1978b. Mundy, Swoyer, and the later Ellis all cite Armstrong’s 
work as being a pivotal influence on their own commitments to realism. (Byerly and Lazara, 
of course, were writing prior to the appearance of the Armstrong volumes.) See Ellis 1987, 
pp. 322 – 23; Ellis 1992, pp. 168 – 70; Mundy, pp. 46 – 7; Swoyer, pp. 236 –46. 
74 
instantiate different determinate properties within a determinable family at different times, 
though it may not instantiate more than one such property at a time. A determinable 
property family, Q, is quantitative if and only if for any two determinate member properties, 
q1 and q2, either q1 is greater than q2 with respect to Q, q2 is greater than q1 with respect to 
Q, or q1 is equal to q2 with respect to Q.
105 This set of relationships is characteristic of 
quantities and forms the theoretical basis for other quantitative concepts, such as 
comparability and commensurability. This set of relationships determines a linear ordering, 
because there always exists a linear ordering of the objects connected by them, so that the 
actual relationships can be read off from their position in the order.106 So if some property is 
quantitative then its instances enter into some particular set of these relationships, each 
particular set of which identifies a particular quantity.107 Just as we think of the extension of a 
property as the set of its instances, we think of the extension of a quantity as an ordered set 
of its instances.  
Ellis, writing in 1987, articulates in an eloquent manner the main argument in 
support of this kind of view. He writes:  
                                                
105 Ellis, p. 25; Swoyer, p. 266. This way of understanding quantitativity, in terms of the 
Trichotomy Thesis, rules out the sort of “roughly equal” parity that Chang, Parfit, Griffin, 
and Raz argue for; according to this understanding, the Trichotomy Thesis analytically true. 
Chang attempts to argue (pp. 661 – 4) that this would be a mistake, and that there is room 
for a fourth quantitatively comparative relation. Although I do not wish to beg the question 
against Chang, et al., I do want to emphasize the intuitive pull of the Trichotomy Thesis. 
Perhaps we should think of Ellis, Krantz, et al. and Swoyer as proposing substantive theories 
of quantitativity that include the Trichotomy Thesis, while acknowledging that there is 
conceptual room for a competing theory that recognized four exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive relations of quantitative comparison. 
106 A proponent of the “tetrachotomy theory” of quantitativity must deny this thesis. 
Although this denial provides a certain flexibility concerning which substances and 
properties may count as quantities, the corresponding scales and units of measurements are 
limited in their usefulness and in the amount of information they may provide.  
107 Ellis makes this claim, but it is not clearly an essential element of the correct theory of 
quantities. If it is possible for there to be distinct but necessarily coextensive quantities, such 
as n-angularity and n-laterality, then this claim is false.  
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The main argument for [this kind of] realism is an argument from the best 
explanation. Scientific realists make the reasonable assumption that the best 
explanations we have of why things behave as they do are the accepted scientific 
ones. These explanations normally purport to refer to theoretical entities of some 
kinds. Therefore, they argue, it is at least the case that the world behaves as if things 
of these kinds existed. Yet the best explanation of why this should be so is that 
things like these really do exist… Now the most striking thing about the fundamental 
properties of nature is that they are nearly all quantitative. That is, they come in 
degrees. Therefore, any adequate ontology for science must recognize the 
fundamental existence of quantitative universals (i.e. universals like mass, charge, 
spin, color, flavor, strangeness, and so on) that may be variously instantiated.108  
 
Ellis goes on to point out that such properties as electromagnetic charge seem to be both 
quantitative and intrinsic to the things that have them (intrinsic because of their relative 
stability; quantitative because of their potential to be greater or less than they actually are), 
and concludes that “the main argument for scientific realism, thus, comes out decisively in 
favor of the existence of some intrinsic quantitative properties.”109 Swoyer echoes this idea, 
claiming that realism about science and measurement requires us to avail ourselves of 
properties. He writes that  
 
Writers like Feyerabend and Kuhn maintain that theoretical terms draw their 
meaning from the theories in which they occur, so that a change in a theory causes a 
shift in the meanings of all its constituent terms… The common, and I believe 
correct, realist response to such versions of semantic holism is to argue that the 
denotations of terms can remain constant through some changes in a theory and, 
indeed, that different theories may contain terms that denote the same thing. Since 
denotation is what determines truth value, one theory may make a claim about a 
given sort of thing, e.g. rest mass, which a competing theory denies… But this 
response cuts little ice unless there are things that the terms of a theory can have as 
denotations, and since most terms in theories are predicates and function symbols, 
the only very obvious candidates for their denotations are things like properties.110  
 
                                                
108 Ellis 1992, pp. 175 – 6. 
109 Ellis 1992, p. 176. 
110 Swoyer, pp. 242 – 3.  
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So, on this view, the objects of measurement—quantitative properties—are seen as 
ontologically and conceptually prior to the techniques, procedures, and results of 
measurement. As Forge puts it, “realists of all persuasions will maintain, contrary to the 
operationalist, that order is discovered, not created, by the application of measurement 
procedures.”111 Quantities are independent of our minds and our activities. This is the sense 
in which the view is “realism.” It is not a strictly Platonic realism, however. Plato believed 
that the forms are real, but he believed that reality comes in degrees and that the forms are 
more real than the concrete objects that are their instances.112  
This idea has struck many critics as ontologically unparsimonious and backward. But 
a moderate realism, beginning with D. M. Armstrong’s Universals and Scientific Realism, has 
been the dominant viewpoint for several decades; as Mundy points out, the dominance of 
the positivist, nominalist viewpoint is an odd feature of the literature on measurement 
theory. He writes,  
 
Indeed, even the name ‘theory of measurement’ replacing the older ‘theory of 
quantity’ suggests an empiricist, reductionist, or nominalist approach, focusing on 
the medium rather than the object of quantitative knowledge… It must be regarded 
as something of an anomaly that the theory of quantity has been studied almost 
exclusively from those viewpoints. The only exception known to me is an article of 
Byerly and Lazara, who observe that quantitative reasoning may equally well be 
interpreted from the contrary viewpoints of scientific realism as opposed to 
positivism and Platonism as opposed to nominalism, and who advocate such 
interpretations on philosophical grounds.113 
 
Furthermore, Mundy points out that realism about quantities can be thought of as an a 
posteriori or naturalistic version of realism, since belief in the relevant universals and their 
second-order quantitative structure are supported by “reference to their observable 
                                                
111 Forge 1995, p. 595. 
112 Plato, The Republic, pp. 514a – 517c, 532b.  
113 Mundy, p. 35.  
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consequences, using the hypothetico-deductive method of natural science. Such a view has 
been maintained by Armstrong concerning properties and relations, and by Quine 
concerning sets.”114 Mundy also suggests that rather than taking their appearance in 
statements of laws of nature to be constitutive of quantities, we should take laws of nature to 
be constituted by second-order relations between various quantities. So, in effect, laws of 
nature are defined in terms of quantities, not the other way around.115 
Swoyer points out that realism plays an important role in the unity of science, noting 
that “the use of different procedures to measure what we take to be the same magnitude is 
not a practical contrivance to avoid more magnitudes… than we can keep straight.” Rather, 
it enables us “to obtain a general and unified picture of nature that minimizes the number of 
unrelated, brute facts by displaying the same laws and causal mechanisms at work behind 
apparently unrelated phenomena.”116 Swoyer thinks we have good reason to believe in 
properties and relations as genuine entities (that is, as multiply-instantiable universals117) 
because of their explanatory value, and that, furthermore, these particular kinds of 
properties—the quantitative kinds—play an important explanatory role that more ordinary 
properties and relations are not well-equipped to play.118  
                                                
114 Mundy, p. 46. He cites Armstrong 1978a and 1978b, and Quine 1960. Although Mundy 
argues that realism is better supported empirically than is nominalism, it is possible that he has 
overstated his case.  
115 Mundy, p. 48 – 9. 
116Swoyer, p. 238.  
117 As it happens, all of the proponents of realism about quantities do so from the perspective of 
multiply-instantiable universals, so I will proceed in this dissertation as though that is what they 
are. However, many philosophers with realist tendencies have nevertheless found universals to 
be problematic or incoherent. This is not a serious problem for realism about quantities because 
it is possible to formulate a trope-theoretic version of realism about quantities.  
118 This account of quantities in terms of properties is incomplete because it lacks an explanation 
of the quantitative structure of the properties—it fails to explain what it is about the quantities 
that is uniquely quantitative. I delay this discussion until the end of Chapter IV, following the 
discussion of measurement and scales. I hope that the reasons for this delay will become clear. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MEASUREMENT AND NUMERICAL STRUCTURE 
 
1. Measurement 
In a landmark paper on the topic, S. S. Stevens argues that measurement is “the 
assignment of numerals to objects or events according to rules,” claiming that any rule will 
do.119 The assignment of numbers to individual baseball players is a kind of measurement 
according to Stevens, as is the assignment of numbers to temperatures, as per the Celsius 
scale. But according to Ellis, not just any rule (or set of rules) will work. For example, there 
might have been a rule in place according to which Paul Revere would climb into the tower 
of the Old North Church and hang a sign reading “2,” and according to which “2” should 
be interpreted as “The British are approaching tonight by land.” This assignment of a 
numeral to an event is a code, not a measurement.  
The process of measurement, according to Ellis, is the process of assigning numbers 
to represent quantities;120 a scale of measurement, according to Ellis, gives an interpretation 
or semantics to pure arithmetic.121 That is, measurement gives a way of interpreting numbers 
and the various mathematical functions that apply to them. So, for example, measuring 
electrical resistance in ohms gives us a way of interpreting, e.g., the numbers ‘3’ and ‘4’ as 
amounts of electrical resistance. It also gives us a way of interpreting the mathematical 
                                                
119 Stevens, p. 677. 
120 Ellis 1966, p. 24.  
121 Ellis 1966, p. 14. Ellis argues that a way of assigning numbers to objects must satisfy 
several conditions if it is to count as genuine measurement. The details of these conditions 
are not of paramount importance for our purposes.  
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function denoted by ‘+’ as the splicing together of objects with the property of being 
resistant to electrical current to some degree. In this way, measuring electrical resistance in 
ohms gives us a way of interpreting ‘3 + 4 = 7’ in terms of amounts of resistance and perfect 
splicing operations: splicing a wire with three ohms of resistance, end-to-end with a wire 
with four ohms of resistance yields a wire with seven ohms of resistance.122 Ellis says that a 
linear scale is one in which the numerical assignments are proportional to the quantities 
themselves; a nonlinear scale is one in which the numerical assignments are not proportional 
to the quantities.123  
The fact that numbers can be assigned to objects in different ways and according to 
different sets of rules gives rise to different scales of measurement. A scale is way of ranking 
objects with respect to a quantity—a function from objects to numbers. Two scales, A and 
B, measure the same quantity if and only if scale A contains all and only the same items in 
the same order as scale B. Scale A is identical to scale B if and only if the assignment of 
numerals to objects according to scale A is identical to the assignment of numerals to objects 
according to scale B.124 The controversy between operationalists and realists rears its head 
here. Proponents of these theories disagree concerning whether it is proper to regard scales 
as functions from objects to numerals, as I have said, or as functions from objects to 
numbers, as the operationalists say. According to operationalism, measurement operations 
are ontologically prior to the quantities measured. This leads them to regard the numbers 
that result from measurement operations as not representing the objects measured as they 
are independent of our activities, and this leads them to be cautious about taking the 
numbers at face value. See, for example, Dingle. I regard this caution as unwarranted, 
                                                
122 Ellis 1966, pp. 14 – 5.  
123 Ellis 1966, p. 3. 
124 Ellis 1966, p. 38, Stevens, p. 677.  
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however, and regard the ontological cost as being worth the explanatory value of realism 
about quantities. 
According to Krantz et al., measurement exploits an identity of structure—a 
homomorphism—between some empirical phenomenon and the real numbers.125 They write 
that 
 
The conclusion aimed for is not that a certain procedure is possible, but rather that a 
numerical function φ satisfying certain properties exists. The procedure to be used in 
assigning numbers (constructing φ) is not specified in posing the problem; thus, quite 
distinct axiomatizations, which operate through different procedures—say, counting 
units and solving inequalities—may be used.  
 
The next step, a small but important one, recognizes that the numerical assignment 
φ, satisfying [certain conditions to be explained in subsequent sections], is a 
homomorphism of an empirical relational structure into a numerical relational 
structure…  
 
From this standpoint, measurement may be regarded as the construction of 
homomorphisms (scales) from empirical relational structures of interest into 
numerical relational structures that are useful.126  
 
According to Krantz, et al., that is, a scale of measurement is a function from empirical 
phenomena to the real numbers that satisfies certain conditions. Which particular conditions 
must be satisfied is determined by the type of scale it is, as classified by Stevens’s statistical 
method (which is discussed in detail below in 3.2). Measurement in this sense is possible 
because certain empirical phenomena—certain properties, that is—exhibit structure 
isomorphic to that of the real number line. Their idea is that there exist sets of empirical 
phenomena, A, a binary ordering relation on A, f, and a three-place concatenation relation 
on A, °, holding among a, b, and c in A, such that (c = a ° b), such that there is a function φ 
from 〈A, f, °〉 to 〈Re, >, +〉, where Re is the set of real numbers, ‘>’ is the familiar relation of 
                                                
125 Krantz, et al. pp. 8 – 9. 
126 Krantz, et al. pp. 8 – 9.  
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greater than on the reals, and ‘+’ is the familiar relation of addition on the reals.127 φ is a 
homomorphism because the relations > and + preserve the relational structure of f and °. 
Stevens seems to agree. He writes that 
 
Scales are possible in the first place only because there is a certain isomorphism 
between what we can do with the aspects of objects and the properties of the 
numeral series. In dealing with the aspects of objects we invoke empirical operations 
for determining equality (classifying), for rank-ordering, and for determining when 
differences and when ratios between the aspects of objects are equal. … The 
isomorphism between these properties of the numeral series and certain empirical 
operations which we perform with objects permits the use of the series as a model to 
represent aspects of the empirical world.128  
 
Stevens’s idea is that objects have certain “aspects,” or features, or properties that have a 
structure identical to corresponding structures and properties of the real numbers. This 
isomorphism allows us to use the real number line to represent “aspects of the empirical 
world.” And this amenability of some empirical phenomena to being modeled by numbers is 
what makes measurement possible and useful.  
Swoyer echoes this account of measurement. According to Swoyer,  
 
The best explanation why a mathematical theory applies to certain concrete 
phenomena—when it does—is that the theory involves some of the same structural 
features as the phenomena. On this account, when we establish a measurement scale, 
for example one for measuring lengths in meters, we set up a correspondence between 
the lengths of objects and the positive real numbers. Each length is paired with a 
corresponding numerical counterpart or representative… and fundamental qualitative 
relational properties of lengths like being longer than are correlated with corresponding 
numerical relations like >. Roughly speaking, we can say that the representing numerical 
system has the same structure as a set of objects of varying lengths if certain concrete 
objects stand in the corresponding numerical relation; for example, it might be that 
the number representing object a is less than the number representing b just in case a 
is shorter than b.129  
 
                                                
127 Krantz, et al., p. 8.  
128 Stevens, p. 677. 
129 Swoyer, pp. 247 – 8. 
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Swoyer goes on to claim that the key fact is that some empirical phenomena have structure 
isomorphic to that of the real numbers, not that there exist operations that reveal this 
structure.130 Ellis disagrees; his account of measurement ties the existence of scales to the 
availability of measurement procedures that generate the desired numbers.131 However, it is 
clear that this is unnecessary. We might have a merely hypothetical scale, in the absence of a 
practical way to take measurements, but this is impossible according to Ellis’s view. The 
crucial factor is the existence of a function from objects or determinate properties to 
numbers meeting the relevant formal constraints. That there should be properties and 
relations like this is an interesting and substantive claim about the world, and is best 
understood in terms of a scientific realism, not a nominalistic or operationalistic 
metaphysical framework.  
2. Scales of Measurement 
As we just saw, the fact that numbers can be assigned to objects in different ways 
and according to different sets of rules leads to different scales of measurement.132 As we 
saw in the previous section, a scale is way of ranking objects with respect to a quantity—a 
function from objects to numbers. Although Stevens claims that measurement is simply the 
assignment of numbers to objects according to rules, Ellis points out that there must be 
some restrictions on which rules are admissible. These restrictions are necessary to guarantee 
that the numerical assignments carry information—the point of measurement, after all, is to 
use numbers to represent facts about the world.133 Two scales measure the same quantity if 
                                                
130 Swoyer, p. 251.  
131 Ellis 1966, p. 43. 
132 See Campbell, Ellis 1966, Krantz, et al., Mundy, Swoyer, and Stevens. 
133 Ellis 1966, pp. 39 – 40. More to come in this and the following section about what this 
means and how it is accomplished.  
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and only if scale A contains all and only the same items in the same order as scale B, where 
the objects of measurement are conceived as being determinate properties, not the objects 
that instantiate them—otherwise n-angularity and n-laterality for regular polygons would end 
up being identical quantities. Scale A is identical to scale B if and only if the assignment of 
numerals to objects according to scale A is identical to the assignment of numerals to objects 
according to scale B.134  
Any complete description of quantitative phenomena makes ineliminable reference 
to a set of relations of quantitative comparison, and the process of measurement is the 
process of assigning numbers to represent quantities.135 The idea here is that since scales are 
functions from objects (or properties) to numbers, if any two scales, A and B, are such that 
A assigns all the same objects (or properties) to all the same numbers as B, then A and B are 
identical. Since every measurement must be made on some scale, if we have a rule for 
making numerical assignments, we have a scale of measurement, since each such rule defines 
a function from a set of objects to the real numbers.136 To have a scale us just to have such a 
function.  
This has some interesting consequences. According to Ellis, it is possible to discover 
and identify a quantity without also discovering a means of measuring it.137 But apparently 
you do need a means of measuring the quantity to have a scale, and if the means of 
measuring is limited, so is the scale. For example, it used to be the case that our procedures 
for measuring temperature were unable to measure down to absolute zero. When that was 
the case, there were some objects in the temperature ordering that we couldn’t actually go 
out and measure. Those objects were not on the Fahrenheit scale at that time, then.  
                                                
134 Ellis 1966, p. 38, Stevens, p. 677.  
135 Ellis 1966, p. 24.  
136 Ellis 1966, p. 39. 
137 Ellis 1966, p. 37.  
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Ellis questions whether this view is really true. His counterexample involves several 
items on his desk: a child’s toy tractor, a coffee cup, an ink bottle, and a packet of cigarettes. 
He assigns them numbers according to some rule, and the numbers are 2, 2, 2, 3. He doubts 
whether he’s measured the objects. He seems to be correct about this, because this 
assignment of numbers does not represent an isomorphism between empirical phenomena 
and the structure of the real number line. Although there technically exists a rule that 
describes his application of the numbers to the relevant objects—“apply ‘2’ to the toy, the 
coffee cup, and the ink bottle; apply ‘3’ to the pack of cigarettes”—he nevertheless applies 
the numbers in an arbitrary manner, and there is no structure being represented as 
homomorphic to that of the number line. The numbers are not being used to sort, 
categorize, or even name the objects. So although Ellis’s counterexample may show that 
Stevens’s account is naïve and inadequate, it does not present a genuine difficulty for the 
richer, function-based theory of scales proposed by Krantz, et al.  
2.1. Types of Scales: Stevens’s Statistical Classification 
As we have seen, a scale of measurement is a function from objects to real numbers, 
and the point of this is that it provides a way of ranking items in order with respect to their 
relative places in the relevant set of quantitative relationships while representing certain 
structural features of the ordering. Different types of scales have different properties; some 
types of scale have more restrictions on the acceptability of the ordering, and therefore carry 
more information than others. According to Stevens,138 the different types of scales are 
defined by the statistical or mathematical operations that leave the scale form-invariant. That 
is, by which mathematical operations do not alter the relevant properties of the relationships 
                                                
138 Stevens, p. 678. 
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that hold between the items ranked on it. This also determines the amount of information 
yielded by the ordering. Ellis calls this type of classification of scales “mathematical.”139  
The weakest type of scale considered by Stevens is the nominal scale. This scale 
imposes the fewest restrictions on the way the numbers can be assigned. The basic operation 
of this type of scale is determination of equality or inequality. On this type of scale the 
numbers function as names for objects—this way of ranking objects is homomorphic to 
none of the relational features of the real number line. Ellis writes that “even the numbering 
of football players is a rudimentary form of measurement. The rule is that each player in a 
given team must be assigned one and only one numeral, but no two players may be assigned 
the same numeral.”140 A scale which assigned ‘1’ to Democrats, ‘2’ to Republicans, and ‘3’ to 
independents would satisfy the requirements for being a nominal scale, as well. The nominal 
scale measures sameness and difference, and nothing else. The numbers on such a scale carry 
no information about whether something is bigger, smaller, better, worse, greater or less 
than anything else. Measurability on a nominal scale is consistent with the relevant set of 
objects being unordered; with there being no greater than, less than, or equality relations 
among the objects measured.141 This strongly suggests that if nominal measurement is the 
highest level of measurement some determinable property is subject to, then that 
determinable property does not exhibit a quantitative structure.  
The next type of scale in Stevens’s classification is the ordinal scale, which is much 
richer than the nominal. This type of scale carries information about the greater than, less than, 
or equal to relations with respect to the relevant quantity. The objects ranked by this type of 
                                                
139 Stevens’s presentation of this material, though seminal, is both brief and undetailed. Ellis 
devotes considerably more space to Stevens’s ideas, and Krantz, et al. contains an extremely 
rich and thorough discussion of this material.  
140 Ellis 1966, p. 59. 
141 Although there is a clear sense in which Democrats are “better” than Republicans, this 
fact is not contained in or represented by this way of measuring political alliances. 
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scale are ranked in order. As Ellis says, “the numerals not only serve as distinguishing marks, 
they indicate an order.”142 A paradigm example of this type of scale cited by Stevens and 
Ellis is Mohs’ scale of the hardness of minerals as determined by which mineral scratches 
which. If mineral A scratches mineral B, then A is harder than B.143 That scale ranks the 
hardness of minerals in order from softest to hardest, such that if minerals are arranged in 
order of their hardness, they are also arranged in order of the numbers assigned by the scale. 
However, it is not the case that numbers on the Mohs scale are “equally spaced.” For 
example, on that scale quartz ranks 7 and topaz 8, separated by one unit, and corundum 
ranks 9 and diamond 10, also separated by one unit. However, it is not the case that the 
interval between 7 and 8 is identical in magnitude to the interval between 9 and 10—topaz is 
two times harder than quartz, while diamond is 3.75 times harder than corundum. The 
defining characteristic of scales of this type is that they may be transformed by any order-
preserving function, that is, any monotonic increasing144 function, without loss or distortion 
of information.  
Mathematical operations for discovering the median make sense when applied to 
ordinal measurements, because the median simply forms the border between the upper and 
lower halves of the relevant sample. Although it is important for this purpose to know the 
correct ordering of the sample, since this is necessary to establish which half is which, 
information about intervals is not important. Procedures for finding the arithmetic mean and 
standard deviation yield nonsensical results when applied to measurements on an ordinal 
scale, because each of these procedures relies on the interval properties of numbers. This can 
be seen by reflecting on the fact that the arithmetic mean of a sample can be drastically 
                                                
142 Ellis 1966, pp. 59 – 60.  
143 Ellis 1966, p. 59, and Stevens, p. 679. 
144 A monotonic increasing function is simply an order-preserving function. A monotonic 
decreasing function reverses the order. See Krantz et al. vol. 1.  
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affected by outlying, atypical members of the sample, and the standard deviation tells us 
what the typical interval between a random element of the sample and the arithmetic mean 
will be.  
There is a difference of opinion between Stevens and Ellis concerning whether 
ordinal measurement is sufficient for quantitativeness. According to Ellis, a property must 
meet the conditions for measurability on an ordinal scale to count as a quantity.145 According 
to Stevens, a property must be measurable on an interval scale to count as a quantity. He 
writes that “[w]ith the interval scale we come to a form that is “quantitative” in the ordinary 
sense of the word.”146 I suspect that Stevens’s is the more intuitive conception, since 
quantities are things that come in amounts of some kind, and the mere presence of an order 
is not sufficient.  
The next type of scale discussed by Stevens is the interval scale. The relative 
positions on this type of scale contain information about the relative sizes of intervals or of 
differences; interval scales tell us about the relative sizes of the items ranked on them.147 The 
objects ranked by this type of scale are ranked in order and the units of the scale are equal 
(or proportional somehow) to one another in size—numbers on an interval scale represent 
endpoints of intervals, not just spots in an order. The unit—the size of the interval—and the 
zero point are each arbitrary on an interval scale. An example of this type of scale is the 
Celsius scale of temperature: although the zero point on the scale is arbitrary, each successive 
point on the scale is warmer than the next, and a difference of one unit near the “bottom” of 
the scale is equal in size to a difference of one unit near the “top.” This type of scale tells us 
not only whether A is warmer than B, for example, it also tells us how much warmer. The 
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146 Stevens, p. 679.  
147 Stevens, pp. 678-9. 
88 
Gregorian calendar is also an interval scale. Its units are of equal size, and it has an arbitrary 
zero point.148 Almost all statistical operations are applicable to this type of scale, unless the 
operation implies the existence of a non-arbitrary zero point. This type of scale supports the 
use of arithmetic mean functions, standard deviations, rank-order correlations, and product-
moment correlations.149 The defining characteristic of scales of this type is that they may be 
transformed by any interval-preserving transformation; that is, by any transformation of the 
form y = mx + b—any linear transformation.  
There is a slight complication here concerning linear interval scales and logarithmic 
scales. An interval scale is linear if the intervals are equal in size; a nonlinear interval scale is 
one in which the numerical assignments are not equal in size. Logarithmic scales, such as the 
Richter scale of earthquake magnitude, are nonlinear, because, in the case of the Richter 
scale, each interval is smaller than the one that comes after it. So, for example, an earthquake 
of magnitude 5 on the Richter scale releases 33.6 times the energy of an earthquake of 
magnitude 4, but a magnitude 6 earthquake releases 1,000 times the energy of a magnitude 4 
earthquake. Although there are intervals on such a scale, the intervals are not equal in size. 
Differences of interval on a logarithmic scales do carry information about the relative size of 
the interval, but the intervals are not equal in size to one another. Logarithmic scales are 
useful principally in applications in which proportionally very large or very small values must 
be represented.  
Because of the existence of useful logarithmic scales, Ellis does not agree that this 
criterion of sameness of interval is important.150 But although the units of a logarithmic scale 
are not equal in size, they are unequal in a systematic way. For example, although the Richter 
                                                
148 Periods of time can be measured on a ratio scale, however.  
149 Stevens, p. 678.  
150 Ellis 1966, p. 60 – 2. 
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scale is not a linear interval scale, does give us information about how much greater in 
magnitude a 7.5 earthquake is than a 6.5 earthquake. Using the ranking provided by the 
Richter scale we could determine the average magnitude of earthquakes. So although the 
sameness of intervals may not be of particular importance, the presence of intervals is. 
Furthermore, interval scales that represent intervals as being the same are often far more 
useful than those that do not.  
If interval measurement is possible, then equations of the following forms can be 
true, where the variables stand for number assignments made on the relevant scale, and 
where (i), (ii), and (iii) represent a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of possibilities (again, 
assuming the equal spacing of a linear interval scale):  
 
i) |A – B| > |C – D| 
ii) |A – B| < |C – D| 
iii) |A – B| = |C – D| 
 
This is because the absolute value of the result of subtracting B from A is identical the 
interval between them; it is determined by the distance or space between the two points on 
the scale. As long as the relevant variables represent numbers from the same interval scale, it 
the above equations will yield meaningful results.  
But if the numbers in the equation are on an ordinal scale, subtraction equations 
such as the ones contained in (i), (ii), and (iii) will not yield coherent results. For example, the 
result of a race, in which each racer is assigned a number representing the order of his finish, 
is an example of a merely ordinal scale. The “units” of a race result are just spots in the 
order. They don’t represent intervals, so one cannot meaningfully subtract numbers 
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representing spots in finishing order from one another and compare the results, so there are 
no genuine intervals on the scale. A mapping of the variables of the above equation onto 
spots in a race-finishing order yields nonsense:  
 
a) | 2nd – 1st| = |4th – 3rd| 
 
It doesn’t make sense to subtract numbers representing positions in an order from one 
another and compare the magnitudes of the results, since the results do not represent true 
intervals. “Second place minus first place” is not equal (or equivalent) to fifth place minus 
fourth place.151 It does, however, make sense to subtract numbers representing intervals 
from one another and then to compare the magnitudes of the results.  
Another example of a purely ordinal scale is the scale that measures degrees of 
consanguinity. x is a cousin of y if and only if x and y share a common ancestor, but neither 
is a descendant of the other. The ordinal degree of the cousinhood relationships is derived 
from the smallest number of generations separating the cousins from their common 
ancestor. So if my grandparents are your grandparents, then we’re first cousins. And if my 
grandparents are your great-grandparents (and I’m not your dad), then we’re first cousins, 
once removed. And if my great-grandparents are your great grandparents (and we’re not first 
cousins), then we’re second cousins.152 But again, it does not make sense to add or subtract 
                                                
151 This should not be confused with what happens when a first-place finisher is disqualified 
on a doping violation. Second, moved up one spot, is first. Moving up one spot is not the 
same thing as subtracting the first position from the second. 
152 Although we do not use the term in this way, this definition of ‘cousin’ entails that my 
brother and I are cousins. There is some historical antecedent for this use, although it has 
been completely replaced by other, more precise terminology. Presumably siblings would 
count as zero-level cousins.  
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degrees of consanguinity from one another. Equations like (i) are nonsensical when the 
ordinal numbers are interpreted as degrees of consanguinity.  
The Celsius scale of temperature is an example of a genuine interval scale. A 
mapping of the variables in the above equation onto numbers representing degrees Celsius is 
well-formed: 
 
b) |34° – 33°| = |44° – 43°|  
 
c) |30° – 20°| > |30° – 25°| 
 
The result of the left-hand side of equation (b) is 1 degree; subtracting the interval whose 
endpoint is 33 from the interval whose endpoint is 34 yields an interval equivalent to the 
interval whose endpoint is 1, as does subtracting the interval whose endpoint is 43 from the 
interval whose endpoint is 44. On the Celsius scale of temperature, one degree is equal to 
one degree. The result of the left-hand side of equation (c) is ten degrees. The right hand 
side has a different result: five degrees. Equation (c) says that the difference between thirty 
degrees and twenty is greater than the difference between thirty and twenty-five. This sort of 
manipulation is possible if the scale in question is an interval scale, and is the defining 
characteristic of this type of scale. Among the statistical operations applicable to numbers on 
an interval scale are the arithmetic mean, the standard deviation, and various types of 
correlation.  
The strongest type of scale discussed by Stevens is the ratio scale. This type of scale 
imposes the largest set of restrictions on the way the numbers can be assigned to the objects 
ranked. The objects ranked on a ratio scale are ranked in order, the units represent genuine 
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intervals, and there is a non-arbitrary, natural, or “true” zero point. Scales of this form are 
therefore homomorphic to the real number line in every important way. The basic operation 
of this type of scale is the determination of equality of ratios, and the defining characteristic 
of scales of this type is that they may be transformed by any ratio-preserving 
transformation—any transformation of the form y = mx. Stevens claims that the scales for 
mass, absolute temperature, and length, among others, are ratio scales.153 Swoyer elaborates, 
writing that “Length can be measured on a ratio scale, and this means that once a unit (e.g. 
the meter) is conventionally selected, there will be an objective fact as to how many meters 
long any given object is (since this will just be a fact about the ratio of its length to that of 
the meter bar).”154 Ellis disagrees; he argues that these scales are at best logarithmic interval 
scales, and at worst ordinal scales.155 
All types of statistical operations are applicable to this type of scale. So something is 
measurable on a ratio scale if it is a quantity; the objects ranked (whatever they are) are of 
determinate size; when one item is greater than or less than another item with respect to the 
quantity, it is greater than or less than by some determinate amount; and there is a natural, 
non-arbitrary zero point.156  
2.2. Theory of Measurement 
How are scales for quantities related to the quantities themselves? According to 
Krantz, et al., measurement begins with the recognition of the existence of an empirical 
ordering relation. This relation, which we symbolize using ‘≿’, is an ordering on a non-
numerical set, A, and is isomorphic to the ordering relation expressed by ‘≥’ on the real 
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154 Swoyer, p. 237. 
155 Ellis 1966, p. 61. 
156 Ellis 1966, pp. 61-2.  
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numbers. We should think of A as being the set of all determinates of a particular 
determinable Q, and when there exists an ordering relation ≿ on A, then Q is a quantity. A is 
ordered by ≿ if and only if for any not necessarily distinct elements of A, a and b, either a ≿ b 
or b ≿ a. We can define an equality relation on A, ‘~’, in the following manner: a ~ b if and 
only if a ≿ b and b ≿ a.157 So, for example, let Q be the determinable property mass, and let A 
be the set of all determinate mass properties. ≿ is an order on the set of determinate mass 
properties if and only if for any determinate mass properties q1 and q2, either q1 ≿ q2 or q2 ≿ 
q1. And if that is the case, then mass is a quantity.  
On this kind of picture, a scale for a quantity, φ, is a function from A to the set of 
real numbers such that φ(a) ≥ φ(b) if and only if a ≿ b. We also say that φ(a) = φ(b) if and 
only if φ(a) ≥ φ(b) and φ(b) ≥ φ(a), and it follows that φ(a) = φ(b) if and only if a ≿ b and b ≿ 
a. The degree of isomorphism between set A and the set of real numbers depends on the 
characteristics of φ. If φ is a nominal scale, then it preserves only sameness and difference 
and is isomorphic to the set of the reals only in that each real number is identical to itself 
and no distinct real numbers are identical to each other. If φ is an ordinal scale, then A is 
isomorphic to the set of the reals at least in that each element of A has either a predecessor, 
or a successor, or both. if that’s the case, then all monotonic increasing transformations φ → 
ψ are permissible and leave the scale form-invariant, since any such transformation is order 
preserving. If φ is an interval scale, then A is isomorphic the set of the reals in that it 
contains intervals and it makes sense to think of the elements of A as being “equally 
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spaced.” In this case, the unit of φ is arbitrary, as is its origin—its zero point.158 And if that’s 
the case, then all transformations φ → ψ of the form ψ = mφ + b are permissible and leave 
the scale form-invariant, since these transformations are interval preserving.159 Finally, if φ is 
a ratio scale, then although its unit may be arbitrary, its zero-point is not. If this is the case, 
then A is isomorphic to the set of the reals in the strongest possible sense: in addition to 
sameness and difference, the presence of an order, and the existence of intervals, there exist 
ratios between its elements. And if that’s the case, all transformations φ → ψ of the form ψ 
= mφ are permissible and leave the scale form-invariant, this type of transformation is ratio 
preserving.160 
A scale of measurement, φ, represents a way of assigning numbers to determinate 
properties; it is a function that assigns a number to each determinate property of the relevant 
determinable. This is useful when the determinable is a quantity because if that’s the case, 
then the determinates are related to one another in a way that is isomorphic to the 
relationships between the numbers themselves. In the case of the SI (or “gram”) scale for 
mass, for example, the numerical assignments might be made in the following way: choose 
an arbitrary unit—some exemplar of the determinate mass property that will serve as the 
basis for comparison—and use an equal-arm balance to determine how many copies of the 
arbitrary unit balanced against the item being weighed cause the arm to remain level.161 So if 
                                                
158 Krantz, et al. p. 10. 
159 Krantz, et al. p. 11; Stevens p. 679. 
160 Krantz, et al. pp. 11 – 12; Stevens p. 679. 
161 There are, of course, practical problems with this procedure. For one thing, there is a limit 
to the number of grams any practically-sized balance may hold. For another thing, friction 
between the arm and the fulcrum causes the measurements to be imprecise in a way that can 
be minimized but not eliminated. Krantz, et al. point out that for this reason the relation 
expressed by ‘∼’ is not necessarily transitive—there exists an a, b, and c such that a ∼ b, and 
b ∼ c, but it is not the case that a ∼ c. It is unclear how severe this problem is; in a central 
range of cases, it is plausible to regard this phenomenon as a practical difficulty stemming 
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an object x is placed in one pan of an equal-arm balance, the arm of the balance is level, and 
there are n copies of the arbitrary gram standard in the balance’s other pan, then x is 
assigned a mass n in grams. This procedure, while crude, satisfies the criteria necessary and 
sufficient for being a scale of measurement. For example, where ‘≿’ is the ordering on the set 
A of mass properties from greatest mass to least, a ≿ b if and only if a’s weight in grams is at 
least that of b (that is, if φ(a) ≥ φ(b)); b ≿ a if and only if b’s weight in grams is at least that of 
a (that is, if φ(b) ≥ φ(a)); a ≿ b and b ≿ a if and only if a’s weight in grams is equal to that of b 
(that is, if φ(a) = φ(b)).  
 
                                                                                                                                            
from imperfections in the procedures and technology that produce the numerical 
assignments, and does not reflect any in-principle trouble with those assignments.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
IN DEFENSE OF THE TRICHOTOMY THESIS 
 
1. Introductory Remarks 
According to a standard picture, there is an exhaustive set of three mutually exclusive 
relations of quantitative comparison: greater than; less than; and equal to. This picture has been 
called the Trichotomy Thesis, and although it is intuitive and plausible, it has been called into 
question by such philosophers as Derek Parfit, James Griffin, Joseph Raz, and Ruth Chang. 
Chang’s discussion is particularly rich, for she proposes and provides a detailed account of a 
possible fourth relation that, she argues, provides a satisfying explanation of hard cases of 
comparison. In this paper, I will examine a version of the main argument against the 
Trichotomy Thesis, and attempt to show that it is unsound.  
2. A Series of Cases 
The idea that there is an exhaustive trichotomy of mutually exclusive quantitative 
relationships has been called the “Trichotomy Thesis,”162 and is a piece of philosophical 
orthodoxy. It is assumed by all the major writers on the topic of measurement,163 decision 
and game theory,164 and appears to be analytic.165 However, according to several prominent 
                                                
162 See Chang 1997, Chang 2002, pp. 659 – 88, and Chang 2005, pp. 331 – 50. 
163 See Ellis 1966, Krantz, et al. 1971, Mundy, pp. 29 – 54, and Stevens, pp. 677 – 80. 
164 See, e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern, Luce and Raiffa, and Resnik. 
165 Wasserman, p. 392. 
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philosophers,166 there are situations in which the precision necessary to determine which of 
the three possible relations holds is unavailable, and this imprecision is not epistemic, but is 
intrinsic to the cases. Parfit’s argument concerns the relative merits of three candidates for a 
literary prize: Poet1, Poet2, and Novelist. Poet1 is neither better nor worse than Novelist with 
respect to literary merit, and Poet2 is slightly better than Poet1. Parfit claims that this 
relationship of equality violates an intuitively plausible principle of transitivity: that Poet2 is 
slightly better than Poet1 while Poet1 is neither better nor worse than Novelist seems as 
though it would entail that Poet2 is slightly better than Novelist, but it does not, because 
judgments of literary merit are insufficiently precise. “Must it be true of Proust and Keats,” 
he writes, “either that one was the greater writer, or that both were exactly equally great? 
There could not be, even in principle, such precision.”167 Griffin writes, “Some values are 
only roughly equal, and the roughness is not in our understanding but ineradicably in the 
values themselves.”168 Although it is not completely clear, his remarks suggest that he intends 
to call the Trichotomy Thesis into question.  
Another case, due to Joseph Raz, concerns a choice between two careers: being a 
lawyer, and being a professional hang-glider.169 The law career would be more financially 
rewarding, but at the cost of long hours, lots of schooling, and many dull days spent poring 
over law books. The hang-gliding career would contain more excitement, a more flexible 
schedule, and would permit more time for extracurricular pursuits, but at the cost of 
financial security and risk to life and limb. Although the hang-gliding career is better in 
certain respects than the career in law, and the career in law may be better in other respects, 
                                                
166 See Parfit, p 431, Griffin 1986, pp. 81 – 92, Raz 1985-86, pp. 117 – 134, and Raz 1997, 
pp. 110 – 28. 
167 Parfit, p. 431.  
168 Griffin 1986 pp. 80 – 1. 
169 In Raz 1985-86. 
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but perhaps neither is better than the other simpliciter, and we are asked to fill in the details in 
such a way as to make it as plausible as possible that this is the case. Raz argues that it 
nevertheless seems that the two careers could not be precisely equally good. There is a 
similar failure of transitivity: adding $1,000 to the annual salary of the hang-gliding career 
seems to be sufficient to make it better as a career than it previously was, but insufficient to 
make it better than the career in law.170  
Ruth Chang presents another influential case: between Michelangelo and Mozart, 
who is the more creative? 171 According to Chang, they are both creative, so they are 
comparable respect to creativity. But she maintains that no member of the trichotomy holds: 
Michelangelo is not more creative than Mozart (Michelangelo wasn’t composing any operatic 
masterpieces) Mozart is not more creative than Michelangelo (Mozart wasn’t designing any 
domes) and Michelangelo and Mozart are not equally creative, because such precision is 
impossible. Furthermore, a slightly improved version of Michelangelo would clearly be more 
creative than Michelangelo but would not clearly be more creative than Mozart. According 
to Chang, this strongly suggests that the Trichotomy Thesis is false and that there is a fourth, 
sui generis, relation of quantitative comparison, “parity.”  
According to Chang, parity is a three-place relation of quantitative comparison that 
relates two objects with respect to a quantity. A and B are on a par with respect to Q if and 
only if A and B are comparable with respect to Q, but neither is greater than the other, nor 
are they equal. Furthermore, when parity holds, it is not the result of ignorance about how A 
compares with B, nor is it the result of semantic or ontological indeterminacy, nor is it a 
                                                
170 Raz 1985-86, p. 325. 
171 Chang 1997, Chang 2002, and Chang 2005. Chang argues that the three traditional 
quantitative comparisons are not exhaustive, and that they must be supplemented with a 
fourth relation, which she names “parity.” Her critics include Espinoza, Gert, Hsieh, and 
Wasserman. 
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result of A and B being incomparable.172 On this picture, if two items are comparable, then 
either one is greater than the other, they are equal, or they are on a par. Parity’s primary 
logical property is that it, unlike equality, is non-transitive. That is, if A is on a par with B and 
B is on a par with C, nothing follows about A’s parity with C. 
The examples used to motivate denial of the Trichotomy Thesis are all similar in 
structure, exploiting intransitive apparent instances of equality that satisfy the following 
schema: where Q is a quantity and A and B are comparable with respect to Q, A is equal to 
B; there exists a slightly improved version of A, A+, such that it is greater than A; but A+ is 
still equal to B. Given the transitivity of equality, the trio of relations is inconsistent: if (A = 
B) and (B = A+), it follows that (A = A+), so it follows that ~(A+ > A). These 
philosophers reject the supposition that (A = B). Chang proposes instead that parity holds; 
the non-transitivity of parity allows her to claim that (A+ > A) is compatible with (A ≈ B)173 
and (B ≈ A+), and suggests that this will help us solve some problems with the sort of utility 
functions used in decision theory, but does not spell out how this will be accomplished.174 
Parity is a fully determinate relation, and not merely an indeterminate version of some 
member or members of the traditional trichotomy.  
3. The Small Improvement Argument 
The Small Improvement Argument175 can be thought of as a reductio against the 
Trichotomy Thesis. Suppose the Trichotomy thesis is true. If, for example, Michelangelo is 
neither more nor less creative than Mozart, we may conclude that they are equally creative. 
                                                
172 Chang 2002, pp. 660 – 2.  
173 Where ‘x ≈ y’ means “x is on a par with y.” 
174 For his part, Griffin is not convinced. See his 1986, p. 81 and 4 of this chapter. 
175 See de Sousa, p. 545, Parfit, p. 431, Griffin 1986, p. 81, Raz 1985 – 86, p. 325, and 
Sinnott-Armstrong 1988, p. 67.  
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Now consider a slightly improved version of Michelangelo, Michelangelo+; imagine that 
Michelangelo+ painted one extra minor fresco—though small, it is a difference.176 However, 
because the improvement is so slight, it is unclear that it is enough to cause Michelangelo+ 
to be more creative than Mozart. How can one fresco make the difference when both artists 
were so creative? It can’t, so it is not the case that Michelangelo+ is greater than Mozart with 
respect to creativity. This, in conjunction with some auxiliary inferences, entails that the 
Trichotomy Thesis is false—in particular, it would seem that the quantitative trichotomy is 
not exhaustive.177  
 
The Small Improvement Argument 
 
1. Trichotomy Thesis Suppose for reductio 
2. ~(A > B) & ~(A < B) 
3. A+ > A 
4. ~(A+ > B) 
5. A = B 1, 2 
6. A+ > B 3, 5, Quantitative Transitivity 
7. (A+ > B) & ~(A+ > B) 4, 6, Conjunction 
 
8. ∴~TT Reductio ad Absurdum 
                                                
176 The thesis that creativity is affected in a straightforward a manner by the number of 
creations the artist has produced is dubious. Although I have produced thousands of 
drawings, I can only draw one thing and almost all of my drawings are of that one thing. I 
am not very creative with respect to drawing, even though I am very productive. In general, 
increasing productivity does not directly increase creativity.  
177 Chang 2002, pp. 687 – 8.  
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The phenomenon is widespread. Other examples include the philosophy department hiring 
committee who is trying to assess the relative potential for future research of two applicants, 
or the more impressive of two structures: Stonehenge or Salisbury Cathedral.178 In each case, 
we are unwilling to claim that either item is better or worse than its competitor with respect 
to the relevant value, though we conceive of a slightly improved version of the first item that 
is legitimately better, but in which the improvement is so slight that it fails to render the 
object superior to its competitor. Chang defends the premise by reference to two theses 
concerning the magnitude of difference a small-unidimensional change can cause. She writes: 
 
The Small-Improvement Argument holds that a small improvement in one of two 
items, neither of which is better than the other, does not necessarily make the 
improved item better.179 
 
And, 
The thought is this: between two evaluatively very different items, a small 
unidimensional difference cannot trigger incomparability where before there was 
comparability. In other words, for items that bear very different respects of the 
covering consideration, incomparability between them cannot be a matter of some 
small difference in one of the respects borne such that without this small difference 
the items would be comparable. A small unidimensional difference just does not 
seem powerful enough to effect a switch from two such items being comparable to 
their being incomparable. Call this the “Small Unidimensional Difference 
Principle.”180 
 
 
Small-improvement cases are examples of this sort of phenomenon: if Michelangelo is 
(roughly) equal to Mozart with respect to creativity, then a small improvement to one of 
Michelangelo’s relevant features is insufficient to bring it about that Michelangelo+ is greater 
                                                
178 Broome 1997, p. 68. 
179 Chang 2002, p. 668. 
180 Chang 2002, p. 674. 
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than Mozart with respect to creativity. So, according to Chang, for any two items and any 
complex quantity, if the items are comparable with respect to the quantity, then a sufficiently 
small change along a single dimension relevant to the quantity that affects one of the items 
of comparison cannot be sufficient to change which relation of quantitative comparison 
holds, nor whether the items are comparable with respect to the quantity at 
all.  
 Line (5), the lemma that A and B are equal, follows from the Trichotomy Thesis and 
line (2). Line (6) follows from the transitivity of greater than or equal to.181 If A+ is greater than 
A, and B not greater than A, then A+ must be greater than B, as well. But this conflicts with 
the intuition that the improvement was insufficient to render A+ superior to B. Something 
must give; according to these philosophers, the best candidate is the Trichotomy Thesis.  
4. The Structure of Parity 
These philosophers argue that the data are inconsistent with the Trichotomy Thesis 
because it and the structure at its foundation are too narrow. It cannot account for the 
behavior of covering values (the value with respect to which the comparison is carried out), 
such as creativity; literary merit; and goodness as a career, and objects of comparison, such 
as Michelangelo and Mozart; poets and novelists; and careers in law and hang-gliding, where 
the relevant relation of equality (or rather, greater-than-or-equal-to) is non-transitive. To 
illustrate, equality interacts with greater than as follows:  
 
[(A = B) & (A+ > A)] ⇒ (A+ > B) 
                                                
181 In particular, the transitivity rule is as follows: { [ (A ≥ B) & (B ≥ C) ] ⇒ (A ≥ C) }. It 
follows that { [ (A+ > A) & (A = B)] ⇒ (A+ > B) }. Being on a par, by contrast, is not 
transitive, nor is greater than or on a par with.  
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Whereas Chang’s parity relation does not support the entailment:  
 
[(A ≈ B) & (A+ > A)] ≠> (A+ > B) 
 
The structure of the quantitative trichotomy is based the real the number line: ‘(A > B)’ is 
true if and only if A occupies a point farther to the right on the number line than the point 
occupied by B; ‘(A = B)’ is true if and only if A occupies the point on the number line that is 
occupied by B. Measurement can be thought of as the arrangement of the instances of the 
relevant quantity along a number line. A scale of measurement is just a particular way of 
positioning items in relation to the numbers on the number line; the different properties of 
the different types of scales, such as ordinality, intervals, and ratios, are based on and 
isomorphic with various properties of points on the real number line.182 For example, the 
point represented by “four” is less than five, greater than three, and equal to four. Is there a 
point on the number line that is “on par” with the point represented by the number four? 
Every possible point must be either greater than, less than, or equal to it. There is not any 
room in the number line, or in a theory of quantities based on it, for parity, so it is hard to 
understand what numerical basis the relation of parity might have. Griffin raises a similar 
point, suggesting that “rough equality,” as he calls it, creates a difficulty for finding a 
mathematical structure that mirrors the structure of prudential values, observing that the 
concept of “vague ordering” is poorly understood.183  
                                                
182 See Ellis, Krantz, et al., and Stevens. 
183 Griffin 1986, p. 81.  
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Furthermore, even Chang admits that parity is sometimes superfluous; it is necessary 
to explain the relationships between instances of some, but not all, quantities. She argues 
that the trichotomy is not always exhaustive, but she admits that it sometimes is. But why 
would one set of quantitative relationships be adequate in some situations but not others? 
This is a clue that the problems are not due to the trichotomy of quantitative relationships. 
Since some but not all of the values and quantities we are interested in fit into the framework 
of the standard trichotomy of relations, we should suspect that there is something wrong in 
the outliers:  
5. Problems Concerning Small-Improvement Phenomena 
The Small Improvement Argument is based on a series of examples according to 
which two items appear to be comparable even though no member of the standard 
trichotomy holds. But one significant problem with these examples, and therefore with the 
argument that relies on them, is that they are all poorly described. In the career case, for 
example, we are told only which fields the careers are in and that they are “successful.” 
There are, however, many potentially relevant factors. What, exactly, are their salaries? What, 
specifically, are their hours? How long is a typical work week? Is there a lot of travel? Are the 
coworkers nice? Will there be time for family? One thing that makes it difficult to compare 
the careers is that we have insufficient information. We are simply asked to “fill out the 
details of each career so that it is as plausible as possible that neither career is better than the 
other with respect to goodness as a career.”184 But, of course, it is impossible to give a 
description of the alternatives that would contain even a small fraction of the facts relevant 
to their values. We are forced to compare them in a state of near total ignorance, in which 
                                                
184 Chang 2002, p. 668. 
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almost everything that could possibly be relevant is unspecified. Similarly, most of us have 
only a passing familiarity with the works of Mozart and Michelangelo. Perhaps someone 
with the relevant expertise would find that one was clearly more creative than the other. 
These values, “creativity” and “goodness as a career,” are complex in a way that is 
completely out of step with the meager level of detail with which the alternatives are 
described.  
Also, the difference between the first item and its improved counterpart is always 
extremely slight in comparison to their overall value. In the career case, we are supposed to 
imagine that $1,000 is added to the salary of one career, when a typical salary is many 
thousands of dollars, and salary is just one consideration among many. We add one extra 
work to Michelangelo’s creative output, but Michelangelo created hundreds of sculptures, 
paintings, frescoes, drawings, and works of architecture in a career that lasted nearly seventy-
five years.  
The incongruence between the overall size and complexity of the objects of 
comparison and the relative minuteness of the small improvement causes problems with our 
intuitions about the cases. Imagine, for example, driving across North Dakota via Interstate 
94 and across Kansas via Interstate 70. Without consulting the odometer, it would be 
difficult to determine which was the longer drive—each is very long, and they are close to 
the same length. We might be tempted to claim that the drives are on a par with respect to 
length. We might bolster this intuition by appeal to North Dakota+, a drive exactly like the 
drive across North Dakota but two miles longer. Since North Dakota+ seems longer than 
North Dakota, but not clearly longer than Kansas, there is a failure of transitivity similar to 
that which is diagnostic of small-improvement cases. This intuition is caused not by intrinsic 
imprecision, but by an epistemically disadvantaged context that cripples our ability to make 
106 
precise judgments. And, of course, lengths of drives are not subject to any sui generis relation 
of parity. Lengths of drives are measured in miles, which are fully precise. This seems to be 
an instance of the small-improvement phenomenon because the objects measured are 
extremely large and complex, which robs us of our ability to make accurate “eyeball” 
measurements. If that is the case, then the Small Improvement Argument is unsound: in 
reality, Kansas is seventy miles longer than North Dakota, and so the small improvement is 
too small to make a difference.  
Additionally, there is no reason to presume that small, unidimensional improvements 
convert directly to overall improvements in the manner proposed by proponents of the 
Small Improvement Argument. Although adding $1,000 to the hang-gliding career improves 
it in some respects, perhaps this meager monetary improvement is insufficient to improve it 
as a career. The fact that we improved the salary of the career in a minor way does not entail 
that we have improved the career with respect to its overall value. Perhaps there is a 
threshold at work, and the addition of a slight amount of extra money is insufficient to 
increase the overall goodness of the career, even when a larger increase would have a 
correspondingly large effect. Perhaps this is an instance of Kagan’s additive fallacy185 or 
Moore’s Principle of Organic Unities.186 Small-improvement phenomena rely on an 
unwarranted assumption regarding the computation of overall value. 
This is likely to occur in cases in which the covering value supervenes upon a 
complex of constituent factors. Just as the overall creativity of an artist depends on a 
multitude of features, so does the “goodness” of a career. There is no reason to think that 
merely making one minute improvement to just one of the many relevant factors would 
necessarily have any, even correspondingly minute, effect on the overall value of the relevant 
                                                
185 Kagan, pp. 16 – 31. 
186 Moore, p. 96. 
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object. Although the assumption that varying one relevant factor independently of the others 
must make an overall difference is attractive, it is just one hypothesis among many. Line (3) 
of the argument is therefore false, because A and A+ are equal with respect to the relevant 
covering value. The “small improvement” was too small to affect the item’s value with 
respect to the quantity under consideration.  
6. Vagueness and Complexity 
Despite arguments to the contrary, some small-improvement cases are instances of 
vagueness. Chang worries that if hard cases of comparability are due to vagueness then the 
Small Improvement Argument would hinge on a Sorites-type fallacy.187 Her counter-
argument proceeds by pointing out that in certain contexts we are inclined to behave in 
certain ways when we encounter paradigm cases of vagueness, and that we are disinclined to 
behave in these ways with respect to paradigm cases of parity.188 Paradigm cases of 
vagueness are such that, in neutral, consequence-free contexts, we are disposed to resolve 
indeterminacy in arbitrary ways, and we would be unwilling to enter a dispute over a 
disagreement.  
Chang claims that small-improvement cases are different. She mentions a case 
concerning an academic hiring committee: were they forced to classify one of two candidates 
as the better, they would be unwilling to flip a coin, and they would defend their eventual 
choice from objections.189 This pattern of behaviors extends to other cases: Mozart versus 
Michelangelo; hard cases of moral comparison; and others.190  
                                                
187 Chang 2002, pp. 672, 679 – 80. 
188 Chang 2002, pp. 680 – 5. 
189 Chang 2002, p. 682. 
190 Chang 2002, p. 685. 
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However, several small-improvement cases are impossible to consider in a properly 
arbitrary context, so this strategy fails to apply to several key cases. For example, the hiring 
committee’s decision is neither neutral nor consequence-free, and this explains their 
behavior. The career, literary prize, and moral cases are similarly important, so Chang’s 
analogy breaks down in a central range of cases and so is silent as to whether the difficulties 
are due to vagueness.  
Some small-improvement cases can be suitably arbitrary; what should we make of 
them? Our intuitions about the Michelangelo case are corrupted by the fact that creativity is 
a complex and confusing value. Specific instances of creativity might be related to any 
number of skills or attributes: the ability to generate innovative or novel solutions to 
problems; the ability to find unnoticed connections between objects or ideas; the ability to 
find new or unnoticed uses for things; et cetera. It is possible for each attribute to vary 
independently of the others and there is no clear way of assessing how or to what degree 
each one is relevant to overall creativity. If that is the case, then the predicate ‘is creative’ has 
no unique extension because there is no unique set of its instances, let alone an ordered set 
satisfying the relevant formal constraints. In this way, ‘creative’ has more in common with 
paradigmatically vague terms such as ‘bald’ and paradigmatically complex properties such as 
physical fitness than it has with precise terms expressing simple quantities, such as ‘mass’. 
There are several equally eligible candidate extensions, with no non-arbitrary way to 
determine which is correct. But if that is the case, there can be no single basis for 
quantitative comparison because it is too complex and its components relate to each other in 
too imprecise a manner.  
For example, consider the set of quantitative relations associated with baldness. 
Imagine two moderately bald heads. Fill in the details of each head in such a way that it is 
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plausible to regard them as equally bald—although such precision is impossible in practice. 
Now imagine a small enhancement to the baldness of one of the heads: two hairs fall out. If 
it is plausible to regard the heads as being equally bald prior to the hairs falling out, it is not 
plausible to regard the slightly improved head as being the more bald afterwards—this is 
clearly a borderline case. So head A is neither more nor less bald than head B, and it would 
be incredible if the heads were precisely equally bald. But a small enhancement did not 
suffice to render head A more bald than head B. But these problems, such as they are, are 
straightforwardly caused by the vagueness of ‘is bald.’  
Physical fitness is an irreducibly complex quantity, related to a variety of qualities: 
upper body strength; lower body strength; core strength; cardiovascular endurance; etc. 
Other things being equal, the person with the greater level of upper-body strength is the 
more physically fit. But cases in which other things are not equal are much more difficult to 
evaluate. If A can do many more pushups than B but B can run the marathon much faster 
than A, there may be no fact of the matter as to who is the more fit, because physical fitness 
is a  jumbled mass of several related quantities. These examples are analogous to Small 
Improvement cases, but the problems are clearly due, not to the quantitative relations in 
themselves, but to the fact that the covering values are paradigmatically vague and multi-
dimensional.  
Creativity is very similar to baldness and physical fitness. Sentence schemas such as 
‘x is very creative’ or ‘x is more creative than y’ cannot be used to make any but the most 
vague pronouncements of merit or relative quality. If, for example, the most precise thing I 
knew about Michelangelo was that he was very creative, it is hard to see why I should be 
regarded as knowing anything at all about him. Similar things might be said about the other 
superhard cases: ‘literary merit’ tracks another extraordinarily complicated complex of 
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features such that it clearly has no precise meaning, as does ‘goodness as a career.’ Although 
it may be the case that equality with respect to each of these covering values fails to be 
transitive, it is clear that this failure is the result of the imprecision involved in the covering 
value itself, and not the relationship of equality. Items of comparison may be just sufficiently 
similar that they lie within the relevant vague boundaries—that they are borderline cases of 
equality—and in such cases, transitivity of equality may fail. In cases such as these, we may 
rightly doubt whether we are dealing with a single genuine quantity.  
It is also worth noting that the kind of imprecision that can potentially lead to 
failures of transitivity of equality is ineliminable from practical, empirical measurement. 
Krantz, et al. write that 
 
Whenever physical differences become sufficiently small, any method for observing 
them ultimately deteriorates. In some cases, and perhaps in all, observations of two 
sufficiently similar entities are inconsistent when the same comparison is repeated 
several times. And when inconsistencies can occur, violations of transitivity may 
arise. But the ideal case… can still be achieved if copies are prepared by [idealized] 
“standard” methods that are much more sensitive than the “working” methods used 
to establish [the relevant empirical ordering relation.]191 
 
 
Small-improvement cases exploit practical problems that plague all forms of empirical 
measurement in order to draw an illegitimate theoretical point—that the intransitivity is 
somehow intrinsic, and is not an artifact of vague predicates, complex, jumbled properties, 
or inadequate tools of measurement. This allows us to see why the Small Improvement 
Argument is unsound. Although there is an agglomeration of loosely related properties we 
can express by using the predicate ‘is creative,’ and that some creative things are more 
creative than others, this predicate nevertheless has no precise meaning. This is why Mozart 
and Michelangelo seem to be incommensurable with respect to creativity: each artist seems 
                                                
191 Krantz, et al. p. 3.  
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to be creative, but ‘creativity’ is so nebulous that this fact does not entail that they actually 
share any features, and there is no fact of the matter concerning how their relevant features 
relate to their overall creativity levels.  
Our intuitions are corrupted by the fact that when we compare Michelangelo with 
Michelango+ we hold all relevant features constant except one, so is clear how Michelangelo 
compares to Michelangelo+, in spite of the fact that the boost is only very slight. Creativity 
is a multi-dimensional quantity, and the comparison of Michelangelo+ with Michelangelo 
holds constant all factors save one; the comparisons between Mozart and the Michelangeloes 
hold nothing constant whatsoever. This causes the tiny boost to Michelangelo+’s output to 
seem significant when placed next to the real Michelangelo, but insignificant when compared 
to Mozart. The apparent intransitivity of equality that is diagnostic of small improvement 
cases is an illusion caused in part by the fact that, in general, A+ is more similar to A than he 
is to B. This interferes with our ability to carry out the comparison. We are able to make 
more fine-grained comparisons between very similar things than we are able to make 
between very dissimilar things, and this explains a key detail of small-improvement cases. We 
should therefore be very careful about using creativity as the centerpiece of an argument that 
the standard trichotomy of qualitative comparisons is inadequate. It is more likely that it is 
whatever is meant by ‘creativity’ that is inadequate; it is not a unique, determinate quantity. 
Furthermore, transitivity could be restored in each case if some more precise or 
otherwise suitable value or measurement were substituted for the relevant covering value. 
Some predicates that apparently express quantities are not precise enough to generate a 
single linear order of their instances, although the comparative relations, greater than, less than, 
and equal to, are fully precise in virtue of the fact that they are homomorphic with the 
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corresponding relationships between numbers.192 If imprecision, ambiguity, or vagueness are 
introduced via the quantitative predicate, we might reject the claim that the relevant, small-
improvement-friendly value is really a quantity and attempt to replace it with something 
better, rather than reject the trichotomy.  
For example, in an important range of cases, it is not possible to determine which of 
two athletes is the more physically fit—physical fitness is too vague and complex. But when 
we focus instead on more precise features closely related to physical fitness, such as one’s 
best time at the marathon; one’s best time at the 200 meter dash; one’s maximum bench-
press weight; the maximum number of push-ups one is capable of; etc., our ability to make 
quantitative comparisons improves dramatically. Furthermore, these comparisons are 
directly relevant to physical fitness, and they provide much more information about the 
individual athletes than simple attributions of various degrees of the property being physically 
fit would. We could then design a formula that would produce a “fitness quotient” as a 
function of these factors, and which would yield a precise result in every case. Perhaps we 
would have to make some arbitrary choices concerning how to weight some of the factors 
against some of the others, and perhaps we would end up with several equally adequate 
equations, but this exercise would help us to be clear about which factors are relevant to this 
new fitness quotient and how. Once this is accomplished, we no longer see any need for 
parity. The quantitative trichotomy is exhaustive with respect to suitably precise quantitative 
predicates.  
So, rather than focus on “creativity,” we could instead focus on such qualities as 
originality of new ideas; depth of insight; sheer productivity (e.g. the number of creative 
works produced); the degree to which the creative products may be applied to real-life 
                                                
192 Stevens, p. 677, Ellis, pp. 14 – 7, Krantz, et al., pp. 2 – 20. 
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situations; etc. Perhaps we will have to impose a somewhat artificial restriction on which of 
all the possible factors are relevant in a particular case, but insofar as such restrictions make 
it possible to isolate and clarify the various effects and interactions of the various relevant 
features, they will play a role in furthering our understanding of the phenomena at hand. For 
example, rather than just saying that Michelangelo was creative, we will be forced to be 
specific about what makes him so creative. And if we are just as specific about Mozart, the 
exercise will illuminate a relationship of quantitative comparison that had been obfuscated by 
nebulous complexity. Small-improvement cases arise only with respect to covering values 
that are so complex or vague that we cannot tell what the basis for comparison is supposed 
to be; by precisifying the relevant concepts, the small-improvement phenomenon and the 
accompanying need for parity evaporates.  
This allows us to see how we might learn from small-improvement cases. The Small 
Improvement Argument does not show that the trichotomy thesis is false, rather, it shows 
that there are vague, defective covering values—due to problems with the language we use 
or with our epistemic relationship with them—and that these defects are serious enough to 
cause normally unproblematic applications of transitivity of equality to fail. So it is not that 
parity is the most precise manner in which  Michelangelo compares to Mozart with respect 
to creativity; it is that it is unclear precisely which property ‘creativity’ picks out, and we 
therefore lack the information necessary to determine which comparison holds. When we 
encounter an apparently legitimate basis for quantitative comparison that, upon closer 
inspection, is inconsistent with the orthodox theory of quantities, we ought to wonder 
whether it is a legitimate basis for comparison; we should be especially suspicious of such 
vague and nebulous bases for comparison as creativity, goodness as a career, literary merit, and 
baldness, among others. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE THESIS THAT PLEASURE AND PAIN ARE 
QUANTITATIVE 
 
1. Introductory Remarks 
The thesis that pleasure and pain are measurable quantities (or constitute a single 
measurable quantity) has seemed preposterous to many philosophers. These philosophers 
have found a variety of reasons for objecting to this thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to 
survey and rebut each of the main arguments for the conclusion that pleasure and pain are 
not legitimate, measurable quantities.  
The first main argument I will discuss is based on the observation that pleasures and 
pains are essentially transient. Each pleasure is over before the next begins; memories of 
pleasures and pains fade and die. This fact is alleged to cause problems for the measurability 
thesis: pleasures go by to fast for you to “get a handle” on them. If you can’t get a handle on 
the pleasure as you’re experiencing it, how can you measure it? The proponent of this sort of 
argument claims that you cannot.  
In the second section I will discuss an argument based on difficulties surrounding 
interpersonal comparisons of pleasure and pain. The argument from transient pleasures can 
be seen as a difficulty based on the comparison of pleasures within the same mind; this 
argument is based on difficulties involved in comparing pleasures not all of which are in the 
same mind. As difficult as it is for me to assess my own pleasures as they happen, or to recall 
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them as they happened in the past, it is much more difficult for me to assess your pleasures, 
and still more difficult to compare them to those of someone else.  
The third section is devoted to the “different types” argument. Proponents of this 
sort of argument attempt to exploit the relative dissimilarity of various pleasures to show 
that there is no legitimate way to compare them. Intellectual pleasures are contrasted with 
sensory ones. Visual pleasures are contrasted with olfactory or gastronomic ones. Sexual 
pleasures are contrasted with nonsexual ones. Intense but brief pleasures are contrasted with 
mellow but lengthy ones. Similar observations hold with respect to pains: emotional pains 
are contrasted with physical pains. There is also a “different types” problem with generating 
a pair of hedon and dolor scales whose units would be commensurate: how much pain is 
identical in absolute hedonic value with some particular quantity of pleasure? These 
difficulties form the basis of an argument designed to show that pleasure and pain are not 
quantities. 
A final section is devoted to problems surrounding the application of mathematics to 
numbers representing quantities of pleasure. According to proponents of this argument, it is 
not the case that the pain of having a toothache in four teeth is four-fifths as bad as the pain 
of having a toothache in five teeth—such assertions make no sense. You can't add another 
toothache to the four-tooth toothache and arrive at the amount of pain in a five-tooth 
toothache, and you can't divide the toothaches in order to generate the result that the five-
tooth toothache is 20% worse than the four-toother. Furthermore, even granting for the 
sake of argument that numbers can be used to represent amounts of pleasure and pain, there 
is no reason to suppose that these numbers would behave, mathematically speaking, in the 
manner predicted by classical hedonic utilitarians. These facts are supposed to cast further 
doubt on the thesis that pleasure and pain are legitimate quantities.  
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The “different types” argument is the most commonly raised by philosophers who 
discuss this and surrounding issues. It's also very weak and generally isn't endorsed by the 
philosophers who raise it. The “transience’ argument is mentioned only by Sidgwick, who 
doesn't endorse it. The “problems with applied mathematics” argument is mentioned only 
by Hall, who doesn't endorse it. I think it's potentially the strongest and most interesting--it 
seems to confront the issue of measurability and of quantativity head-on in a way the others 
do not.  
2. Pleasures are Ephemeral 
2.1. The Problem of Transient Pleasures 
Several philosophers argue that the fact that pleasures are ephemeral poses a 
problem for the measurability of pleasure and pain. T. H Green, in his introduction to 
volume II of Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature, argues that “pleasant feelings are not 
quantities that can be added,” because “each is over before the other begins.”193 Green 
seems to think that this causes a problem for hedonism. Since one pleasure is over before 
the next begins, there is no physical way to add or splice them together.194 There is no 
physical analog of addition that can be performed on pleasures or pains. According to 
Green, this suggests that expressions such as “greatest happiness” and, presumably, 
“hedonic utility” are meaningless.  
John MacKenzie seems to concur. He claims that  
 
I may be aware at each of two successive moments I have a pleasure of 
approximately the same degree [of intensity]; and I may thus be entitled to say that 
the pleasures of these two moments taken together are twice as great as the pleasure 
as one of them alone would have been. Surely 1 + 1 = 2… but it is also true that 1 + 
                                                
193 Green, p. lc. He is quoted in Sidgwick. p. 133.  
194 As there is with lengths of rope, etc.  
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1 – 1 = 1. When a second pleasure is added the first is taken away, and there is only 
one left. If I have only one pleasure now, I am none the richer for the fact that I had 
another before.195 
 
MacKenzie goes on to claim that “Every moment stands on its own basis; and the number 
of moments makes no difference to the happiness of life as a whole, because… life is not a 
whole.”196 It’s not entirely clear what MacKenzie is getting at, but he seems to think that 
since each momentary pleasure is over before the next momentary pleasure begins, they do 
not “add up” or aggregate in the way required by standard versions of the hedonic calculus. 
He claims that the happiness of one moment does not run into another.197  
Hastings Rashdall considers a similar objection,198 as does W. D. Ross. Rashdall 
discusses an objection based on “the very simple fact that we cannot enjoy a sum of 
pleasures all at once—that a sum of pleasures is not capable of existing altogether at a given 
moment of time.” For any two distinct pleasures, that is, there is no way to bring them 
together. They must remain essentially separate. Ross mentions that the time interval 
between the experience of pleasure and the act of comparison can affect the accuracy of the 
comparison. This is because our ability to remember pleasures and pains is unreliable.199 
Since we cannot reliably recall the precise durations and intensities of past pleasures and 
pains, we cannot reliably compare past pleasures and pains to one another, nor to present 
episodes. 
John C. Hall also considers a similar point. He writes that 
 
…fundamental measurement begins with an arbitrary choice of a single standard, 
with which other objects can be subsequently compared as being equal in the 
                                                
195 MacKenzie 1890, pp. 206-7. 
196 MacKenzie 1890, p. 208.  
197 MacKenzie 1890, pp.. 208-9. 
198 Rashdall, p. 367.  
199 Ross, p. 142. 
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magnitude in question. Now to perform this function the initial standard must be 
permanent: otherwise no successive matchings could take place. … But there could 
be no such permanently available standard pleasant experience, since experiences are 
essentially transient.200  
 
The claim Hall is considering here is that since a permanent standard is necessary for 
measurement, and their ephemeral transience rules out the possibility of a permanent 
standard pleasant experience, measurement of pleasures is impossible. 
2.2. The “Ephemeral Pleasures” Argument 
These remarks suggest the following argument:  
 
The Ephemeral Pleasures Argument 
 
1. Pleasures are essentially transient and ephemeral. 
2. If pleasures are essentially transient and ephemeral, then pleasure is not a measurable 
quantity. 
3. Therefore, pleasure is not a quantity.  
Line 1 seems to be true. Pleasures are often brief and transitory. As Green puts it, 
“each is over before the other begins.”201 There is no physical way to splice them together, or 
to hold one pleasure up next to another to see which is bigger. Green argues that this 
precludes adding them together, even in the abstract. There is no way to generate a 
permanent standard on the order of the International Prototype Meter Bar that served as the 
                                                
200 Hall, p. 43. 
201 Green, p. lc.  
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definition of the meter between 1889 and 1960.202 The relevant experiences are “essentially 
transient,”203 in Hall’s words. And Rashdall points out that we can’t “enjoy a sum of 
pleasures all at once,” and that there is no way to collect any non-contemporaneous group of 
pleasures together at a single time.204 This apparently rules out coherently desiring a sum of 
pleasures, as well as the enjoyment of such a sum. 
Ross points out that memories of pain begin to fade and lose their vividness almost 
immediately. It is difficult to know the magnitudes of pleasures and pains past.205 For 
example, I remember being confident, when I was 16 and recovering from surgery to 
remove a portion of my skull that had become infected (due to mastoiditis), that I was 
undergoing the most intense pain I had ever experienced. I also remember being confident, 
when I was 22 and recovering from a difficult quadruple-wisdom-tooth extraction, involving 
four stubbornly impacted molars, that I was then experiencing the most intense pain I had 
ever undergone. Now that I am over thirty I am not sure which really was the more intense 
pain. I remember what I was thinking at each of those times, but I can’t recall the pain itself, 
so I can’t recall which pain was the more intense. I also have trouble remembering which 
was the longer-lasting, so I have no idea which pain was “larger.”  
Since I’m not sure about the relative magnitude of these two pains, I’m doubly 
unsure of their absolute magnitude. As difficult as it is to determine which pain was worse, it 
is even more difficult to determine precisely how bad each one was, relative to a non-
arbitrary zero point. It is possible that I could give a ballpark estimate, but there is no way I 
could produce a precise number for either one.  
                                                
202 Nor is there a way to generate a standard pleasant experience based on time and the speed 
of light, as the meter is currently defined.  
203 Hall, p. 43.  
204 Rashdall, p. 367. 
205 Ross, p. 142. The point is also made by Hall, p. 38. 
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Line 2 seems to be true, as well. Pleasures go by too fast; you can’t get a grip on 
them. There is no way to collect any non-contemporaneous group of pleasures together at a 
single time. There is no way to generate a permanent standard, and the existence of a 
standard is thought to be essential to genuine measurement.206 If there is no way to generate 
a standard of measurement, then there is no way to measure the pleasantness of pleasures. 
And if there is no way to do any of those things, if there’s no way to measure pleasantness, 
then pleasantness is not a measurable quantity.  
2.3. Problems for the “Ephemeral Pleasures” Argument 
The argument is valid and in Modus Ponens. It is not sound because line 2 is 
obviously false. Henry Sidgwick points out that although Green argues that pleasures cannot 
be physically compared, they can be mentally compared. This mental comparability is 
sufficient for the meaningfulness of the relevant comparative expressions.207  
Rashdall points out that “transience argument” would rule out the coherent 
enjoyment of or desire for even an individual pleasure. Each pleasure exists in time, he 
argues, and there is no moment so brief that it cannot be subdivided further. “If, therefore, I 
cannot [enjoy or] desire anything I cannot have all at once, I could not desire either pleasant 
consciousness in general or any particular state of consciousness which is pleasant.”208 But 
since we obviously can do this, line 2 is false.  
Hall argues that line 2 depends upon an impossibly strong standard of 
measureability. It cannot be necessary to generate a permanent standard of comparison for 
each measurable quantity, because if it were, then time would fail the test. It is impossible to 
                                                
206 See Hall’s discussion of the problem in Hall, p. 43. The other philosophers who consider 
this argument do not defend premise 2, apparently taking it to be obvious.  
207 Sidgwick, p. 134.  
208 Rashdall, p. 367.  
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generate a permanent standard chunk of time. Nothing, after all, is more transient and 
ephemeral than time. “In this case,” he writes, “the initial standard is not a permanent 
particular, but an infinitely recurring series of particulars guaranteed to be equal in duration 
by physical hypothesis.”209 If it were possible to generate a similarly repeatable standard for 
the measurement of pleasure and pain, it would be possible to show that the transience of 
pleasant experiences is not a threat to the measurability of pleasure and pain.210  
3. Interpersonal Comparisons 
3.1. Introductory Remarks 
Several philosophers have claimed that interpersonal comparisons of utility are 
problematic or even impossible, and that this poses a problem for the thesis that pleasure is 
a legitimate, measurable quantity. Philosophers who have considered this line of argument 
include Lars Bergström, Richard Brandt, John Hall, R. M. Hare, Richard Jeffery, Stuart 
Rachels, and Ilmar Waldner. Its proponents begin by noticing that interpersonal 
comparisons of pleasure and pain are impossible in some relevant sense. This impossibility 
has been exploited by different philosophers for different purposes, but it is clear that the 
main target in each instance is the thesis that pleasure and pain can be measured in an 
interesting and meaningful way. 
3.2. The Problem of Interpersonal Comparisons 
Several philosophers have noticed that interpersonal comparisons of pleasure and 
pain are problematic. Richard Brandt mentions the problem in A Theory of the Good and the 
Right. Although Brandt doesn’t devote much space explicitly discussing the problem, a 
                                                
209 Hall, p. 43.  
210 I discuss Hall’s proposal in detail in sections 3.5 and 3.6 of this chapter. 
122 
number of his remarks clearly hint at it.211As he sees, it, the problem is fundamentally a 
problem concerning our ability to know about the states of other minds.212 According to 
Brandt, there is only one way for a person to know the intensity of a pleasure, and that is to 
be directly introspectively aware of it. We can observe our own conscious states, and 
perhaps also the properties and behavior of physical objects, but we cannot observe the 
conscious states of others. So how can we hope to determine whether some event has given 
more happiness to one than to another?213 Since no person can introspect the contents of 
any mind that is not his, the pleasures and pains experienced by those other minds are 
unknowable to him.  
R. M. Hare also discusses the problem, and conceives of it in a similar way.214 He 
devotes considerable space to the topic in Moral Thinking. He takes care to distinguish this 
problem of interpersonal comparison from the more general skeptical problem of other 
minds. The problem of other minds is deep and intractable, and it is illegitimate to use it as a 
weapon in this context.215 It is also not a problem according to which an alleged essentialism 
or haecceitism prevents me from fully putting myself in another’s place.216 As Hare sees it, 
the problem concerns having a sufficient quantity of empirical data about other people to 
give sense to statements about the preferences of others,217and arises from the principle of 
verification, according to Hare. If we do not know the truth-conditions of sentences 
expressing interpersonal comparisons of pleasure and pain, then we do not know what the 
sentences express at all. 
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Waldner also sees a problem. His discussion shares several features with those of 
Brandt and Hare—that there are empirical problems surrounding the interpersonal 
comparison of pleasure and pain. According to Waldner,218 there’s no way to compare the 
“feelings” in one mind to the “feelings” of another. There’s no physical test, such as a blood 
test, that one could perform that would yield any relevant information. Although statements 
of interpersonal comparison are well-established in everyday discourse, there is no way to 
discover on empirical grounds whether the statements are true or false. This empirical 
vacuum leads opponents219 to doubt the meaningfulness of interpersonal comparisons.220  
 
…what is being compared are the intensities of certain [attitudes] of which different 
persons are conscious, and if one further assumes that the only acceptable empirical 
basis for comparing the intensities of such [attitudes] is for one person to be 
simultaneously conscious of both and directly judge their comparative intensity, then 
clearly no interpersonal comparisons are possible.221  
 
Waldner goes on to consider the possibility that we can collect enough information through 
the observation of behavior to license the sort of interpersonal comparisons that seem to be 
necessary. He concludes, however, that these sorts of observations are not enough. He 
claims that developments in economics have provided grounds for the development of 
interval scales of preferences, but that ratio scales are necessary for the interpersonal 
comparison of utilities. Also, this suggestion does not properly take into account the 
distinction between pleasure and desire. He goes on:  
 
It is the inability of the outcomes of choice situations of these kinds to provide 
evidence for interpersonal comparisons, together with the impossibility of relevant 
                                                
218 Waldner, pp. 90-1.  
219 Waldner cites Arrow as a prime example. See Arrow, p. 9.  
220 Waldner, p. 89.  
221 Waldner, p. 93.  
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introspective evidence that seems to have been a major factor in leading people to 
conclude that such comparisons are not empirically justified.222  
 
Rawls finds the prospect of interpersonal comparisons similarly dubious, and objects 
to utilitarianism on this basis: 
 
It is clear that utilitarianism assumes some fairly accurate measure of these 
expectations. Not only is it necessary to have a cardinal measure for each 
representative individual but these measures must make sense in interpersonal 
comparisons. Some method of correlating the scales of different persons is 
presupposed if we are to say that the gains of some are to outweigh the losses of 
others.223  
 
…Simply because we do in fact make what we call interpersonal comparisons of 
well-being does not mean that we understand the basis of these comparisons or that 
we should accept them as sound. …we should try to find some objective grounds for 
these comparisons… At the present time, there appears to be no satisfactory answer 
to these difficulties from a utilitarian point of view.224  
 
Bergström, in his survey of the problem, takes notice of the fact that  
 
No one believes that it is easy to find out, in practice, whether a given action would 
produce a maximum of pleasure… But it is not merely this point that is being made 
by those who claim that interpersonal comparisons are “impossible.” Rather, what is 
being claimed is that such comparisons are “unscientific” or “meaningless.” As we 
have seen, Neurath holds that they do not always “make sense” and he seems to 
mean by this that a maximum of pleasure does not always “exist.” One way of 
putting Neurath’s claim is, I think, this:  
 
Sceptical claim I: Statements to the effect that one situation X involves more happiness 
or well being than another situation Y are often neither true nor false.225  
 
                                                
222 Waldner, p. 95.  
223 Rawls, p. 90.  
224 Rawls, p. 90-1. 
225 Bergström, p. 288. Bergström mentions Neurath, Arrow, and Jevons as paradigm 
instances of this sort of claim. Neurath’s claim about whether interpersonal comparisons 
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in Neurath, p. 114.  
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Bergström claims that the fact that it is difficult to make measurements of pleasure and pain 
in practice is well-known. He attributes to Otto Neurath, the arch-positivist, the view that 
this poses a serious problem. The problem, according to Neurath, is that this practical, 
empirical difficulty casts doubt on the very truth-aptitude of the propositions involved. Take, 
for example, the claim that I would enjoy a cup of coffee a little more than my brother 
would. According to Neurath,226 since there is no practical way to determine just what the 
“amount” of enjoyment I would get is, and there’s no way to determine what amount of 
enjoyment my brother would get, and there’s no way to compare the two amounts, either 
directly or indirectly, it is unclear why we should regard the sentence as making an assertion 
that can be either true or false.  
According to Goldstick,227 it is a “common objection” to the thesis that pleasure and 
pain are quantities is that no meaning can be attached to “maximizing utility” because it 
presupposes comparisons of utility and no such comparison is in principle possible. 
Presumably, since “maximizing utility” presupposes that at least interval measurement is 
possible, the interpersonal incomparability of pleasure and pain entails that they are not 
interval measurable. Hall228 claims that it has been argued that ordinal incomparability of 
pleasures is generated by cases in which the two experiences of pleasures being compared 
are experiences of different persons (among others). If that were correct, then pleasure and 
pain would not be quantities; they would be only nominally measurable. 
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228 Hall, p. 38.  
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3.3. The Argument from Interpersonal Comparisons 
These remarks suggest that interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible, and 
that this causes a range of problems for a variety familiar ethical views. This problem is 
supposed to arise on the basis of a difficulty for the thesis that pleasure is a measurable 
quantity. Some of the philosophers I’ve consulted think that the truth of traditional 
hedonistic versions of utilitarianism depends crucially on the measurability of pleasure and 
pain. Some think that hedonism as a theory of value is put into difficulty. Others point out 
that other, non-hedonistic theories do not remain unscathed: any plausible view in ethics, 
they suggest, must presuppose that pleasure and pain are legitimate, measurable quantities. 
Though none of these philosophers put the point in precisely this way, the critical point can 
be interpreted as an argument designed to show that there is something seriously wrong with 
thesis that pleasure and pain are quantitative: 
 
The Interpersonal Comparisons Argument 
 
1. It is impossible to make reliable, accurate, and precise interpersonal comparisons of 
pleasure and pain. 
2. If it is impossible to make reliable, accurate, and precise interpersonal comparisons 
of pleasure and pain, then pleasure and pain are not measurable quantities. 
3. Therefore, pleasure and pain are not measurable quantities.  
 
Why should we believe line 1? Brandt points to the difficulty of knowing the mental goings-
on of minds other than one’s own. Pleasure and pain are, at bottom, mental phenomena, and 
a person’s mental states are private. Hare seems to agree, as do Rawls and Waldner. Waldner 
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claims that it is impossible to know the feelings in another mind. According to these 
philosophers, although we often make just this sort of interpersonal comparison, the actual 
empirical basis for such claims is completely inadequate.  
Brandt, Waldner, and Rawls argue that in order to know how intense some pleasure 
is, you must have introspective access to it. But we have introspective access only to our 
own pleasures and pains; we don’t have that kind of access to the minds of others. We can 
therefore have no way of comparing our pleasures to those enjoyed by others.  
It seems clear that whatever knowledge we can have of the intensities of the pleasures and 
pains experienced by others, this knowledge is indeed limited by the privacy of other minds, 
difficulties associated with the collecting enough relevant evidence, and with drawing 
inductive inferences from behavior.  
Why should we believe line 2? Although none of the philosophers who consider this 
argument devotes space to defending the second premise, the reasoning behind it appears to 
be something like this: our inability to make interpersonal comparisons is evidence that 
pleasure and pain are not genuinely quantitative. The most direct evidence that we can have 
in favor of something’s being a measurable quantity involves going out and taking reliable 
measurements. Why do I think that length is a genuine, measurable quantity? Because I have 
a device that measures length. Why do I think that mass is a quantity? Because we have 
balances and scales that make measurements of mass. In these cases, we can also simply see 
that they are quantities—we can easily make reliable judgments of length and massiveness. 
Even more “abstract” quantities like electrical charge and electrical resistivity are 
measurable.229 If it were impossible to take reliable, accurate measurements of electrical 
                                                
229 The electrical resistivity of a material is its tendency to resist electrical current. It is 
measured in resistance times length. Resistance itself is measured in terms of lost current. So 
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resistivity it is unclear how we could be justified in believing that there was such a quantity. 
And we can’t do that in the case of pleasure and pain. We can’t take reliable, accurate 
measurements. This undercuts the only evidence we could possibly have in favor of this 
claim. In the absence of evidence in favor of it, we should reject the claim that pleasure and 
pain are measurable.  
3.4. Some Unsuccessful Responses 
Brandt rejects line 1 of the “interpersonal comparisons” argument. He argues that 
we can make the cardinal measurements that the measurability of pleasure requires. 
According to him, these measurements take the form of inferences to the best explanation 
of behavior. He invites us to suppose that, for example, your friend comes to your house on 
successive occasions after tennis. On the first, you serve cold soft drinks. On the second, 
you serve tepid water. You notice that your friend drank three times as much of the soft 
drink as he did of the water. The friend smiled as he took sips of the soft drink, but did not 
smile as he took sips of the water. In the past, we have observed the friend paying for the 
soft drink but never paying for water. Why? What explains this? The best explanation of the 
observed phenomena is obviously that the friend enjoyed the soft drink much more than he 
enjoyed the water.230 Along this line, Richard Jeffery points out that people are often willing 
work harder for the things they like more, and work less hard for things they like less.231 
According to these philosophers, we make inferences of this type on a constant basis, with a 
high level of justification. 
                                                                                                                                            
if a two-foot length of wire has a resistance of 14 ohms, the resistivity of the material the 
wire is made of is 7 ohms per foot.  
230 Brandt, pp. 258-61.  
231 Jeffery, p. 652.  
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Brandt’s solution is inadequate. He has failed to appreciate how difficult it is (or can 
be) to determine accurately and precisely how much pleasure or pain some other person is 
experiencing. Brandt assumes that “likes and dislikes are fairly constant.”232 While this 
principle may be innocent enough for us to use in typical practical circumstances, taken in its 
full generality, it is false. A person’s tendency to enjoy various experience types may change 
frequently and without notice. I, for example, enjoy eating my favorite dishes and drinking 
my favorite drinks much more when I am ravenously hungry and thirsty than I do when I 
am satiated. I also sometimes enjoy eating things when ravenous that I dislike entirely in 
more ordinary circumstances. Dinty Moore Beef Stew is an example. As a child, I disliked 
guacamole and loved Froot Loops. Now I dislike Froot Loops and love guacamole. When I 
was in college my favorite TV show was Northern Exposure. Now (I am sad to say) I find it 
poorly written and boring. These are just a few of the many ways in which my likes and 
dislikes—my tendencies towards pleasure and pain—have changed and continue to change.  
Brandt also assumes that people tend to drink more of what they like, and less of 
what they don’t. Again, the assumption is unwarranted. Perhaps your guest drinks less of 
what he likes out of a sense of consideration: he knows that his preferred beverage is 
expensive, so he declines in favor of something more affordable but which he likes less. 
Perhaps the guest was merely less thirsty on the day when he was offered his preferred drink. 
As a general rule of thumb, it may be true that people drink more of what they like and less 
of what they don’t, but this is of no significant help with respect to the problem of 
interpersonal comparisons. There are too many other possibilities that can’t be adequately 
ruled out. Brandt’s willingness to make these assumptions indicates that either he has not 
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taken the problem of interpersonal comparisons seriously or has failed to confront it head-
on.  
Furthermore, Brandt’s attempted response to the problem of interpersonal 
comparisons does not involve any comparisons that are legitimately interpersonal. The case 
involves him attempting to compare two different enjoyments experienced by just one 
person. He does not attempt to compare the enjoyments of one friend with those of 
another, nor does he attempt to compare the enjoyments of the friend with his own. 
Comparisons of the sort Brandt makes are intrapersonal, not interpersonal. In light of all 
this, it is hard to see how Brandt’s response is helpful.  
Waldner, like Brandt, responds to the argument by rejecting line 1.233 He claims that 
it is possible to make reliable interpersonal comparisons. He argues that there are other ways 
besides direct awareness to judge relative strength of sensations or feelings, and that because 
pleasures are really dispositional states, like desires, indirect observation is possible. Waldner 
thinks you can make indirect observations that permit knowledge. We observe behavior and 
make inferences concerning amounts of pleasure and pain on the basis of the observations. 
“Other things being equal,” he writes, “we generally suppose that the person who makes a 
firm and quick decision between two items has a stronger preference than the one who finds 
it very hard to make the decision.”234 Waldner then introduces a formal way of representing 
the relative strengths of these preferences.235 This formal system is based on the assumption 
that behavior mirrors the relevant underlying mental states in a fairly straightforward and 
predictable way. He argues that the fact that this method of making comparisons often 
works is evidence that it is fundamentally sound. 
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235 Waldner, pp. 97-100. The actual details of the system would take too much space to 
reproduce.  
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Waldner, like Brandt, has overestimated our practical abilities with respect to the 
measurement of pleasure and pain. Our indirect observations of behavior are useless because 
each behavior is compatible with a wide, potentially infinite variety of mental states. 
Waldner’s principle, that other things being equal, the person whose decisions are firm and 
quick has a stronger preference, is of no practical value because we can never know whether 
other things are really equal. When we assume that the other things are equal, for the 
purposes of convenience or of conversation, we merely ignore the fact that we don’t or can’t 
know that they are. Waldner, like Brandt, has has failed to confront the problem of 
interpersonal comparisons head-on. 
My view is that line 2 is false. I draw a distinction between practical measurability 
and measurability in theory. Practical measurability is sufficient, but not necessary, for 
theoretical measurability. That is, although it is true that if reliable interpersonal comparisons 
are possible in practice, then pleasure and pain are measurable quantities, it is not the case 
that if pleasure and pain are quantitative then it is possible to make reliable interpersonal 
comparisons. The practical difficulties surrounding interpersonal comparisons of utility are 
no reason to suppose that interpersonal comparisons of utility are nonsensical, meaningless, 
or theoretically impossible. Sometimes a philosopher will introduce the hedonic calculus or a 
related concept by telling a story about a procedure for figuring out the net quantity of 
pleasure in a state of affairs. When this happens, the story is intended as a way to introduce 
or explain what the calculus is. The “calculus” is not the procedure; it is the underlying set of 
facts that would have to be true if the procedure itself is coherent, and the procedure does 
not have to be implementable for these facts to be true.  
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4. Heterogeneous Pleasures 
This argument is related to, but distinct from, the interpersonal comparisons 
argument. Interpersonal comparison raises a unique difficulty due to the privacy of mental 
states. The comparisons referenced by this argument may be interpersonal, but may also be 
intrapersonal. The difficulties arise not because of problems with access, but because the 
various pleasures and pains are so different from one another that accurate comparison 
becomes impossible.  
4.1. The Problem of the Heterogeneity of Pleasures 
The most significant discussion of the heterogeneity problem is found in Ross’s The 
Right and the Good. He claims that “any denial that pleasures are comparable proceeds in the 
following way: imagine two extremely disparate pleasures and tell me which is the greater.”236 
Hall mentions the problem and provides a list of several problematic features with respect to 
which pleasures can differ.237 These differences include sensory vs. intellectual pleasures; 
visual vs. tactile pleasures; feelings of pleasure that result from an actual increase in 
pleasantness vs. feelings of pleasure that result merely from a decrease in painfulness; intense 
pleasures vs. long-lasting pleasures.238 Rashdall writes that “…every comparison between 
very heterogeneous pleasures simply in respect of their pleasantness is a very difficult and 
delicate proceeding.”239  
Christine Korsgaard discusses the heterogeneity of pain, in an attempt to show that 
pain is not, at bottom, as sensory phenomenon. She writes,  
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What do nausea, migraine, menstrual cramps, pinpricks, and pinches have in 
common, that makes us call them all pains? (Don’t say they’re all horrible; that’s just 
repeating yourself.) What emotional pains have in common with physical ones is that 
in these cases too we are in the grip of an overwhelming urge to do battle, not now 
against our sensations, but against the world.240 
 
Korsgaard argues that in physical and emotional cases alike, the “horribleness” of pain is a 
result of our attitude toward the relevant state of affairs, and not in the intrinsic character of 
the state itself, for the states may be so different from one another that they do not share any 
common features. She does not attempt to show that this fact creates a problem for the 
hedonic calculus.  
Fred Feldman, in a discussion of the relationship between sensory and intellectual 
pleasure, asks us to imagine a man lying on the beach on a sunny tropical island, remarking:  
 
One thing to notice about sensory pleasure is its apparent heterogeneity. The man on 
the beach enjoys some pleasurable smells as well as some pleasurable feelings of 
warmth. Each of these sensations is pleasant, pleasurable, “pleasure giving.” Some 
would find nothing odd in saying that each of these sensations “is a pleasure.” 
Nevertheless, from a strictly phenomenological perspective, they seem to have very 
little in common. One is an olfactory sensation—it is the smell of the fresh, salty air. 
The other is an all-over bodily feeling of warmth. Aside from the fact that they are 
experienced simultaneously and by the same person in the example, they seem to be 
utterly unalike.  
 
In order to see the heterogeneity of sensory pleasures even more clearly, consider the 
pleasurable sensations you get when you eat delicious, salty peanuts and drink 
sparkling, cold beer. The taste of the peanuts is a pleasure. The taste of the beer is a 
pleasure. Yet, unless your taste sensations are profoundly unlike mine, the taste of 
the peanuts has little in common with the taste of the beer.241  
 
Feldman points out that these types of sensation—the smell of fresh, salty air; the warmth of 
the sun and the breeze; the flavor of sparkling cold beer; the salty, crunchy flavor of 
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peanuts—have little common in themselves, other than the facts that they are sensations and 
they are (or tend to be) pleasant. 
Franz Brentano presents several cases that can be interpreted as instances of the 
heterogeneity problem, and it is clear that Brentano intends to call the hedonic calculus into 
doubt. He writes,  
 
A foot is divisible into twelve inches; but an intense joy is not divisible in the same 
sense into twelve less intense joys. Consider how ridiculous it would be if someone 
said that the amount of pleasure he has in smoking a good cigar is such that, if it 
were multiplied by 127, or say by 1,077, it would be precisely equal to the amount of 
pleasure he has in listening to a symphony of Beethoven or in viewing one of 
Raphael’s madonnas. This is enough, I think, to suggest the further difficulties in 
trying to compare the intensity of pleasure with that of pain.242  
 
Brentano’s idea is that pleasure does not satisfy the conditions necessary for measurability. 
He regards as absurd the claim that units of pleasure are divisible into equal subdivisions, as 
feet are into inches, as well as the idea that an episode of pleasure, such as ones associated 
with listening to a symphony or viewing a sculpture, could be 127 times greater than another, 
such as one associated with smoking a cigar. Brentano is not mocking the idea that the 
symphonic pleasure would be 127 times greater than the cigar-related pleasure, nor the idea 
that we could come up with a number as precise as 127. Rather, Brentano’s target is the 
claim that the relevant intensities are comparable at all.  
Similarly, John Rawls has pointed to the heterogeneity of pleasure and pain in an 
attempt to cast doubt on the thesis that pleasure is measurable. He writes that 
 
…there is the fact that there are different sorts of agreeable feelings themselves 
incomparable, as well as the quantitative dimensions of pleasure, intensity and 
duration. How are we to balance these when they conflict? Are we to choose a brief 
but intense pleasant experience of one kind of feeling over a less intense but longer 
pleasant experience of another? Aristotle says that  a good man if necessary lays 
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down his life for his friends, since he prefers a short period of intense pleasure to a 
long one of mild enjoyment, a twelvemonth of noble life to many years of humdrum 
existence. But how does he decide this? Further, as Santayana observes, we must 
settle the relative worth of pleasure and pain. When Petrarch says that a thousand 
pleasures are not worth one pain, he adopts a standard for comparing them that is 
more basic than either.243  
 
Rawls makes the point that pleasant feelings can be different from one another in ways that 
make it difficult or impossible to determine which is the greater—which contains more 
pleasure. Episodes of pleasure vary in their length and in their intensity. Certainly we are able 
to measure the relative pleasantness of pairs of pleasure when one attribute is held constant: 
between two equally intense pleasures, the longer contains the more pleasure; between two 
equally long pleasures, the more intense is the greater. But how are we to determine between 
an episode of brief but intense pleasure and a longer but more mellow episode? Perhaps 
Rawls intends this to be a merely practical problem. Perhaps it’s just that there’s no way to 
tell which of the two episodes contains the greater amount of pleasure. But the difficulty 
might be more serious than that. The difficulty might be that there is really no fact of the 
matter as to which is the greater. Perhaps Rawls’s point is that although there are two 
separate dimensions along which episodes of pleasure may be compared with one another—
intensity and duration—there is no single authoritative way to combine these two factors 
that reveals the true “amount” of pleasure.  
Rawls goes on to question the assumption, central to orthodox utilitarianism, that 
pleasure and pain are commensurable. As we saw in chapters 3 and 4, for any two 
determinate properties A and B, A and B are commensurable if they are elements of the 
same determinable and it is possible for amounts of A and of B to be equal to one another 
with respect to that determinable. So, for example, assets and debts are commensurable, 
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since for any amount of assets, it is possible for there to be a debt that would be equal in 
magnitude but opposite in sign. Rawls’s idea, which he attributes to Petrarch, is that pleasure 
and pain are incommensurable in this sense—amounts of pleasure are never equal in 
magnitude to amounts of pain. Furthermore, this idea, while at odds with a long tradition in 
utilitarian ethics, is not so counterintuitive. Pleasure and pain are phenomenologically very 
different, and elicit different psychological and physiological responses. Perhaps the hedonist 
will claim that there exists for each amount of pleasure a corresponding amount of pain such 
that it is rational to be indifferent between experiencing them both or experiencing nothing 
at all. But it’s not clear that this is really right; someone who is sufficiently pain-averse, rather 
than choose to enjoy even vast amounts of pleasure along with miniscule quantities of pain, 
might always just prefer to have nothing at all. 
Perhaps it will be helpful to consider some concrete examples. Each of the following 
pairs of episodes of pleasure represents a manner in which they may differ that causes a 
problem concerning measurement: 
 
A1: Justin taking pleasure in reading Slaughterhouse-Five at t. 
 
A2: Justin taking pleasure in a back massage at t. 
 
B1: Justin taking pleasure in listening to the song Like a Rolling Stone by Bob Dylan at 
t. 
 
B2: Justin taking pleasure in watching the sun set over the Pacific Ocean at t. 
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C1: Justin taking pleasure of increasing intensity in a back massage of increasing 
intensity over the interval t1 to t2. 
 
C2: Justin taking pain of decreasing intensity in the sensation generated by a 
thumbscrew as the thumbscrew is loosened over the interval t1 to t2.  
 
D1: Justin taking pleasure in the sensations generated by drinking a delicious, well-
brewed cup of espresso during the interval t1 to t2.  
 
D2: Justin taking pleasure in the sensations generated by resting comfortably near a 
warm fire in a recliner with his feet up during the interval t1 to t9. 
 
E1: Justin taking pleasure in the flavors and textures of a bite of well-prepared 
spaghetti at t.  
 
E2: Justin taking pain in the flavors and textures of a bite of undercooked and over-
salted spaghetti at t.  
 
Pleasure episode A1 is supposed to be an intellectual pleasure. What’s enjoyable 
about reading Slaughterhouse-Five is not the pleasing way the letters are arranged and lined up 
on the page; it has to do with an appreciative understanding of the story, in conjunction with 
an appreciation for the way Vonnegut tells it, in conjunction, perhaps, with an appreciation 
of Vonnegut’s way with words, et cetera. The pleasure associated with reading the book is 
not sensory in nature. It’s not that something looks nice. It is intellectual in nature. In contrast, 
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the pleasures associated with A2, getting a back massage, are sensory in nature. Back 
massages cause pleasant-feeling sensations, and that is why back massages are pleasant. 
There is no distinctively intellectual component to the pleasure associated with receiving a 
back massage. The pleasantness generated by the back massage seems to me to be exhausted 
by the pleasure generated by the sensations involved.244 
Although episodes of pleasure B1 and B2 are both “sensory” pleasures—pleasures 
derived from sensations—they are derived from different sorts of sensation. B1 is auditory in 
nature, whereas B2 is visual. This difference in source material seems to generate a difficulty 
in the determination of which pleasure is more pleasant. It is relatively easy for me to tell 
that I get more pleasure from listening to Like a Rolling Stone than I do from listening to 
Knocking on Heaven’s Door. I find Knocking on Heaven’s Door’s melody to be inferior and 
repetitive. So, for any two moments, t1 and t2, such that I’m listening to Like a Rolling Stone at 
t1 and listening to Knocking on Heaven’s Door at t2, I take more pleasure at t1 in listening to Like 
a Rolling Stone than I do at t2 in listening to Knocking on Heaven’s Door over the interval. 
It also seems reasonably easy, in some cases, to determine which of two visual 
experiences I take more pleasure in. If one thing “looks better” to me than something else, I 
can usually tell. That is, between two objects of pleasure, both of which are visual 
experiences, I can usually tell which of the two I take more pleasure in. But if I’m asked to 
determine whether or not B2 “looks better” than B1 sounds, my level of confidence in my 
judgment drops. It is difficult for me to determine whether I take more pleasure in B1 or in 
B2. This difficulty seems to be generated by the fact that the two objects of pleasure are so 
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back massage because they think the massage might lead to some other pleasant experience. 
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different. This qualitative difference between the objects of pleasure generates a difficulty 
with respect to the judgment of quantity. The aural object of pleasure is so different from 
the visual object of pleasure that it is difficult to determine which quantitative relationship 
holds between the two pleasures.  
The pair C1 and C2 each represent an increase in overall hedonic levels over an 
interval of time, but C1 is an increase in pleasure over the interval whereas C2 is a decrease in 
pain over the interval. If pleasures and pains quantities on the same hedonic scale, then they 
are commensurable. That is, for any amount of pleasure, n, there is some amount of pain, m, 
such that the absolute value of n is equal to the absolute value of m. If that’s the case, then n 
plus m is hedonically equivalent to zero. This is an important feature of interval- and ratio-
measurement. The equivalence not just of spots in the order, but of intervals, is what 
determines whether some property or feature is quantitative or not.245 
But cases like C1 and C2 are meant to cast doubt on the commensurability of pleasure 
and pain. If pleasure and pain are quantities of the appropriate sort, then the overall hedonic 
increase in C1 is comparable to the overall hedonic increase in C2. That is, either the absolute 
value of increase in pleasure in C1 is greater than that of the decrease in pain in C2, or the 
decrease in pain is greater in absolute value than that of the increase in pleasure in C1, of 
their absolute values are equal. But it’s not easy to see how such a comparison could be 
carried out—it’s difficult to see how such a determination could be made. It’s very difficult 
to imagine, after having had a thumbscrew removed, being able to determine the precise size 
of the quantity of hedonic change over the interval of time, and being able to know whether 
the quantity was greater than, less than, or equal to the size of some other hedonic change. 
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This casts doubt on a central portion of the thesis that pleasure and pain are legitimate, 
measurable quantities.  
The pleasure of D1 is brief but intense, whereas the pleasure of D2 is not very intense 
but lasts much longer. This represents a final difficulty caused by the heterogeneity of 
pleasures and pains. Although in some cases, in which the pleasures are approximately equal 
in duration but where one is much more intense than the other, or in which the intensities 
are approximately the same but where one lasts much longer than the other, determining 
which is “more pleasant” can be reasonably unproblematic. The problems multiply when 
neither intensity nor duration is held constant. Reflection on case D shows that it can indeed 
be very difficult to determine, between a brief but intense pleasure and a long-lasting but 
mellow one, which contains more pleasure.  
4.2. The Argument from Hedonic Heterogeneity 
Although they both think that it can ultimately be overcome, Ross246 and Hall,247 
claim that the heterogeneity problem is a serious problem for the thesis that pleasure and 
pain are quantities. The problem might be expressed in terms of the following argument:  
 
The “Heterogeneous Pleasures” Argument 
 
1. It is impossible to determine, for each pair A through D, which of the pair is 
hedonically greater. 
2. If it is impossible to determine, for each pair A through D, which pair is hedonically 
greater, then each pair, A through D, represents a pair of incomparable pleasures. 
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3. If each pair, A through D, represents a pair of incomparable pleasures, then pleasure 
and pain are not quantitative. 
4. Therefore, pleasure and pain are not quantitative.  
 
Line 1 seems to be true. It is impossible to determine, based on the given 
descriptions, for each pair A through D, which member of the pair is hedonically greater 
than the other, or whether they are hedonically equal. When I reflect on each case as it is 
described above, I find that I cannot determine which member contains more pleasure than 
the other, or whether they contain an equal amount of pleasure. Each member of each pair 
is too different from its counterpart for an accurate comparison to be made.  
Line 2 appears to be true because our inability to make comparisons between very 
heterogeneous pleasures and pains is evidence that there are really no comparisons to be 
made. The contrast cases represented by pairs A through D are not isolated or rare. They 
represent many of the most familiar hedonic experiences. Our total inability to determine for 
each pair which is the “greater” member should strike the friend of the hedonic calculus as 
deeply troubling. In the absence of even the most rudimentary capability to draw 
comparisons, the suggestion that pleasure and pain are quantitative may be question-begging. 
4.3. Criticisms of the Heterogeneity Argument 
Ross claims that line 2 is false:248 the fact that pleasantness and painfulness are 
measurable quantities does not entail that for any two pleasures or pains, I am able to say 
which is the greater. The fact that mass is a quantity does not entail that, for any descriptions 
of any two massive objects, no matter how vague or incomplete the descriptions may be, I 
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can determine which of the two objects is the more massive. Nor does the fact that temporal 
duration is a quantity entail that for any two temporal intervals, I am capable of determining 
which is the longer. Since line 2 is the assertion that pleasantness and painfulness are not 
quantitative properties in virtue of an inability on our part to make precise determinations of  
the relevant amounts, the argument relies on an improper inference of a metaphysical 
conclusion from an epistemological premise.  
It is also worth pointing out that the pleasures are under-described. The descriptions 
are particularly undetailed. One prominent reason I can’t tell which is the hedonically greater 
member of each pair is that I am not given enough information to determine which it is. 
According to standard versions of the hedonic calculus, the magnitude of a pleasure is equal 
to its intensity times its duration. Neither piece of information is even hinted at in any of the 
above descriptions. And it is important to note that this is not a rhetorical trick on the part 
of the friend of the hedonic calculus; when this sort of argument is presented be 
philosophers who endorse it, it is presented in this manner, with this defect.249  
It is possible that the request for intensity ratings is a question-begging demand. The 
very issue in discussion, whether pleasantness and painfulness are quantitative, depends 
crucially on whether the intensities of pleasures and pains are quantities, since their duration 
clearly is. It would clearly be question-begging to ask for precise intensity ratings for each 
pleasure or pain. The existence of precise intensity ratings is controversial; this is the very 
controversy I am attempting to resolve. But the existence of imprecise intensity ratings is not 
particularly controversial. Not all cases are tough, borderline cases. The pleasure of an 
orgasm is more intense than the pleasure of a bit of cold pizza. The pain of a hangnail is less 
intense than the pain of being stabbed in the stomach.  
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Perhaps the cases listed above, A through D, are tough, borderline cases. Since it is 
illegitimate to request impossibly precise information, requests for perfectly precise 
information about the intensity of each above-mentioned episode of pleasure or pain begs 
the question. I don’t think that’s what’s going on in these cases, though. In these cases, we 
are given no information at all about their intensity or their duration. It is not question-
begging to ask for the most precise possible information, and it is clear that the descriptions 
of the intensities of pleasure and pain that cases A through D represent are not as precise as 
they could possibly be. 
There is an additional, verbal, problem here that results from the problem of 
interpersonal comparisons. Since it is impossible for one person to directly compare the 
intensities of his pleasures with the intensities of someone else’s pleasures, it is impossible 
for any of us to develop a publicly usable vocabulary that would be of use to describe these 
intensities. So if the proponent of the heterogeneity argument were to describe A1 as “Justin 
reading Slaughterhouse-Five at t, while taking pleasure of intensity 8 in doing so,” this would 
still not be particularly helpful to anyone else. Still less helpful would it be to describe the 
intensity as being “exactly similar to that associated with his watching of the Red Sox game 
at t2.” Although this description does not make an appeal to a mysterious number rating, it 
nevertheless compares it to an inaccessible standard. If the description were to compare the 
intensity of A1 to, say, one of your pleasures, then it is unclear why we should be confident 
in the correctness of the comparison. Such confidence appears to beg the question. 
But this is a deeper problem than the mere heterogeneity of the relevant pairs of 
hedonic phenomena. The heterogeneity problem is merely the problem that the pleasures are 
“too different” for accurate quantitative comparisons to be possible. It is not an attack based 
on the alleged vagueness of intensity itself, nor an attack based on the impossibility of 
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interpersonal comparisons.250 We might, therefore, wonder whether the argument from 
heterogeneity represents a genuine theoretical problem,  or whether it is another practical 
objection, like the argument from interpersonal comparisons, and has a similar solution.  
The problem of heterogeneity may merely be a practical problem, but I think even its 
practical force is illusory. I think that as long as the various different types of pleasure are 
legitimately pleasant, then there is no problem based on their various differences. However 
different they may be, as long as it makes sense to think of them as all being pleasant 
somehow, then they are all instances of the same quantitative phenomenon. This is where 
the attitudinal view of pleasure, which I argued for in chapter 2 can help us.251 If we keep in 
mind that there is a distinction between the attitude of pleasure on one hand, and the object 
of the attitude on the other, we can see that however heterogeneous the objects of pleasure 
may be, they are nevertheless united insofar as they are the objects of pleasure. However 
various and sundry the objects of pleasure may be, they are all objects of the unitary attitude 
of pleasure. It’s not the objects that are being compared with respect to their intrinsic 
pleasantness, but instances of the attitude of enjoyment, with respect to their intensity and 
duration.  
5. Pleasure and Pain are not Amenable to Mathematical Operations 
As we saw in chapters 3 and 4, if pleasure and pain are legitimate quantities 
measurable on a ratio scale, then there are a wide variety of mathematical operations 
applicable to numbers representing amounts of pleasure and pain. A final class of argument 
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against this thesis attempts to show that for a variety of reasons, even if there were numbers, 
these mathematical operations would be inapplicable. Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not 
quantities.  
5.1. The Problem of Mathematical Amenability 
The problem of mathematical amenability is this: if pleasure and pain were 
measurable on a ratio scale, then, by definition, it would be possible to perform various 
mathematical and statistical operations on numbers representing amounts of pleasure and 
pain. For example, it would be possible to add them together, and to subtract them from 
one another. It would also be possible to meaningfully and coherently express relationships 
between amounts of pleasure and pain in terms of ratios. It would be possible, that is, to say, 
truly, that one episode of pleasure contained twice as much pleasure as another episode; or 
that one episode contained a third as much pain as another.  
But for a variety of reasons, it has been argued that it is not possible to perform 
these mathematical and statistical operations. In what follows, I will present a generic version 
of the argument. I will then explain several distinct reasons for thinking that its key premise 
is true. I will then explain why none of these purported rationales is a legitimate reason for 
believing the premise.  
 
Argument from Mathematical Inaptitude: 
 
1. If pleasure and pain are not amenable to the right kinds of mathematical operation, 
then pleasure and pain are not quantities.  
2. Pleasure and pain are not amenable to the right kinds of mathematical operation. 
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3. Therefore, pleasure and pain are not quantities. 
 
Line (1) is true in virtue of the meaning of the meaning of the word ‘quantity.’ If 
some “stuff” is a quantity, then the stuff must come in “amounts” that meet certain formal 
constraints. The formal constraints are given in terms of the mathematical and statistical 
operations that can be performed on numbers representing the amounts. First, there must 
exist an ordering of the relevant items from least to greatest with respect to the quantity. The 
intervals on the scale must represent genuine intervals. Finally, there must be genuine ratios 
between the intervals. That is, the “amount” represented by the number ‘6’ must be two 
times the amount represented by the number ‘3.’ Since whether or not some “stuff” is a 
quantity is determined by its susceptibility to these sorts of mathematical operations, if some 
“stuff” is insusceptible to these operations, it is not a quantity. But why should we think that 
pleasure and pain are not susceptible to such measurement?  
 
5.2. Linear Incomparability 
John Hall discusses a pair of cases concerning toothaches:  
 
Even where experiences are admitted to be ordinally comparable in respect to 
pleasantness… the difference e.g. in pleasantness between pairs of pleasures may be 
incomparable, so that while it is all right to say that to have two teeth aching is more 
painful than to have four, and that to have five teeth aching is more painful than to 
have four, it makes no sense either to assert or deny that it causes a greater lessening 
of pain to stop one tooth aching in the case of the man with two teeth aching than in 
the case of the man with five.252 
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The point Hall is considering concerns interval measurement. Can units of pleasure and pain 
represent genuine intervals, or merely places in an order? If interval measurement is possible, 
then equations of the form can be true, where the variables stand for number assignments 
made on the relevant scale:  
 
i) |A – B| >, <, = |C – D| 
 
As we saw in chapter 3, an example of a merely ordinal scale is a race result. The 
“units” of the results are just spots in the order. They don’t represent batting intervals—there 
are no half-spots, no genuine intervals. A mapping of the variables of the above equation 
onto spots in a batting order yields nonsense:  
 
ii) | 2nd – 1st| = |4th – 3rd| 
 
It doesn’t make sense to subtract numbers representing positions in an order from one 
another and compare the magnitudes of the results. “First minus second” is not equal to 
first. It does, however, make sense to subtract numbers representing intervals from one 
another and then to compare the magnitudes of the results.  
Another example of a purely ordinal scale is the scale that measures degrees of 
consanguinity. X is a cousin of y if and only if x and y share a common ancestor, but x is not 
a descendent of y, and y is not a descendent of x. The ordinal degree of the cousinhood 
relationships is derived from the smallest number of generations separating the cousins from 
their common ancestor. So if my grandparents are your grandparents, then we’re first 
cousins. And if my grandparents are your great-grandparents, and I’m not your dad, then 
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we’re first cousins, once removed. And if my great-grandparents are your great grandparents, 
and we’re not first cousins, then we’re second cousins. But again, it does not make sense to 
add or subtract degrees of consanguinity from one another. Equations like (ii) are 
nonsensical when the ordinal numbers are interpreted as degrees of consanguinity.  
The Celsius scale of temperature is an example of a genuine interval scale. A 
mapping of the variables in the above equation onto numbers representing degrees Celsius is 
well-formed: 
 
|34° – 33°| = |44° – 43°|  
 
The result of the left-hand side of the equation is 1 degree. The right-hand side has the same 
result: one degree. One degree is equal to one degree. Degrees Celsius can be subtracted in 
this manner if and only if the Celsius scale is an interval scale, and when you have an interval 
scale, the substance it measures is a legitimate quantity.  
Our question, then, is whether a hypothetical scale for the measurement of pleasure 
and pain would be amenable to interval measurement: would numbers taken from the scale 
and mapped onto the above equation schemas yield sense, or nonsense?  
If the suggestion about toothaches is correct, then any attempted mapping of 
amounts of pleasure and pain into this schema yields nonsense. According to its proponent, 
“it makes no sense either to assert or deny that it causes a greater lessening of pain to stop 
one tooth aching in the case of the man with two teeth aching than in the case of the man 
with five.”253 That is, the claim that the difference in pain represented by subtracting 1 unit 
of pain from 2 units is less than (or not less than) the difference represented by subtracting 4 
                                                
253 Hall, p. 38.  
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units of pain from five units lacks a truth value, because it is nonsense.254 For example, 
suppose there are two men waiting in a dentist’s office at time t. Adam has a toothache in 
two teeth, and Burt has a toothache in five teeth. Adam is called back and the dentist is able 
to cure one of Adam’s toothaches, but not the other. Then Burt goes back to see the doctor. 
The dentist is able to cure four of his toothaches, but not the fifth. So at t2, each man has 
just one toothache.  
The proponent of this line of argument is fine with the claim that Burt at t is in more 
pain than Adam is at t.255 The central claim here is that it makes no sense to compare the 
“lessening of pain.” That is, while Adam is in less pain at t2 than he was at t, and so is Burt, it 
makes no sense to say how much less each of them is in at t2, and to compare those amounts to 
one another. Suppose that ‘2’ represents the amount of pain Adam is in at t; that ‘1’ 
represents the amount of pain Adam is in at t2; that ‘5’ represents the amount of pain Burt is 
in at t; and that ‘1’ represents the amount of pain Burt is in at t2. Now consider the following 
equations: 
 
a) 5 > 2 
 
b) 1 = 1256 
 
                                                
254 This remark presumes a controversial view of the relationship between sentences and 
truth-values. I intend the assumption to be innocent; nothing in what I say here turns on the 
truth of this view. 
255 Hall, p. 38.  
256 Perhaps the proponent of this line of argument would argue that (b) isn’t really true, on 
the grounds that it is nonsense to claim that Adam’s pain at t2 is precisely equal to Burt’s 
pain at t2. Perhaps the most precise thing that could be said is that Adams t2 pain is roughly 
equal to Burt’s t2 pain. If that were the case, then (b) would be false, and (b1) would be true: 
b1) 1 ≈ 1. If (b) is false and (b1) is true, I think what I have to say about this case will still 
apply. I discuss rough equality in more detail in section x. 
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c) |2 – 1| < |5 – 1| 
 
Equation (a) says that the amount of pain Burt was in at t is greater than the amount of pain 
Adam was in at t. Equation (b) says that the amount of pain Adam was in at t2 is equal to the 
amount of pain Burt was in at t2. According to Hall, the proponent of this line of argument 
believes that equation (a) is true, and Hall’s remarks suggest that the proponent would accept 
equation (b), too (since pains are ordinally comparable, they are therefore able to occupy the 
same spot in the order). But equation (c) is problematic. It says that over the interval t – t2, 
Burt had a greater reduction in pain than Adam did. According to the story, Adam had two 
toothaches and one was cured, leaving him with one toothache. Burt had five toothaches 
and four were cured, also leaving him with one toothache.  
According to the proponent of this line of argument, although it makes sense to say 
that Burt was in more pain than Adam at t, and it makes sense to say that Burt and Adam 
were in the same amount of pain at t2, and it makes sense to say that Burt and Adam were 
both relieved of some pain, but it does not make sense to say that Burt was relieved of more 
pain than Adam. That is, equation (d) is nonsense: 
 
d) |2 – 1| < |5 – 1|257 
 
Hall does not present any particular rationale in favor of this claim. It cannot just be that it is 
difficult in practice to discover and compare amounts of pain felt by different people, since 
the problem would be merely practical in nature, and would not threaten the truth-aptitude 
or meaningfulness of claims about measurability of pleasure and pain. It would also reduce 
                                                
257 (2 – 1) represents the amount of pain of which Adam was relieved, and (5 – 1) represents 
the amount of pain of which Burt was relieved.  
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the problem to a variant of the “interpersonal comparisons” problem previously discussed. I 
think it would be a mistake to suppose that this argument relies crucially on any practical 
problem.  
In any case, it is not at all clear that this story is correct, or even coherent. The facts 
of the case are these: Burt is in more pain than Adam at t; Burt and Adam are in equal (or 
roughly equal) amounts of pain at t2; and Burt and Adam each underwent a reduction in the 
amount of pain he was experiencing between t and t2. These facts seem to me to entail that 
Burt was relieved of more pain than Adam was; the difference between Burt’s pain at t and 
his pain at t2 is greater than the difference between Adam’s pain at t and his pain at t2. That 
is, if you’re willing to admit that Burt was in more pain than Adam at t, and that Burt and 
Adam were both relieved of some of that pain, and that by t2 Burt and Adam were in equal 
(or roughly equal) amounts of pain, I can see no reason to deny that Burt’s relief was greater 
than Adam’s. So it seems that the truth of equations (a), (b), (c) entails the truth of equation 
(d). 
5.3. Analogies to Temperature 
Hall considers another type of rationale for the second line of the argument from 
mathematical inaptitude, which admits that pleasure and pain are susceptible to ordinal and 
interval measurement, but according to which addition and subtraction of numbers 
representing “amounts” of pleasure and pain is nevertheless impossible. This is 
accomplished by an appeal to an analogy with temperature. Suppose you have two bowls of 
water. Bowl A contains water at 50° C. Bowl B contains water at 60 ° C. If you were to mix 
bowls A and B together in bowl C, you would not end up with a bowl that contained water 
at 110° C. Moreover, with the information given so far, there is no way to determine just 
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what the temperature of the water in bowl C would be.258 Similarly, the proponent of this 
argument claims, even though pleasantness and painfulness can be measured according to an 
interval scale, it makes no sense to combine, aggregate, or otherwise “add together” the 
numbers representing the amounts of different pleasures and pains.  
Another, similar, rationale for line 2 considered by Hall concerns the prospect of 
adding together the “feelings” of pleasure felt by two or more people. The proponent of this 
kind of argument concedes that there is an ordinal scale for the measurement of pleasure 
and pain, but denies that interval measurement is possible. Hall writes:  
 
Smith might then be said to having or undergoing more pleasure at 3 o’clock than 
Jones, if he was characterized more strongly by the emotion or feeling which pleasure 
is supposed to denote. But here again we are dealing with a quality: it would still 
make no sense to add the degrees of emotion (as measured on some scale) 
characterizing Smith to the degrees characterizing Jones than to add their respective 
body temperatures as measured in degrees Fahrenheit.259  
 
Suppose Smith is standing by himself in a room, with a body temperature of 98.6° 
Fahrenheit. Suppose that Jones joins him there, and that Jones’s body temperature is also 
normal, at 98.6° Fahrenheit. It is clear that they do not compose a third object, Smith-and-
Jones, whose temperature is 197.2° Fahrenheit.260  
According to the proponent of this kind of argument, the supposition that there is a 
similar aggregation of Smith’s pleasure with that of Jones makes equally little sense. Even if 
it’s true that Smith is experiencing more pleasure than Jones, and even if it’s true that Smith 
and Jones are each feeling some determinate amount of pleasure, it is nevertheless not the 
case that adding the pleasure felt by Smith to the pleasure felt by Jones yields a third, 
determinate amount of pleasure.  
                                                
258 Hall, pp. 38-9. 
259 Hall, p. 39.  
260 For a related argument, see MacKenzie, p. 206.  
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These analogies are faulty for a variety of reasons. One is that the fact that 
temperatures cannot be simply added together in the manner described has no bearing on 
whether other quantities, unrelated to temperature, can be added in this manner. Units of 
length, mass, volume, electrical resistance, and others can be sensibly added in a 
straightforward manner. Numbers expressing the temperatures of two bowls of water 
cannot be added together in this manner because these numbers represent the average 
temperatures of the bowls, not the magnitude of the temperatures of the bowls. That is, the 
temperature of the bowl represents heat divided by the volume of the water, not the total 
amount of heat contained in the bowl.  
Furthermore, although it is not possible to discover the temperature of bowl C, this 
is only because the information given in the story is insufficient. In order to discover the 
temperature of bowl C, we need to know the volumes of bowls A and B. Once we know 
those volumes, it becomes easy to determine the temperature of bowl C. The example 
simply does not contain the necessary information. The objection, then, is that there is a way 
to determine the temperature of the “combination” of bowls A and B, we just need more 
information, because temperatures cannot simply be added, because the quantity, 
temperature, is derived from two other quantities and a mathematical operation: heat energy 
divided by volume. Bowl C contains the heat energy in bowl A plus the heat energy of bowl 
B, but it also contains the volume of bowl A plus that of bowl B. So in order to determine 
the temperature of bowl C, you must add the amounts of heat energy in the two bowls, then 
add their volumes, and then divide the heat by the volume. That will yield the temperature of 
bowl C. So although temperature is a quantity, it is a derived quantity. This causes problems 
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for some straightforward applications of the addition function to numbers representing 
temperatures.261 It does not affect the fact that temperature is a quantity.  
These facts provide an important way to resist the analogy of “degrees” of pleasure 
and pain to degrees of temperature is specious. Temperature in degrees Fahrenheit, whether 
it is of bowls of water or human bodies, is an average of two factors: heat and volume. 
Temperature is determined by dividing heat energy by volume.262 Pleasure and pain are not 
like that. On standard versions of the hedonic calculus, amounts of pleasure and pain are 
determined by two factors: intensity and duration. But intensity is not divided by duration, it 
is multiplied. It’s not an average, that is, it is a two-dimensional area. This fact entails that 
amounts of pleasure can be sensibly added together, and that the result of such an operation 
is itself an amount of pleasure.  
The second analogy is faulty, as well. Although there is no sense in which Smith and 
Jones’s combined bodily temperature is 197.2° Fahrenheit, there is a sense in which, if it 
makes sense to talk about “degrees” or “amounts” of pleasure at all, Smith and Jones taking 
pleasure in something involves “more pleasure” than if just Smith were pleasure pleasure. As 
we saw, the temperature of a bowl of water, or of a human body, is an average of heat over 
volume. Pleasantness and painfulness are not averages. However, there is a clear sense in 
which the amount of heat energy in the room doubles when Jones walks into it. This is true 
even if the temperature of the room remains in equilibrium. Jones’s body is a metabolic 
furnace; it uses fuel and produces energy. Some of that energy is radiated in the form of heat. 
The amount of heat being radiated in the room doubles when Jones enters, and the fact that 
                                                
261 Not all straightforward applications of addition, though. Adding (or subtracting) heat 
energy without also simultaneously adding volume yields no addition problems. 
262 According to a standard reduction, temperature of a sample is its “mean kinetic molecular 
energy.” That is, it is the average degree to which the molecules of the sample are moving.  
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the temperature of the room does not rise263 is irrelevant, because temperature is not 
equivalent to heat, it is heat divided by volume.  
Similarly, suppose you have a basement room with a hot-water heater in it. Suppose 
the temperature of the room is a constant 50° F. Now suppose you want to increase your 
hot-water output, so you add another hot-water heater to the room, identical to the first. The 
temperature of the room will not double. It’s possible that the temperature of the room 
would so negligible as to be undetectable, if the heaters were very well insulated. But just as 
surely, something doubles. The amount of hot water, for one thing. The amount of heat energy 
will nearly double, as well (accounting for the ambient heat energy in the room, in virtue of 
which the temperature is 50° F). The friend of the hedonic calculus argues, plausibly, that 
hedonic phenomena are like the hot water in the scenario. Hedonic phenomena are not like 
the temperature of the room.  
The root of the problem here is the admission by the proponent of the argument 
that pleasantness and painfulness are measurable on an ordinal scale. Once ordinal degrees 
of pleasure and pain have been recognized, intervals follow. There is a disanalogy between 
the cases of pleasure and pain and the paradigm instances of merely ordinal measurement. 
There are natural “spots,” or places, in batting orders and cousin relationships. Batters come 
up to bat in a particular order; there are no half-spots, quarter-spots, or no continuum. A 
batting order is made up of discrete places. Degrees of cousinhood are similarly discrete. The 
degrees depend on the number of generations between the shared ancestor and the nearer of 
the two cousins to that common ancestor; successive generations are similarly discrete. 
There are no corresponding natural “spots” or places in the (admittedly) ordinal scale of 
                                                
263 Of course, this isn’t quite accurate. The temperature of the room would have to rise, at 
least a little. There are now two furnaces in it, rather than just one. Perhaps the rise would be 
too slight to register on any but the most sensitive of thermometers.  
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feelings or attitudes of pleasure and pain. These feelings or attitudes make up a continuum, 
which entails that the relevant quantity is not merely ordinal in nature, but admits of intervals 
as well.  
5.4. A Problem Concerning Aggregation 
Another possible rationale for line 2 begins by conceding the point that pleasure and 
pain come in determinate degrees; the problem is that these degrees cannot be meaningfully 
subtracted from one another in the way demanded by, for example, standard hedonic 
versions of utilitarianism.  
Suppose, for example, that I take pleasure to degree 5 in the drinking of a cup of 
coffee at time t. Suppose further that I take displeasure or pain to degree 3, measured on the 
same scale, in the dreariness of the day outside my window at t. The proponent of this line 
of reasoning claims that there is no sense in which my overall hedonic state is “+2” at t, 
because there is no composite object to which I am taking (5 – 3) degrees of pleasure in at t. 
Although units of pleasure and pain are supposed to be identical in magnitude but opposite 
in sign, the proponent of this argument claims that there is no sense in subtracting numbers 
representing pain from numbers representing pleasure.264  
To see why, suppose that I am 5 feet from the door to my office at t. Suppose 
further that I am 3 feet from the filing cabinet in my office, but in the opposite direction. 
Although there exists a dimension along which my door is “+5” feet from me and my filing 
                                                
264 Hall, p. 40. According to Hall, the suggestion that it does make sense to add pleasures and 
pains in this way is related somehow to the suggestion that pleasure and pain are attitudes, 
not feelings. 
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cabinet is “-3” feet from me, there is no composite object, the “door & cabinet” such that I 
am “+2” feet from the composite object.265  
Although spatial length is clearly measurable along a ratio scale, it nevertheless does 
not have the characteristics necessary to support a spatial analogue of the hedonic calculus. 
This casts doubt on the claim that if pleasure and pain were ratio measurable, then they 
would have the necessary characteristics. Perhaps pleasure and pain really are precisely 
measurable on a ratio scale; even so, perhaps there is no way to give sense to their being 
amenable to addition to and subtraction from one another. 
Although spatial distance is a ratio-measurable quantity, it does not behave in the 
manner predicted by analogy to a robust hedonic calculus. Although it makes sense to 
subtract the distance between my body and the door from the distance between my body 
and the filing cabinet, and it is clear why we would be willing to say that the result of that 
subtraction operation is “+2 feet,” it is also quite clear that it does not follow that there is 
any object such that I am 2 feet from it. It does not make sense to conclude that I am 2 feet 
from the door and cabinet combined. It does not make sense to conclude that there is any 
object such that I am 2 feet from it.  
This line of argument is no better than its predecessors. For one thing, space is three 
dimensional; the pleasure/pain scale is one-dimensional. This casts doubt on the analogy 
between spatial distance and the hedonic attitudes because it is impossible to translate the 
three-dimensional spatial matrix into a two-dimensional “greater/less than” scale without a 
great deal of distortion or loss of information. Drawing three dimensional graphs, with x, y, 
and z axes, on a two-dimensional piece of paper always involves distortion of the image, 
provided that the image is genuinely three-dimensional. There is no reason to suppose that 
                                                
265 Hall, p. 39.  
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the one-dimensional hedonic number line would behave in a way analogous to a three-
dimensional spatial matrix. 
The line of argument also fundamentally mischaracterizes the hedonic calculus. It 
relies on a confusion concerning how pleasures and pains are to be aggregated. The theory 
that pleasure and pain are ratio-measurable along a single scale does not have the 
consequence that, in the scenario described above, there is a single object toward which I 
take 2 units of pleasure, just as there is no single object I’m 2 feet away from in the spatial 
case. The essential core of the hedonic calculus, as Bentham first intended it and others 
improved upon and refined his original idea, is that it makes sense to consider “a lot” of 
pleasure and pain “en masse.” The idea is not that when I take pleasure of intensity n in the 
taste of coffee but simultaneously take pain of intensity m in the dreariness of the day, there 
is some third object, an aggregate of the coffee flavor and drearieness, such that I take 
pleasure-pain of intensity (n minus m) in it. The idea is that both my enjoyment of the coffee 
flavor and my pain in the burning sensation contribute to the overall “enjoyability” of the 
two things for me. The pleasure I take in the flavor of the coffee is relevant to how much 
enjoyment I’m getting overall, but so is the pain. And that is so even though there is no 
single object of my pleasure-and-pain. 
Denying this quickly leads to a series of absurdities. For example, recall MacKenzie’s 
denial that duration makes a difference with respect to the quantity of pleasure. It follows, 
then, that given two pleasures, A and B, such that A and B have intensity n, but where A 
lasts for 5 minutes and B lasts for 10, it is not the case that B contains or represents a greater 
amount of pleasure than A. But there is a difference: B contains double the pleasure of A. If 
I had a choice between A and B, and I wanted to choose whichever I would enjoy most, I 
should choose B. Given equal intensity, the longer pleasure is the more pleasant.  
159 
Similarly, given two pleasures, A and B, such that A and B have a duration of 10 
minutes, but where A is more intense than B, a follower of MacKenzie might suggest that 
that A and B are nevertheless hedonically equivalent. But it is clear that, given a choice 
between A and B, and given that I want to choose whichever I would enjoy the most, I 
should choose A. Given equal duration, the more intense pleasure is the more pleasant.  
6. Draining Water From the Pool 
The spatial-distance analogy suggests another, closely related argument against the 
hedonic calculus, based on the idea that considering aggregates of pleasures and pains must 
be based on a mistaken idea about how “adding” pain to a state of affairs affects the amount 
of pleasure contained in it. In particular, the idea that adding pain is equivalent to subtracting 
pleasure might be thought dubious. Consider, for example, the following states of affairs: 
 
State of affairs A: Justin takes pleasure to degree one for five minutes in drinking 
coffee. 
 
State of affairs B: Justin takes pleasure to degree one for seven minutes in drinking 
coffee, and takes pain to degree 2 for one minute in a burning sensation on his 
tongue.  
 
An argument based on this example could be stated in the following manner: 
 
The Subtraction Argument 
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1. If what Bentham et al. say about a lot of pleasure is correct, then state of affairs A 
contains the same amount of pleasure as state of affairs B.  
2. It’s not the case that state of affairs A contains the same amount of pleasure as state 
of affairs B.  
3. Therefore, it’s not the case that what Bentham, et al. say about a lot of pleasure is 
correct.  
 
Line 1 is supposed to be true because Bentham advocated a hedonic calculus 
according to which the total amount or “net quantity,” of pleasure in a state of affairs is 
equal to the sum of the amounts of pleasure contained in each episode of pleasure in the 
state of affairs, minus the sum of the amounts pain contained in it.266 So to determine the net 
quantity of pleasure in a state of affairs, take all of the individual pleasures it contains, and 
add them together. Then take all of the individual pains the state of affairs contains, and add 
them together. Finally, subtract the total amount of pain in the state of affairs from the total 
amount of pleasure.  Net pleasure is a difference of sums. Adding pain into a state of affairs 
has an identical net effect to that of subtracting pleasure.  
Line 2 is true because of the way the situations are described. According to the story, 
situation A contains 5 units of pleasure, and situation B contains 7 units of pleasure. In 
situation B, 2 of the units are “offset” by units of pain. According to the proponent of this 
argument, the two states of affairs nevertheless contain different amounts of pleasure. It’s 
not the case that the 2 units of pleasure are destroyed or somehow removed from 
consideration by the pain. Adding some pain to the state of affairs does not reduce the 
amount of pleasure contained in it. The amounts of pleasure and pain contained in a state of 
                                                
266 Bentham, pp. 19-22.  
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affairs are independent of one another. Adding some pain to some pre-existing pleasure is 
not the hedonic equivalent of draining water out of the pool. That is adding something, not 
taking anything away. Adding pain does not obliterate pleasure; adding pleasure does not 
annihilate pain. 
The argument is unsound because line 1 is false. It relies on a confusion about the 
distinction between different ways of calculating the amount of pleasure in a state of affairs. 
Although situation B contains more gross pleasure than situation A, the two situations 
contain the same amount of net pleasure. Once this difference is seen, it is clear how state of 
affairs B contains more pleasure than state of affairs A—more gross pleasure—but is 
nevertheless is also equal to state of affairs A with respect to pleasure—net pleasure. That is, 
although B contains more pleasure than A does, that extra pleasure is offset by the presence 
of the pain that is present in B but not in A.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE THESIS THAT PLEASURE AND PAIN 
ARE QUANTITATIVE 
 
1. Introductory Remarks 
There are three main kinds of arguments in the literature for the thesis that pleasure 
and pain are quantitative. The first class of arguments are merely question-begging assertions 
of the controversial contention that pleasure and pain are measurable quantities. Another 
class of arguments are defensive: they argue that the thesis that pleasure and pain are 
quantitative is not ruled out by some admitted practical inability on the part of normal 
humans. A third group of arguments, by contrast, argues that there is some mathematical 
operation such that it makes sense to apply it to the case of pleasure and pain, and that this 
could be true only if pleasure and pain are quantitative.  
2. Sidgwick: An A Priori  Assumption 
Sidgwick’s remarks in his article “Utilitarianism” presume that pleasantness is 
sensory in nature and is quantitative:  
 
…Pleasure cannot be distinguished from Happiness, except that Happiness is rather 
used to denote a sum or series of those transitory feelings each of which we call a 
pleasure… Utilitarians have always treated pain as the negative quantity of pleasure. 
So that, strictly speaking, Utilitarian right conduct is that which produces not the 
greatest amount of pleasure on the whole, but the greatest surplus of pleasure over 
pain, the pain being conceived as balanced against an equal amount of pleasure, so 
that the two mutually annihilate each other for the purpose of ethical calculation.  
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…It is assumed that all pleasures are capable of being compared quantitatively with 
each other and with all pains—that every kind of feeling has a certain intensive 
quantity, positive or negative (or perhaps zero), in respect of preferableness or 
desirableness, and that this quantity can be known…267 
 
In this passage, Sidgwick’s language indicates that he assumes, without argument, that 
pleasure and pain are quantities. Expressions such as ‘sum,’ ‘negative quantity,’ ‘greatest 
amount,’ ‘greatest surplus,’ ‘equal amounts’ being ‘balanced,’ and ‘ethical calculation’ are 
clearly quantitative, but Sidgwick does not provide any independent reasons for thinking that 
pleasure and pain instantiate these quantitative properties.  
In Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick provides a little more in the way of argument for his 
views. His claim is that although we cannot empirically verify that pleasures all have a 
definite degree of intensity, we are justified a priori in making the assumption:  
 
…if pleasure only exists as it is felt, the belief that every pleasure and pain has a 
definite intensive quantity or degree must remain an a priori assumption, incapable of 
positive empirical verification. For the pleasure can only have the degree as 
compared with other feelings, of the same or some different kind; but, generally 
speaking, since this comparison can only be made in imagination, it can only yield 
the hypothetical result that if certain feelings could be felt together precisely as they 
have been felt separately, one would be found more desirable than the other in some 
definite ratio. If, then, we are asked what ground we have for regarding this 
imaginary result as a valid representation of reality, we cannot say more than that the 
belief in its general validity is irresistibly suggested in reflection on experience, and 
remains at any rate uncontradicted by experience.268 
 
Sidgwick argues that although we cannot empirically verify that this pleasure is a “5” whereas 
that one is a “7”—there is no such thing as a hedonometer, unfortunately—nothing in 
experience contradicts the hypothesis that pleasures and pains are quantitative, and we are 
justified a priori in making the assumption that they are quantitative. 
                                                
267 Sidgwick 1907, pp. 4 – 5.  
268 Sidgwick 2000, p. 146.  
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3. Socrates: Everyone Wants to Maximize Pleasure 
Another early discussion of the quantitative properties of pleasure and pain occurs in 
Plato’s Protagoras. Plato’s project in the final section of this dialogue is to propose and defend 
a version of hedonism about welfare value that explains why people sometimes appear to be 
incontinent, but which is compatible with Socrates’s overall position that because 
incontinent or weak-willed behavior is psychologically impossible, no one is ever actually 
incontinent.  
 
…the argument becomes ridiculous when you say that a man frequently knows that 
evils are evils and nonetheless does them when it’s possible not to do them, because 
he’s driven and distracted by pleasures…269 
 
He distinguishes intrinsic goodness and badness from extrinsic goodness and badness, and 
argues that pleasures are good in themselves, apart from their effects, and pains are bad in 
themselves, apart from their effects. The theory appears to be a version of what Moore 
called “definism”—that ‘pleasant’ and ‘good’ are equivalent in meaning. 
 
That this [the claim that it is possible for an agent to perform an action he knows to 
be sub-optimal] is ridiculous will be evident if we stop using many names at once—
pleasant and painful, good and evil. On the contrary, since they’ve appeared to be 
two, let’s call them by two names: first, good and evil; alternatively, pleasure and 
painful…270  
 
…like a man good at weighing, add the pleasures, add the pains, balance also in the 
scale the near and the far, and state which is more. For if you weigh pleasures against 
pleasures, the greater and more numerous must always be taken; if pains against 
pains, the fewer and smaller; if pleasures against pains, then if the pains are exceeded 
by the pleasures, whether the near by the far or the far by the near, the action in 
which they’re present must be done; if the pleasures are exceeded by the pains, it’s 
not to be done.271  
 
                                                
269 Plato, Protagoras, p. 355b. 
270 Plato, Protagoras, pp. 355b – c. 
271 Plato, Protagoras, pp. 356b – c.  
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…Since then the salvation of life has appeared to us to consist in the right choice of 
pleasure and pain—more and fewer, greater and less, nearer and farther—doesn’t it 
in the first place appear to be an art of measurement, an inquiry into excess and 
deficiency and equality relative to one another?272 
 
In the first and second passages, Socrates argues that the claim that people 
sometimes know that their actions are evil but do them anyway because they are distracted 
by immediate pleasure is ridiculous. The argument is that people are confused by the use of 
two sets of names for the same things: pleasantness is just another name for goodness and 
painfulness is just another name for evilness. Once this is recognized, it is hard to see how 
the confusion could be sustained, according to Socrates.  
In the third passage, Socrates appears to propose an axiological theory: pleasures that 
are more numerous and greater (in magnitude?) are better than pleasures that are less 
numerous and smaller. Similarly, pains that are less numerous and smaller are better than 
pains that are more numerous and greater.  
If Socrates’s remarks in the fourth passage are true, then pleasure and pain are 
measurable quantities: he claims that pleasures and pains have relationships of “excess and 
deficiency and equality relative to one another.” That is, there exists between any two 
pleasures either a greater than relation, a less than relation, or a relation of equality. If that’s 
the case, then pleasure is a quantity. Presumably pain is, too. Socrates’s remarks suggest the 
following argument, though I think it is clear that the argument is not contained in the text.  
 
Everyone Maximizes Pleasure Argument 
 
1. Everyone always tries to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. 
                                                
272 Plato, Protagoras, pp. 357a – b.  
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2. If (1), then pleasure is a quantity 
3. Therefore, pleasure is a quantity 
 
The first premise is supposed to be true because, according to Socrates, ‘pleasure’ 
and ‘pain’ are synonymous with the evaluative terms ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ respectively.273 
Therefore, it follows that whenever anyone evaluates a possible course of action, he is 
thereby considering the amount of pleasure and pain it would generate. Socrates appears to 
take as a datum that everyone always tries to do what is best, all things considered.274 “Like a 
man good at weighing,” he says, “add the pleasures, add the pains, balance also in the scale 
the near and the far, and state which is more. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, the 
more numerous and the greater must be taken; if pains against pains, the fewer and smaller;” 
and so on. Protagoras does not deny it.275  
The Second premise is supposed to be true because “maximizing” and “minimizing” 
are quantitative notions. I understand maximization and minimization in the following way: 
 
X maximizes F =df no alternative to x is greater with respect to F than x is. 
 
X minimizes F =df no alternative to x is less with respect to F than x is.  
 
If something is maximal—if nothing is greater than it—then it must be maximal with respect 
to some quantity. Similarly, if something is minimal—nothing is less than it—then it must be 
minimal with respect to some quantity. Both concepts make essential reference to 
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274 See Plato, Protagoras, pp. 356c – 358d. 
275 Plato, Protagoras, pp. 356a – c . 
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quantitative relationships; maximization presupposes ordinal measurement, since, as we saw 
in chapters 3 and 4, ordinal measurability is a necessary condition for the determining of 
which of several alternatives is at least tied for first place, which is definitive of 
maximization. Anything that could possibly deserve to be called “maximization” must make 
some reference to being greater than.276 Though Socrates does not tell us what features of 
pleasures make them greater or less in size, or what determines their relationships of excess, 
deficiency, and equality, some of his remarks provide hints. He asks, rhetorically, what 
inequality in “weight” of pleasure and pain consists of, and answers that “becoming larger 
and smaller than each other, more numerous and fewer, more frequent and less.”277  
As an argument designed to show that pleasure and pain are legitimately quantitative, 
the EMPA is hopeless. Its first premise is clearly question-begging. In his discussion with 
Protagoras, Socrates presumes, but does not argue for, the thesis that pleasure and pain are 
the sorts of things that could sensibly be maximized or minimized. I do not think this is a 
defect in Socrates’s discussion—Socrates’s aim is to explain what is going on when people 
appear to display weakness of will. On his view, weakness of will is impossible, but apparent 
instances of it are not to be explained away by ignorance or a failure to adequately consider 
the relevant consequences. According to Socrates, apparent instances of incontinence are to 
be explained in terms of an error in measurement. Objects generally seem larger when they 
are more near, and smaller when farther away. Pleasures and pains are no different—they 
loom larger when they are nearer in time, and seem less significant when they are more 
                                                
276 Furthermore, maximization of hedonic utility presupposes interval measurement. This is 
because hedonic utility is calculated by finding net total pleasure and net total pain, and then 
subtracting net total pain from net total pleasure. This subtraction operation, as we saw in 
chapter 2, makes sense only if there are genuine intervals. So although maximization per se 
presupposes ordinal measurement, the calculation of hedonic utility presupposes interval 
measurement.  
277 Plato, p. 355d. 
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distant. This distorting effect of proximity, and not ignorance or weakness of will, sometimes 
causes people to make poor decisions.278  
While this is interesting, it is not particularly valuable for our purposes, since 
Socrates’s remarks merely beg the question. Socrates provides no independent reason for 
thinking that pleasure and pain are quantitative—he merely assumes that they are 
quantitative for the purposes of showing that a certain class of actions are psychologically 
impossible.  
4. Ross: Precise Intensities 
According to Ross, pleasures have a precise degree of intensity. If one pleasure is 
more intense than some other pleasure, then there is some definite, precise amount of 
intensity such that the first is more intense than the second by that amount.279 This may be 
exactly equal to the intensity of the second pleasure; if that’s the case, then the first is twice 
as intense as the second. Ross seems to rely on the intuitiveness of this claim for 
justification. He writes: 
 
…if we compare two comparatively simple and comparatively similar pleasures 
recently experienced, we may have no difficult in seeing one to have been more 
pleasant than the other; and this is enough to show that pleasures have different 
intensities. If we proceed from these to others that are more complex or less similar 
or were experienced less recently, it is plain that there is no point at which we can 
                                                
278 Plato’s discussion of this topic is remarkable, if not for the cogency of his solution to the 
problem of weakness of will, then for the degree to which his solution anticipates the ideas 
Bentham would articulate over two thousand years later. Although Socrates makes no 
attempt to link pleasure and pain to moral obligation and permission, and does not attempt 
to catalog the features that determine the amount of pleasure or pain an episode contains, he 
comes very close to saying that nature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. The extent to which he anticipates the central tenets of 
Bentham’s Felicific Calculus is uncanny. Although Socrates has not given us any particularly 
good reason for thinking that pleasure and pain are quantitative, it is nevertheless worthy of 
discussion in this context.  
279 Ross, p. 143. 
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stop and say, some pleasures are in their nature comparable and others are not. The 
truth is that pleasures have the only characteristic on their side that is necessary to 
comparability, viz. difference of intensity; but that some of the conditions on our 
side which would enable us to compare them are often lacking.  
 
If this is clear, we may next argue that pleasures are commensurable, i.e. that one 
pleasure may not only be more intense than another, but may be, say, just twice as 
intense. This surely follows from our previous conclusion. For if one pleasure is 
more intense than another, it must have a definite amount of extra intensity. …the 
difference between the intensity of two pleasures is an amount of intensity, and of 
course a definite amount. And this may be exactly equal to the intensity of the less 
pleasure; and if so, the greater pleasure is just twice as great as the less.280 
 
Ignoring some terminological infelicities, if Ross’s remarks are correct, then pleasure and 
pain are quantitative phenomena, measurable on a ratio scale. He complains that most 
philosophers who care to argue against the thesis that pleasure and pain are quantitative do 
so by pointing out that there exist pairs of episodes of pleasure or pains such that it is 
difficult or impossible in practical situations to determine which is hedonically greater than 
the other. Ross correctly points out that the thesis that pleasure and pain are quantitative is 
compatible with the existence of epistemic difficulties involved with making determinations 
of the actual quantitative relationships. That is, the fact that pleasure and pain are 
quantitative does not entail that we can discover, for any pair of hedonic episodes, which is 
hedonically greater. Ross mentions cases in which the relevant episodes are distant in time, 
or were particularly long-lasting, as examples of especially difficult hedonic comparisons.281 
Nonetheless, Ross claims that there are clear cases in which it is possible to make the 
relevant quantitative comparisons, and that this is enough to show that pleasure and pain are 
legitimately quantitative. Once we admit that pleasantness is quantitative in one instance, 
there is no non-arbitrary place to draw the line—if A and B are both simple and recent 
enough to be amenable to quantitative comparison, and A is clearly greater than B, then no 
                                                
280 Ross, pp. 142 – 3.  
281 See also chapter 3, section 4 for a more detailed treatment of this sort of argument. 
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amount of added complexity or temporal distance could possibly serve to disrupt the fact 
that A bears some quantitative relationship to B. If there is no non-arbitrary way to 
distinguish between those pairs of episodes of pleasure or pain that stand in quantitative 
relationships to one another and those that stand outside the network of quantitative 
relations, then every episode of pleasure or pain stands in some quantitative relationship to 
every other episode. The epistemological fact that we are often not appropriately positioned 
to carry out the comparisons does not provide evidence in favor of the metaphysical 
conclusion that there are no facts of the matter.  
Furthermore, Ross argues, if A is more pleasant than B—if A is greater than B with 
respect to pleasantness—then A must be more pleasant than B by some precise amount. 
“For if one pleasure is more intense than another,” he claims, “it must have a definite 
amount of extra intensity.”282 Ross denies that pleasure and pain are susceptible to 
vagueness—that is, that quantitative relationships with respect to hedonic phenomena admit 
of borderline cases.  
Ross’s argument could be stated in the following way: 
 
1. Every instance of pleasantness or painfulness has a precise degree of intensity. 
2. If every instance of pleasantness or painfulness has a precise degree of intensity, then 
pleasure and pain are quantitative. 
3. Therefore, pleasure and pain are quantitative.  
 
                                                
282 Ross, p. 143. 
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Line 2 is correct. If every instance of the attitude283 of pleasure or pain has a precise 
intensity, then in principle it is possible to compare any pair of them. For any two pleasures, 
either one would be greater than the other, or they would be precisely equal. As Broome 
points out, rough equality and incomparability are borne of indeterminacy. If all pleasures 
have a precise degree of intensity, then there is no indeterminacy. If there’s no 
indeterminacy, then there’s no incomparability or rough equality.  
But although the second premise is true, the first is basically undefended. One 
consideration Ross brings to bear is an ad hominem against philosophers who deny that 
pleasure and pain are quantitative, but who believe pleasure to be of even the slightest moral 
relevance. According to Ross, all plausible moral theories claim that pleasure and pain are of 
at least some moral relevance.  
It is clear, however, that this is not enough. Ross is using the intuitive fact that 
pleasure and pain have varying degrees of intensity as the sole basis for inferring that these 
degrees of intensity are precise. This clearly does not follow. The existence of a few 
paradigmatically clear cases in which one episode of pleasure is more intense than the other 
is clearly consistent with it’s being the case that, in general, hedonic intensity is imprecise—
too vague for claims of quantitativity to be well supported. Take, for example, the following 
three episodes of pain: 
 
A: Justin taking pain in being waterboarded over interval t1-t2.  
 
                                                
283 For reasons I discuss in the introductory chapter, I have set this discussion in the parlance 
of the attitudinal view of pleasure and pain, in spite of the fact that Ross accepted a view 
according to which pleasure and pain are sensory in nature. This is because I am interested 
less in Ross’s actual views and more in whether Ross’s remarks can be interpreted as a 
reason to think that the propositional attitudes of pleasure and pain are quantitative.  
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B: Justin taking pain in his experience of the sensation of having stubbed his toe over 
interval t1-t2. 
 
C: Justin taking pain in his experience of the sensation of moderate nausea over 
interval t1-t2. 
 
Although I’ve never been waterboarded, it is clear that the unpleasantness associated 
with that form of torture is far more intense than that associated with stubbing one’s toe, or 
moderate nausea—unpleasant as they may be. But it is not clear that the unpleasantness 
associated with stubbing one’s toe is more intense than the unpleasantness of moderate 
nausea, or vice versa. Nor is it clear that the two episodes are of equal intensity. If that were 
the case, perhaps it is indeterminate which of the three quantitative relationships holds 
between the pain associated with episodes B and C—whether B is greater than C, C is 
greater than B, or B is equal to C—and nothing that Ross has said is inconsistent with there 
being no fact of the matter. Ross’s key premise, that there exist cases in which it is obvious 
that one episode of pleasure is dramatically more intense than another, could be true even if, 
in more typical cases, there is no fact of the matter which of two episodes of pleasure or pain 
is the more intense. This could happen in cases in which the two episodes are not so 
dramatically different and there is some imprecision or vagueness associated with their 
intensity levels. The fact that each episode has an intensity does not entail that there is a 
precise degree of intensity that is either greater than, less than, or equal to that of every other 
episode. If intensity is suitably vague, there may be no fact of the matter as to which episode 
of pain is more intense in a wide, central range of cases.  
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This response to Ross’s argument raises some questions about the applicability of the 
standard trio of quantitative relationships to alleged quantities of pleasure and pain.284 The 
problem is that if there were vagueness or indeterminacy concerning just how intense 
various episodes of pleasure are, then pleasure and pain would fail to be quantitative. This 
apparent failure could be the result of vagueness, or of our epistemic limitations. If the 
indeterminacy is sufficient to bring about failures of the three quantitative relations to hold, 
this would be a serious problem for the thesis that pleasure and pain are quantitative. If that 
were the case, then pleasure and pain would not be precise enough to count as legitimate 
quantities, and Ross has not ruled out this possibility.   
5. Rashdall: Heaps of Pleasure And Pain 
The arguments of the previous sections leave us with a problem: given admitted 
difficulties concerning our knowledge of the intensity levels of our own episodes of pleasure 
and pain, any confidence that there really are such levels is suspect. Given that attitudes of 
pleasure and pain are mental states, the fact that in a certain range of cases we can’t know 
what the relevant intensity ratings are undermines the thesis that any such ratings exist. That 
is, our inability to know just how intense the relevant attitudes are, the fact that our 
knowledge of them seems sketchy and incomplete at best and totally nebulous at worst, 
suggests that there might not be any such ratings of a sufficient level of precision. Hastings 
Rashdall addresses this problem, drawing an analogy between the case of pleasantness and 
the case of grains of sand in a heap. He says that we can certainly know of two heaps of sand 
which is the larger, even though we can’t know by how many grains. “The fact,” he says, 
                                                
284 Or, rather, to quantities of intensity of pleasure and pain. It is clear, however, that if the 
trio fails to apply to the intensity of pleasure and pain, then a fortiori, it fails to apply to 
pleasure and pain themselves.  
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“that we can have a very decided and well-grounded opinion that one total is larger than the 
other total, while any attempt to express our comparative estimate by numbers would be the 
wildest and most unprofitable guess-work, does not affect the question. The difficulties in 
the way of the exact mensuration of pleasures seems to be me to be practical rather than 
theoretical.”285 
 
1. There is a precise quantity of grains in any given heap of sand, whether or not we 
know what the quantity is. 
2. If (1), then it is possible for there to be a precise quantity of pleasantness in any 
given episode of pleasure, whether or not we know what the quantity is. 
3. Therefore, it is possible for there to be a precise quantity of pleasantness in any given 
episode of pleasure, whether or not we know what the quantity is. 
 
The idea here is that precise quantities might exist in the world even if we can’t know 
precisely what they are. The argument is really that our inability to have precise knowledge of 
the quantity of pleasantness in a pleasure is not an argument that there are no precise 
quantities of pleasantness. Rashdall illustrates this idea with an analogy between amounts of 
pleasure and the amount of sand in a heap—our inability to know the number of grains of 
sand, even after undertaking as complete an inspection as is practically possible, is not 
evidence that there is no precise number of grains, therefore we should not take our inability 
to determine the precise amount of pleasure in an episode as evidence that there is no 
precise amount.  
                                                
285 Rashdall, p. 376.  
175 
However, line 2 is clearly false, because the analogy is suspect. Heaps of sand are 
clearly mind-independent; episodes of pleasure and pain are obviously not. We have 
introspective access to our own attitudes of pleasure and pain in a way that we have no 
access to the amount of sand in any heap. Although there are controversies concerning the 
nature, scope, and justificatory status of our knowledge of our mental states, all orthodox 
self-epistemological theories hold that our knowledge of our own mental states is privileged 
and authoritative, though not infallible. Although difficulties surrounding our knowing 
precisely how intense our episodes of pleasure are may not be fatal, this response is 
completely inadequate—Rashdall merely points to the obvious fact that there are things we 
can’t know, and leaves it at that. But we’re supposed to be able to know about our own 
mental states; we’re supposed to be uniquely epistemically situated to know about them. 
That we find it difficult to ascertain the intensity ratings of various pleasures and pains is 
puzzling, given these epistemic facts, and must be explained.  
One possible explanation is that the relevant intensity ratings exist, but we lack an 
adequate vocabulary and requisite knowledge of other minds necessary to express them. 
There are several potential reasons for lack of self-knowledge of the precise intensities of 
pleasure and pain that are consistent with there being precise intensities. For one, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, there is a significant practical problem surrounding interpersonal 
comparisons of pleasure and pain. Though this problem does not have a direct impact on 
the theoretical thesis that pleasure and pain are quantitative, it nevertheless creates a serious 
obstacle to the development of a vocabulary that could be used to describe episodes of 
pleasure or pain in any precise or useful way. But it is worth emphasizing that this problem is 
practical in nature, not theoretical. It is a problem for those who would attempt to precisely 
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characterize episodes of pleasure and pain; it does not suggest that there are no relevantly 
precise facts of the matter.  
Secondly, pleasure and pain are genuinely ephemeral. As Sidgwick points out, and we 
discussed in the previous chapter, it is hard to “get a grip” on them. Furthermore, pleasure 
and pain are distracting. It is easy to forget to think about precisely how intense some 
episode of pleasure or pain is, in the heat of the moment, while one is undergoing it. This 
imposes a further difficulty on determining precise intensity ratings, since the having of the 
attitude of enjoyment itself interferes with our ability to assess its intensity, and this 
interference is in direct proportion to the intensity of the pleasure or pain.  
For example, I enjoy cycling. One of my favorite things to do is to go for a long bike 
ride on twisty, rolling New England backcountry roads. I take pleasure in a wide variety of 
propositions on a typical bike ride, many of which fall in to several common classes: I take 
pleasure in the fact that I am seeing the beautiful New England scenery as I go by; that I am 
experiencing the fluid feeling of speed; in the effortless way a bike can be steered by merely 
leaning in the desired direction; in the effort required to go fast downhill or climb slowly 
uphill; in the sound of the wind and of the birds in the trees; in the fact that I am faster than 
my friends; in the very fact that I am enjoying myself so much; the list goes on and on. 
Sometimes when I’m riding I think about how much I am enjoying the particular 
propositions I am taking pleasure in at the moment, but I generally cannot focus on the 
enjoyment itself for very long—something more enjoyable always distracts me. There is 
simply too much enjoyment going on for me to think about how much I am enjoying any of 
it very carefully or for very long.  
On the other hand, one thing I cannot stand is riding into a headwind. I hate it—I 
hate everything about it: feeling like I’m killing myself to go fourteen miles per hour; the low, 
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low riding position required to minimize wind resistance; the noise of the wind; the feeling 
of slowness. (Interestingly, these are all things I enjoy or at least do not mind in other 
contexts: I don’t mind going slow uphill—I kind of like it; I don’t mind the feeling of the 
wind going downhill—I kind of like it; I don’t mind the low, flat-backed, wind-minimizing 
posture on flat ground, either. But I detest all these things when they are caused by 
headwinds.) Sometimes, as I am riding into a headwind, it occurs to me how much I hate 
riding into headwinds. But, as before, I am always quickly distracted by the actual things I do 
not like and am unable to spend much time thinking carefully about precisely how intense 
my net displeasure is. Furthermore, each of these cases is complicated by the sheer number 
and volume of objects of pleasure or pain present. In each case, I take pleasure or pain in 
such a wide variety of simultaneously occurring, related, but nevertheless distinct 
propositions that it is impossible for me to individuate them in order to isolate their 
individual effects on my overall hedonic state. My efforts are further hampered by the fact 
that I am distracted by the actual pleasure or pain itself. This is not unique to these particular 
examples; the phenomenon is typical. On the contrary, cases in which a person takes 
pleasure in just one single proposition at a time are more rare.  
Finally, this failure of self-knowledge is not an isolated or unique phenomenon. 
Cases in which rational agents are unaware of the relevant details of their own mental lives 
are commonplace. For example, Crispin Wright asks us to consider the following excerpt 
from Jane Austen’s Emma: 
 
Emma’s eyes were instantly withdrawn; and she sat silently meditating, in a fixed 
attitude, for a few minutes. A few minutes were sufficient for making her acquainted 
with her own heart. A mind like hers, once opening to suspicion, made rapid 
progress. She touched-- she admitted--she acknowledged the whole truth. Why was it 
so much worse that Harriet should be in love with Mr. Knightley, than with Frank 
Churchill? Why was the evil so dreadfully increased by Harriet's having some hope of 
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a return? It darted through her, with the speed of an arrow, that Mr. Knightley must 
marry no one but herself!286 
 
Of this passage, Wright writes: 
 
Here Emma has just been told of the love of her protégé, Harriet, for her—
Emma’s—bachelor brother-in-law, a decade older than Emma, a frequent guest of 
her fathers’, and hitherto a stable, somewhat avuncular part of the background of her 
life. She has entertained no thought of him as a possible husband. But now she 
realizes that she strongly desires that he marry no one but her, and she arrives at the 
discovery by way of surprise at the strength and colour of her reaction to Harriet’s 
declaration, and by way of a few minutes’ reflection on that reaction. She is, 
precisely, not moved to the realization immediately; it dawns on her as something 
she first suspects and then recognizes as true. It explains her reaction to Harriet.287  
 
What should we make of all this? Even in typical cases, we often lack adequate 
knowledge of our own mental states. I suggest that although the analogy from heaps of sand 
to amounts of pleasure and pain is deeply flawed and provides no reason to believe that 
pleasure and pain are quantitative, it is nevertheless a successful defensive project. That is, it 
shows that the apparent inability of normal human beings in normal everyday situations to 
make accurate or reliable judgments of any level of precision of the intensities of their 
attitudes of pleasure and pain is not evidence that there are no such intensities. In this 
respect, pleasure and pain are not unlike other kinds of genuinely quantitative mental 
phenomena. The problems are exacerbated by the lack of a publicly available rating system 
and by the fact that pleasure and pain themselves interfere with our judgments of hedonic 
intensity. It would be nice to have a practical way of using numbers to represent amounts of 
pleasure and pain; however, in light of the above-mentioned facts, it is clear that this is not 
possible. In particular, in the absence of any practical way to perform interpersonal 
comparisons or to compare individual episodes of pleasure or pain to a repeatable standard 
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episode, there is no scale for the measurement of pleasure and pain—no acceptable function 
from hedonic episodes to numbers. Problems concerning self-knowledge are relatively 
minor.  
6. A Moral Argument: Two Pleasures Are Better Than One 
Another interesting argument presented by Rashdall rests on the claim that the 
pleasure involved with two people enjoying some state of affairs must be greater than the 
pleasure involved with just one of the persons enjoying it, because the extra pleasure has 
extra moral significance, and this extra moral significance is evidence that the extra pleasure 
exists. He argues that the state of affairs involving two persons taking pleasure in some 
proposition is morally better than a similar state of affairs involving just one person taking 
that amount of pleasure in the proposition, and that this is evidenced by our moral duty to 
bring about the first state of affairs rather than the second if it is in our power. He writes: 
 
The question whether two people’s pleasure is not twice the like pleasure in one 
persons’ consciousness must depend on the purpose for which the addition is to be 
used. The meaning I attach to the assertion is that I regard a certain amount of 
pleasure in two persons as twice as important as the same amount in one; and ceteris 
paribus I regard it as a duty to promote more pleasure than less pleasure If this last 
proposition is to be denied, we have arrived at an ultimate difference of ethical ideal: 
if it is admitted, I do not see how duty is to be fulfilled without mentally adding 
together, multiplying, the amount of pleasure by the number of persons enjoying that 
pleasure or (to avoid cavil) enjoying a like amount of pleasure. If this is admitted, 
where is the objection to the phrase “a sum of pleasure”?288 
 
Hare seems to agree, suggesting a type of tu quoque defense against an objection to 
hedonic versions of utilitarianism. In Moral Thinking, He writes:  
 
Those who think it [the immeasurability of pleasure and pain] is an easy objection to 
utilitarianism have not examined their own consciences. Any method of moral 
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reasoning which gives any weight whatever to beneficence or non-maleficence has to 
cope with this problem.  
 
Hare mentions Ross, in particular, as a philosopher who is not a utilitarian but whose theory 
of morally right action includes prima facie duties of beneficence and non-maleficence.  
These remarks suggest the following argument: 
 
1. If the pleasure of two persons considered together involves more pleasure than just 
the pleasure of one of the persons considered in isolation, then pleasure is a quantity. 
2. The pleasure of two persons considered together involves more pleasure than just 
the pleasure of one of the persons considered in isolation. 
3. Therefore, pleasure is a quantity.  
 
The first premise is analytically true. As we saw in chapters 3 and 4, for some 
substance or property to be a quantity is for its instances to satisfy certain formal conditions. 
These conditions include the presence of an order, of intervals, and ratios; the necessary 
conditions for amenability to just these sorts of addition and multiplication functions. In 
particular, if there exist genuine ratios between episodes of pleasure—if, for example, it is 
possible for one state of affairs to contain twice the pleasure of another—then pleasantness 
is a quantity.  
Line two is more controversial. Rashdall defends it on the ground that amounts of 
pleasure and pain vary in their moral “importance” according to their relative sizes. He 
regards a certain amount of pleasure felt or taken by two people as being twice as important 
as that amount of pleasure taken by just one person. Like Ross, he takes beneficence to be a 
prima facie duty. This duty, to increase pleasure when possible, is incoherent unless pleasure is 
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quantitative. According to Rashdall, that there is such a duty is a moral datum—a piece of 
moral bedrock. This greater importance of a “like amount” of pleasure taken by two people 
compared to that same amount of pleasure taken by just one, is evidence that pleasure and 
pain come in amounts: if they did not, there would be no way of making sense of this greater 
importance.  
Unfortunately, this is also clearly question-begging. Rashdall’s rationale for line two 
presupposes that there are amounts of pleasure. The problem is in the description of the 
pleasures experienced by the two people as “a like amount of pleasure.” The “amounts” 
could be “alike” only if pleasure and pain are quantitative—but whether or not pleasure and 
pain are quantitative is precisely the contentious issue. Rashdall’s argument is that there are 
quantities of pleasure because larger quantities of pleasure are more morally important than 
smaller quantities; but the thesis that larger quantities of pleasure are more morally important 
than smaller quantities presupposes that there are quantities of pleasure. Although we clearly 
value this extra pleasure, this attitude might be based on the false assumption that pleasure is 
quantitative. For him to bring the moral importance or quantities of pleasure to bear as 
evidence that there exist quantities of pleasure therefore begs the question, and even if 
pleasure and pain are quantitative, this argument does not provide a convincing reason for 
thinking so.  
7. Hall’s “Bull’s Eye” Argument 
Hall attempts to generate a standard against which we could measure pleasures. His 
example concerns a boy named John who likes bull’s eye candies.289 John can eat one bull’s 
eye per hour with unwavering enjoyment.  
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Suppose a boy, John, to have a taste for bull’s eyes that is constant throughout the 
time we are concerned with, suppose one bull’s eye of a given make of constant size 
to be available to him each hour from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., and suppose he is able, when 
they are so spaced, to eat up to twelve bull’s eyes in a day without satiety setting in to 
any appreciable degree. These conditions presuppose that the ordering relations, 
including equality, are applicable to John’s pleasure, at different times, in eating bull’s 
eyes; otherwise one could not say his taste was constant or when satiety set in…  
 
If we could find an operation analogous to addition, whereby the pleasure obtainable 
from two members of this class could be combined, we could use any member of 
this class as a standard unit applicable to the measurement in terms of pleasure of as 
many of John’s experiences… as could be compared as being equal in pleasure to, or 
greater or less in pleasure than the eating of one bull’s eye under the spacing 
conditions laid down.290 
 
Though there is no suitable physical operation, Hall’s strategy here is to appeal to a 
repeatable pleasure-generating experience that can be compared to other pleasure-generating 
experiences, which he intends to serve as a benchmark for the quantitative comparisons 
required by the thesis that pleasure is a measurable quantity. It serves as a pleasant 
experience of a standard intensity and duration that can be compared to other, less standard 
experiences. These comparisons are not done by laying out the pleasures and pains on a 
physical measuring board; they are done by forming rational preferences for one object of 
pleasure or pain over another. A unit of pleasure on the scale is the amount of pleasure John 
gets in an hour from eating a bull’s eye during the hour. Comparisons to other pleasures can 
be done by determining how many bull’s eyes John would exchange for the other pleasure. 
Presumably, we could also define a unit of pain as the amount that would cause John to be 
indifferent between getting both the pain and the bull’s eye, and getting nothing at all. 
Comparisons to other episodes of pleasure can be done by determining how many bull’s 
eyes John would exchange for the other episode.  
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…the comparisons on which the making of rational choices depends on demonstrate 
the sense of talking of combining two units of pleasure. To return to our example, 
John might be willing to forgo one bull’s eye for the sake of some other enjoyment, 
but not to forgo three, and he might find it difficult to decide whether it was worth 
forgoing two… Two experiences can be combined in thought for the purpose of 
making rational comparisons with other experiences in respect of pleasure, whether 
or not there is any other sense in which the experiences could be said to be 
combined.291 
 
This process is sufficient to render pleasantness and painfulness susceptible to 
fundamental measurement as long as the quantity resulting satisfies the conditions necessary 
and sufficient for quantitiveness: there would exist a genuine order, based on the number of 
bull’s eyes John would be willing to exchange for the episode; there would be legitimate 
intervals, because it would make sense to claim, for example, that the difference between a 5-
unit episode of pleasure and a 2-unit episode is three units of pleasure; and there would be a 
non-arbitrary, natural zero point: the point at which John would be willing to trade zero 
bull’s eyes in exchange for the episode.  
Hall claims that as long as little John is being rational with respect to his preferences, 
the conditions are satisfied. He says: 
 
Anyone adopting a method, such as the one we have been supposing John to use, 
for working out which sets of experiences are worth forgoing for the sake of others, 
would regard it as irrational to allow the conclusion for his deliberation to be 
determined by the order in which he took the various experiences into consideration 
or the order in which he carried out his mental operations, since this ordering is 
arbitrary, whereas the deliberation is supposed to yield valid conclusions about the 
relative suitability of choice (from a rational point of view) of the experiences 
themselves.  
 
I conclude that there is an operation of combination of the kind needed to construct 
and operate with a scale of fundamental measurement of the pleasure derived from 
eating bull’s eyes and from comparable experiences under the conditions given. All 
that is needed now before we actually have a system of measurement is that 
numerical values should be assigned by some rule to the quantities of pleasure that 
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we are comparing. The simplest rule would be to assign the number n to the pleasure 
derived from eating n bull’s eyes under the conditions given.292 
 
Hall then attempts to extend the scale to cases in which the pleasures or pains of 
more than just one person are to be compared. He claims that it is absurd to deny that 
interpersonal comparisons are at least sometimes possible: if they are impossible, then “there 
is no sense in saying that [John] suffers more from being tortured by the Gestapo than 
[Robert] suffers from a momentary pin-prick…”293 He likens this claim to a total skepticism 
about the existence of other minds—both claims, he says, are absurd. Hall thinks that the 
bull’s eye scale can be unproblematically extended to cases of interpersonal comparison. The 
hard work, on his view, is getting the scale going at all; it can then be easily extended in a 
variety of ways.294  
 
Hall’s argument, then, could be stated in the following way: 
 
1. Pleasantness and painfulness are fundamentally measurable.  
2. If pleasantness and painfulness are fundamentally measurable., then pleasantness and 
painfulness are quantitative. 
3. therefore pleasantness and painfulness are quantitative.  
 
Line 1 is supposed to be true in light of Hall’s bull’s eye example, which enabled him 
to construct a pleasantness-scale that satisfied the conditions for fundamental measurement.  
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Line 2 is supposed to be true because being an extensive magnitude is a necessary 
condition for fundamental measurement. A quantity is fundamentally measurable when 
either (i) it is possible to generate an arbitrary standard, copy it, and compare it to various 
magnitudes of the quantity, or (ii) it is possible to derive measurements of the quantity from 
other measurements that are made in the way described under (i). If it is possible to generate 
a standard, then it is possible to double the size of the standard, or to halve it. If that’s 
possible, then the quantity is an extensive magnitude.  
Line 3 is true because if something is an extensive magnitude, it must satisfy the 
conditions necessary for measurement on an interval scale. Anything measurable on an 
interval scale is a quantity.  
7.1. Practical Problems for Hall’s Argument 
One problem for Hall’s scale is its imprecision. The units of pleasure are big and 
unwieldy. Each graduation on the scale corresponds to a relatively intense pleasure and a 
fairly big chunk of time. Such an imprecise scale will be useless to make very fine-grained 
hedonic discriminations. For example, the bull’s eye scale might well supply the vocabulary 
we need to understand how much somebody likes a movie. It cannot, however, supply a 
comprehensible vocabulary necessary to understand how much he likes some sufficiently 
small, brief experience.  
It’s also unclear why we should think that we (in general, or little John in particular) 
are particularly good at gaining accurate knowledge of the magnitudes of our own pleasures, 
or the magnitudes of merely potential or hypothetical pleasures, or whether some as-yet-
unrealized possibility would yield more pleasure than some other one, even in terms of a 
coarse-grained scale such as the one Hall recommends. Hall might claim that at the very 
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least, we are good at comparing the pleasantness-levels of actual experiences. But it’s not 
clear that he would be right about that, either. Sidgwick295 makes the point that pleasures are 
essentially transient: they pass before we can get a mental “grip” on them. Memories of pain 
begin to fade and lose their vividness almost immediately. It is difficult to know the 
magnitudes of pleasures and pains past. Ross writes that “undoubtedly memory of the 
intensity of pleasures is treacherous when it has to cover any long span of time.”296 
For example, as was mentioned in chapter 6, I remember being confident, when I 
was 16 and recovering from surgery to remove a portion of my skull that had become 
infected (I had mastoiditis), that I was undergoing the most intense pain I had ever 
experienced. I also remember being confident, when I was 22 and recovering from a difficult 
quadruple-wisdom-tooth extraction, involving stubbornly impacted molars, that I was then 
experiencing the most intense pain I had ever undergone. Now that I am getting older I am 
not sure which really was the more intense pain. I remember what I was thinking at each of 
those times, but I can’t recall the pain itself, so I can’t recall which pain was the more 
intense. I also have trouble remembering which was the longer-lasting, so I have no idea 
which pain was “larger.”  
Since I’m not sure about the relative magnitude of these two pains, I’m doubly 
unsure of their absolute magnitude. Not only am I unsure which episode I would give up 
more bull’s eyes in order to avoid, I’m not sure exactly how many bull’s eyes I would give up 
in order to avoid each one. As difficult as it is to determine which pain was worse, it is even 
more difficult to determine precisely how bad each one was in terms of bull’s eyes. It is 
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187 
possible that I could give a ballpark figure, but there is no way I could produce a precise 
number for either one.  
Furthermore, if we have no good reason for thinking that we are reliable judges of 
the absolute magnitudes of our own pleasures and pains, we have even less reason to 
suppose that we can make reliable judgments concerning the magnitudes of the pleasures 
and pains of others. If I am unsure whether or not my wisdom tooth extraction was more 
painful than my mastoidectomy, and I am unsure how many bull’s eyes each pain is worth, 
then how can I determine how many bull’s eyes your tonsillectomy, toothache, or stubbed toe 
would merit? 
The interpersonal case presents another problem. Suppose that Smith, like little 
John, enjoys bull’s eyes and can eat one per hour without getting tired of them. Smith also 
likes coffee, and would be willing to trade three Bull’s eyes for one cup of Seattle’s Best 
Coffee. This allows us to assign a rating of “3” to the intensity of Smith’s enjoyment of a cup 
of SBC. In addition, suppose that Jones also likes Bull’s eyes and can also eat one per hour 
without getting tired of them. Further suppose that Jones also likes coffee, but unlike Smith, 
Jones would be willing to trade four Bull’s eyes for one cup of Seattle’s Best Coffee. This 
allows us to assign a rating of “4” to the intensity of Jones’s enjoyment of a cup of SBC 
coffee: 
 
Smith’s pleasure = 3 
Jones’s pleasure = 4 
 
However, in order to apply the same scale to both Smith and Jones, we have to 
know that Smith enjoys one Bull’s eye exactly as much as Jones does. But does Smith like 
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Bull’s eyes more than Jones, or Jones like coffee more than Smith? Based only on the 
information we have, we can’t tell. Although we presumably can fix one common point on 
the scale, zero,297 we need to be able to fix at least two common points in order to know that 
the two scales are identical. But it is impossible to do this without more information.  
7.2. The Scale Begs the Question 
Hall is willing to concede the empirical point. “I freely admit,” he writes, “…that 
[Bentham] was grossly optimistic about the practicability of using such a calculus with any 
approach to accuracy.”298 He’s clearly correct about this: the bull’s eye scale of pleasure and 
pain is of no practical value whatsoever for the making of interpersonal comparisons of 
utility. Hall claims that the real value of the scale is not practical; it is theoretical. He claims 
that it is not necessary to actually be able perform these measurements, because what is 
important is that they be possible in theory, not that they be practically possible. He argues 
only that the scale, and therefore the facts that it would quantify and information that it 
would reveal, is logically coherent.299  
But it is hard to see how the bull’s eye scale could be of any genuine theoretical 
value, either, because it is clearly question-begging. Hall’s claim that little John takes the 
same amount of pleasure in the eating of each bull’s eye entails, without argument, that 
pleasure comes in suitable amounts. If each of little John’s bull’s eye eating experience 
generates the same quantity of pleasure as all of his other bull’s eye eating experiences, then 
there are legitimate quantities of pleasure. This begs the question because the issue is 
whether or not pleasure comes in amounts. Hall doesn’t argue for this claim, he assumes it 
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when he sets up the scale. So the scale itself begs the question. These considerations show 
that Hall’s proposal is hopeless as a reason for taking pleasure and pain to be quantitative. 
8. Trade-Offs Between Intensity And Duration 
By far the most popular sort of argument in favor of the conclusion that pleasure 
and pain are quantitative trades on the idea that there exist certain equivalences between the 
intensity of an episode of pleasure or pain and its duration. Although different authors 
express it and defend its key premise in different ways, the central idea is that for any 
episode of pleasure or pain, e1, there exists another episode, e2, such that e2’s intensity is one 
half that of e1, but such that its duration is double. According to the proponents of this type 
of argument, e2 contains the same amount of pleasure (or pain) as e1.  
One prominent proponent of this argument is Brandt, who makes the following 
remarks: 
 
…it is clear that the benevolent person will act so as to produce an increment of 
enjoyment level of two units for ten minutes rather than just for one. But will he be 
indifferent as between adding one moment of a 2-unit increment and two moments 
of a 1-level increment? The proper answer to this question seems affirmative. For if 
we know that the second increment of the 2-unit increment is really identical in 
magnitude to the first one, what difference would it make whether we add it at the 
first moment of time, or the second?300 
 
James Griffin’s Well-Being contains a related point. He presents an account of 
strength of desires according to which desire strengths can be put into terms of leisure time. 
His idea is that if one desires something to degree 4, for example, one would be willing to 
give up 4 hours of leisure time in order to satisfy the desire. Griffin writes, 
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Suppose, for example, that the County Council decides to change the layout of a 
road I use, threatening various things along the way that I find very beautiful. I 
decide that I am willing to give up five hours of my leisure time campaigning to save 
the chestnut tree, ten hours to save the stone wall, and twenty hours to save the 
copse…We could say that I value the copse about twice as much as the stone wall, 
and the stone wall twice as much as the chestnut. And we could say that the 
combined value to me of the wall and the chestnut is still well short of the value of 
the copse… 
 
We have concentrated on the marginal rate of substitution between two goods. We 
can define a unit of well-being on a unit if leisure time.301  
 
It is easy to see how this discussion might be applied to the case of pleasure. The 
pleasure I get from the copse while driving past it (let’s suppose) one morning is worth 
exchanging twenty hours of the lesser pleasures that occupy my leisure time. To determine 
how much some pleasure is worth to me, we ask how much leisure time I would give up in 
order to preserve it. By repeatedly applying this procedure, we can introduce a unit of 
intensity in terms of duration.  
Rashdall makes some similar remarks:  
 
The briefest pleasure occupies a sensible time: and there is no time that cannot 
conceivably be subdivided into two halves. If, therefore, I cannot desire anything 
which I cannot have all at once, I could not desire either pleasant consciousness in 
general or any particular state of consciousness which is pleasant. 
 
…And in so far as we are taking account of the duration of pleasures merely, the 
units of time are applicable also in the case of pleasures; there is nothing essentially 
unmeaning in applying these units the measurement of pleasures, and saying that a 
pleasure that lasts an hour is four times as great as one that lasts only for fifteen 
minutes.302 
 
Rashdall’s idea is that since time is divisible, so are events that occur in time, 
including events that consist of some person enjoying something. So every pleasure is 
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divisible in time into (e.g.) two halves—a first half and a second half—each of which 
contains some pleasantness. If each half contains some quantity of pleasantness, so does the 
state of affairs that consists of both halves taken together. Time is infinitely divisible, and 
therefore so are episodes of pleasure: “Assuming that there is such a thing as pleasure, it 
must be in time: and the time or the temporal state that is incapable of division is not time or 
in time at all.”303 
The passage that suggests the main argument reads as follows: 
 
We certainly say: “this is more pleasant than that”. The position that the word more 
does not involve the idea of quantity is so startling that I must excuse myself from 
further discussion of it… It is enough for my present purpose if it be admitted that 
one whole state of consciousness is pronounced more pleasant than another, 
provided it be conceded also: (a) that the total pleasure in each cases is made up of a 
number of successive moments; (b) that a certain degree of intensity is actually 
judged to be equivalent of—and may influence desire as the equivalent of—a certain 
degree of duration: in other words, that a man in pursuit of pleasure may choose a 
less [intense] pleasure for a longer time rather than an intense pleasure for a shorter 
time; (c) that a whole pleasant state may be analyzed into various distinguishable 
elements.304 
 
Proposition (b) is the most directly relevant for our purposes: that for any episode of 
pleasure, there exists a less-intense but longer-lasting alternative such that it is hedonically 
equal to the more intense but more brief episode in spite of the fact that it is not as intense. 
Indeed, according to Griffin, the less intense episode might even contain more pleasure 
overall than the more intense episode. This suggests at least two different types of scenario. 
In scenarios of the first type, for any episode of pleasure, call it A, where A has a certain 
intensity and duration, there exists another episode of pleasure, B, where B is of lower 
intensity and longer in duration in such a way as to guarantee that B contains more pleasure 
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than A does, overall. Rashdall and others appear to have in mind situations in which episode 
B is half as intense as A, but more than twice as long as A, which, in light of a standard 
version of the hedonic calculus according to which net pleasure is determined by multiplying 
intensity by duration, results in B’s containing more pleasure than A contains.  
In scenarios of the second type, for any episode of pleasure, A, there exists some 
other episode, B, where B is of lower intensity and longer in duration in just such a way as to 
bring it about that episodes A and B are equal with respect to their net total amount of 
pleasure. If these scenarios are possible, then intensity must admit of degrees because 
increasing or decreasing the degree of intensity of a pleasure can affect the quantity of 
pleasantness in it in a way that is equivalent to the way that increasing or decreasing its 
duration affects the quantity of pleasure contained in the episode. Intensity and duration are 
independent factors, and that modulation of either one affects the overall amount of 
pleasure in the same way. 
Rashdall reminds us also of the parallel case of pain: in cases of torture, for example, 
the duration of the torture matters as much as the intensity. When undergoing severe pain, 
whether the pain lasts for a week or for 1/100 of a second is of the utmost importance—the 
sooner it is over, the better. He continues: 
 
In the first place, it appears to me self-evident that the value of a pleasure is 
dependent upon its duration, and that two minutes of a given pleasure may be fairly 
said to be twice as pleasant as one minute of it—if it is really the same pleasure as is 
not diminished by satiety. Further, believing that we are in the habit of equating the 
intensity of pleasure with a certain duration of it, I hold that it is possible to indicate 
our sense of the comparative intensity of two pleasures by expressing them (so to 
speak) in terms of duration. If it is a matter of indifference to me whether I enjoy 
one minute of one pleasure or two minutes of another, I may reasonably be said to 
regard the one pleasure as twice as pleasant [intense] as the other.305 
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Rashdall argues that the value or magnitude or quantity of pleasure depends (in part) 
on its duration, and duration is a paradigm case of a cardinally measurable quantity, and 
intensity is expressible in terms of duration. The two features can be traded for one another 
without loss of pleasantness, which results in its being possible to construct a unit of 
intensity in terms of duration. Intensity, therefore, is measurable on a ratio scale, just as time 
is. 
The argument, then, might be interpreted in the following way: 
 
The Hedonic Trade-Off Argument 
 
1. For any episode of pleasure (or pain), A, there exists another episode of pleasure (or 
pain) B, such that B is less with respect to intensity than A, and B is greater with 
respect to duration than A, and B is equal to A with respect to the total amount of 
pleasure (or pain) contained; and there exists another episode of pleasure (or pain), 
C, such that C is less with respect to intensity than A, and C is greater with respect to 
duration than A, and C is greater than A with respect to the total amount of pleasure 
(or pain) contained. 
2. If (1), then pleasure and pain are quantitative. 
3. Therefore, pleasure and pain are quantitative.  
 
Proponents of this type of argument defend line 1 by appeal to our intuitions about 
cases. If a gain in intensity can be offset in a perfect way by a loss in duration, and a gain in 
duration can be perfectly offset by a loss in intensity, then there exist amounts of intensity 
that are hedonically equivalent to amounts of duration. And since duration is a paradigm 
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case of a quantity measurable on a ratio scale,306 and intensity is hedonically equivalent to 
duration, then intensity is measurable on a ratio scale as well. If this were true, it would 
indeed be a powerful reason for thinking that pleasure and pain were quantitative.  
An obvious but ultimately misguided objection to the argument would argue that if 
line 1 were true, then, for example, a six-hour baseball game should be twice as much fun as 
a more standard three-hour game, since line 1 clearly suggests that a game that lasts twice as 
long should be twice as enjoyable. But, the proponent of this kind of objection claims, six-
hour baseball games are awful—to sit through one is unbearably boring. Therefore, there is 
no stable relationship between intensity and duration, contrary to what Rashdall, Brandt, and 
Griffin would have us believe.  
The problem with this kind of objection is that it fails to control for variations in 
intensity over time. Six-hour baseball games are not preferable, hedonically speaking, to 
three-hour games precisely because even the most die-hard baseball fans are incapable of 
sustaining the level of enjoyment taken in the watching of a game for six hours. Like a lot of 
genuine objects of pleasure, baseball eventually begins to cloy; we get sick of it after a while. 
If, however, we stipulated that no such cloying effect would occur and that the level of 
intensity of the pleasure would remain constant, it would be much harder to argue that the 
six-hour game would not generate twice as much pleasure as the three-hour game.307  
Of course, it’s silly to suggest that the pleasure taken in watching a baseball game 
remains constant over the full duration of the game even in the best of circumstances. In 
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typical cases, fans watch games out of an interest not only in baseball itself, but in particular 
teams, and the fan’s pleasure increases when the fan’s favorite team does well and decreases 
when the opposing team does well. Even in cases in which the fan has no particular interest 
in one team or the other, her pleasure might increase in intensity during a particularly 
brilliant defensive play and decrease in intensity during a particularly inept comment by one 
of the broadcasters. Situations in which a person’s attitude of enjoyment remains constant 
and unwavering in its intensity are decidedly not the norm, and it is unclear whether they 
ever arise in natural, uncontrived circumstances. On the other hand, however, it is just as 
clear that insofar as discussion of “wavering” or “variable” levels of intensity, discussion of 
“constant” or “unwavering” levels of intensity also makes sense. The central problem is not 
one of constancy or variability, which presuppose quantitative relationships, but on the 
existence of the quantitative relationships at all.  
The opponent of the Hedonic Trade-Offs Argument might then argue that any talk 
of “constant intensity” of pleasure is question-begging, since such language assumes that 
hedonic intensity is quantitative on the outset, because it depends on there being various 
levels of intensity of which some are less than, equal to, or greater than others, is absurd. 
But, of course, the denial that there are various levels of intensity and that some of them are 
greater than others is absurd. Some episodes of pleasure are more intense than others; some 
episodes of pain are less intense than others. For example, on the evening of May 19, 2008, I 
watched the Red Sox play a baseball game against the Kansas City Royals. In the top of the 
fourth inning, rookie center fielder Jacoby Ellsbury made a fairly spectacular diving catch of 
a fly ball hit by Jose Guillen. The pleasure I took in the catch was fairly intense.  
It was not as intense, however, as the pleasure I began to take during the top of the 
fifth inning as pitcher Jon Lester struck out the first two batters he faced, Bill Butler and 
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Miguel Olivo, and then induced a ground ball to second base Matt Teahen to end the half-
inning. The intensity of the pleasure I took in Lester’s performance during that half-inning 
began to escalate because I began to realize that he was getting deep into the game and had 
not yet allowed a hit—that he was working on a no-hitter. With each successive inning, the 
pleasure I was taking in the events of the game grew more intense, as Lester retired each 
batter he faced without giving up a hit. What’s more, Lester’s performance became more 
dominant as it went on. He struck out just two batters prior to Ellsbury’s catch to end the 
fourth inning and seven batters after it. Another thing that heightened the intensity of the 
pleasure I took in watching the game was that pitchers who take no-hitters into the sixth, 
seventh, eighth, and ninth innings almost never succeed. There are so many things that can 
go wrong—a bloop over the shortstop’s head; a close play at first base that could go for an 
error but is scored as a single instead; a home run to ruin it—but Lester really seemed like he 
might actually do it. And when he struck out the last batter, Alberto Callaspo, completing 
the no-hitter, the pleasure I was taking in the game was really quite intense. It’s a rare 
thing—happening only once or twice a year in either major league—and was accomplished 
by a pitcher on the team I like, and who is a cancer survivor—a chronic backache during 
August of 2006 turned out to be caused by lymphoma—who beat it, came back, and then 
managed to throw a no-hitter. It was really outstanding, and it is no doubt evident that I 
continue to take pleasure in contemplating the relevant propositions. 
I admit that I am not in possession of a reliable procedure for assigning numbers to 
intensity levels of pleasure—there is no function from episodes of pleasure to numbers 
satisfying the relevant constraints. It nevertheless is obvious to me that the pleasure I took in 
Lester’s first out—a fly ball to left field hit by David DeJesus—was much less intense than 
the pleasure I took in his strikeout of Callaspo to end the game. It is also obvious to me that 
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I enjoyed Lester’s first out much more than I enjoyed my most recent trip to the dentist, 
which did not really hurt (thanks to Novocain)  but in which I nevertheless took displeasure. 
And it is obvious that the displeasure I took in that trip to the dentist was much less intense 
than the displeasure I took in the sensations associated with the removal of my wisdom 
teeth, which I discussed earlier in this chapter, and in chapter 6.  
The foregoing examples all involve somewhat coarse-grained judgments. It is easy 
for me to determine that I enjoyed the first out of Lester’s no-hitter is less than the last out 
of that game because the differential is so great. The same thing is true of the other 
examples. It is clear, however, that fine-grained determinations are also possible. For 
example, a few minutes ago I had a brief sip of cold, sweetened sun-tea, followed by a brief 
sip of Coke Zero. I took pleasure in each sip. Although neither episode of pleasure was 
particularly intense, and their intensity levels were quite close, I enjoyed the sip of sweet tea a 
little more—not by much, but a little. Furthermore, this kind of situation is not unique. It 
seems to me that the typical case is one in which the person taking pleasure in some 
proposition or another can tell how intense her pleasure is and is capable of making fairly 
fine-grained determinations concerning intensity.  
However, the key premise hedonic trade-offs argument goes further than the mere 
claim that some episodes of pleasure or pain are more intense than others. That premise is 
the claim that for every episode of pleasure (or pain) of a given intensity and duration, there 
(possibly) exists a hedonically equivalent episode of the appropriate attitude which is less 
with respect to intensity and greater with respect to duration. This assertion is what the 
opponent of the hedonic trade-offs argument will find dubious, regardless of our ability to 
make fine-grained hedonic discriminations. The opponent of this argument may not find it 
significant that I took higher intensity pleasure in Lester’s final out of the no-hitter than I 
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took in the fact that Ellsbury made the diving catch during the fourth inning; rather, he will 
want to know how much longer the episode of pleasure consisting of my enjoyment of the 
catch would have to last in order to be hedonically equivalent to the episode of pleasure 
consisting of my enjoyment of the final out.  
This is a fair question, and it is not easy to answer. One source of difficulty is the fact 
that the pleasure I took in the final out was far and away more intense than the pleasure I 
took in Ellsbury’s catch. Another problem has to do with the fact that the proposition I took 
pleasure in during the second episode is substantially more complex than the proposition I 
took pleasure in during the first. During the first episode, I took pleasure in the fact that the 
hitter, José Guillen, didn’t get on base; that the score was still tied at zero; that Lester seemed 
to be pitching well; that Ellsbury had made a difficult diving play; that he hadn’t injured 
himself in the process; and that is all. During the second episode I took pleasure in the fact 
that Lester got the final out; that Lester had pitched a rare complete game; that the Red Sox 
had won the game; that the game was a no-hitter; that the opposing team (not the team I 
like) was the team without a hit; that the guy who pitched the no-hitter was a cancer 
survivor; that the no-hitter had been accomplished at Fenway Park; that the broadcasters had 
taken great pains throughout the game to indicate that the no-hitter had been in progress 
without directly saying the word ‘no-hitter,’ which may have put a jinx on it (I thought that 
they were cute); that it had been the first no-hitter I’d ever seen live (I’ve never seen one in 
person, and on TV I’d only seen one on a replay—I’d never watched one live from start to 
finish); and that I’d been keeping score from home and therefore had a memento of the 
occasion in the form of a scorecard.308  
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This type of question is further complicated by the fact that we ordinarily do not 
consider the duration of episodes of pleasure in this manner. In typical cases, when choosing 
the more pleasant of two potential episodes of pleasure, we often focus on intensity (almost) 
exclusively while duration plays a much more minor role; this in spite of the fact that, ceteris 
paribus, longer-lasting episodes of pleasure contain more pleasure. I suspect that this is has to 
do with the fact that the relevant ceteris paribus clause is almost never satisfied. That is, when 
choosing the more pleasant of two potential episodes of pleasure, the temptation to select 
the longer-lasting episode must in ordinary cases be tempered by the realization that we 
often get bored by long-lasting objects of pleasure. This propensity toward boredom causes 
us, in normal circumstances, to focus on intensity of pleasure and to behave in a way that 
suggests that it is the only significant variable, which, of course, it is not.  
Furthermore, in cases like this one, we are often distracted by extraneous, 
hedonically irrelevant factors. It is important to distinguish between my enjoyment of the fact 
that Jon Lester is a cancer survivor who went on to pitch a no-hitter from its greater moral 
significance (if there is any), or its impact on Lester’s life, which doesn’t affect me; its impact 
on Lester’s friends and family, which, though significant in some sense, nevertheless doesn’t 
affect me;  
So how much longer would the episode of pleasure consisting of my enjoyment of 
Ellsbury’s catch have to be in order to be hedonically equivalent to the episode of pleasure 
consisting of my enjoyment of the final out? I’m not sure. I am sure it would have to be 
quite a bit longer at the same level of intensity, but I cannot be sure just how much longer. 
However, it is worth noting that there is always imprecision in empirical ordering operations; 
the question regarding quantitativity of pleasure and pain has to do with the extent and 
                                                                                                                                            
rather than taking several simultaneous attitudes of enjoyment in several discrete 
propositions. 
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nature of the imprecision, and not with the mere fact that it exists. For example, the 
empirical ordering of objects according to their mass, using an equal-arm balance, while 
generally reliable, involves a not-insubstantial element of imprecision. This is because of the 
friction between the arm of the balance and its pivot point, as well as difficulties ensuring 
that the arms of the balance are precisely equal in length and that the pans of the balance are 
precisely equal in mass. These difficulties render determinations of mass-order impossible 
beyond a certain level of precision.309 We do not, however, regard these practical difficulties 
to be evidence of ontological, theoretically significant imprecision in the quantity mass. I have 
attempted to demonstrate that coarse-grained hedonic discriminations are possible, and we 
should not underestimate the significance of this fact. I have also attempted to demonstrate 
that fine-grained discriminations are also possible, and that many of the difficulties 
surrounding these kinds of discrimination are practical in nature and do not pose a serious 
theoretical problem, even if the practical problems are indeed serious. 
In light of the foregoing, I recommend that we tentatively conclude that the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that pleasure and pain are genuinely quantitative.  
9. Hedonic Zero 
Another important issue concerns whether or not a hypothetical hedonic scale 
containing a natural, non-arbitrary zero point could be constructed. This is important 
because the defining characteristic of the ratio-type scale is the presence of such a natural 
zero. Sidgwick argues that there is a non-arbitrary hedonistic zero point, which would make 
pleasantness measurable on a ratio scale. He follows Plato in claiming that some apparently 
pleasant experiences are actually merely releases from pain, and are intrinsically neutral, 
                                                
309 Krantz, et al. 1971, p. 27.  
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hedonically speaking. This hedonic neutrality is a type of experience that is neither pleasant 
nor unpleasant, which makes it a natural candidate for the hedonic zero point. Any non-
pleasant but non-painful experience would count as zero, hedonically speaking.310 
Although Sidwick and Plato have identified an important phenomenon, it is not clear 
that they are correct to regard it as hedonic zero. If, for example, I experience a release from 
pain, I am likely to be glad about the fact that I have been released from the pain. That is, I 
take pleasure in the fact that I am no longer taking pain in anything. I am therefore not in a 
hedonically neutral state; I am taking pleasure in something. Although being relieved of pain 
is not itself an episode of pleasure, it is nevertheless something we often take pleasure in.  
Bergström and McNaughton propose similar hypotheses. According to them, 
unconsciousness and death are paradigm instances of hedonic zero.311 A dead person 
experiences no pleasure and no pain; a dead person experiences nothing whatsoever. 
Similarly, a person is not conscious of anything when he is dreamlessly unconscious, so he is 
not taking pleasure or pain in anything. So, according to Bergström and McNaughton, 
unconsciousness and death are examples of hedonic zero. 
It is not clear, however, that this is correct. This picture is not analogous in several 
important ways with standard accounts of other types of propositional attitudes. For 
example, the standard account of the attitude of belief holds that belief comes in degrees 
that measure the believer’s confidence in the proposition believed. This is commonly 
represented by a scale between zero and one, according to which if S believes that P to 
degree 1, then S regards P as being completely certain, whereas if S believes that P to degree 
0, then S regards P as being certainly false. If S believes that P to degree .5, then S regards P 
                                                
310 Sidgwick 1903, pp. 140 – 1.  
311 Bergström, p. 292, McNaughton, p. 176. 
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as being just as likely to be true as false.312 But notice that although belief of .5, the point at 
which S neither believes nor disbelieves P, is closely analogous to hedonic zero, the point at 
which S takes neither pleasure nor pain in P, we do not want to claim that the dead or the 
unconscious are neutral with respect to belief—that they believe everything to degree .5. We 
would not want to claim that S believes P to degree .5 in situations in which S has not 
considered P. For example, my wife has not considered the proposition that the Philadelphia 
Athletics won the World Series in 1911. Not only does she not believe it, she does not 
regard it has having a probability of .5 of being true—she does not regard it at all. She has no 
attitude concerning this proposition, since she has never considered it. She therefore does 
not believe it—her relationship to the proposition that the Athletics won the 1911 series is 
not represented by the standard scale of degree of belief.  
The lesson we should draw from this analogy to doxastic attitudes is this: the sort of 
situations McNaughton and Bergström describe should not be thought of as hedonic zero, 
since hedonic zero is the attitude of taking neither pleasure nor pain in some proposition. 
Because the dead and the unconscious have no attitudes, they cannot be said to take neither 
pleasure nor pain in any proposition, for the same reason that they cannot be said to regard 
any proposition as being equally likely to be true or false. Similarly, the unconscious cannot 
be said to regard any proposition as being neither hedonically positive nor negative, nor can 
the dead. On the current view, the zero point on the hedonic scale applies to situations  in 
which S considers the relevant proposition, and takes neither pleasure nor pain in it. 
Situations in which S has not considered P, whatever the reason, do not appear in the 
relevant order, and therefore receive a hedonic rating equivalent to “not applicable.” 
                                                
312 See Jeffery 1983 and Skyrms.  
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The question, therefore, is this: are there situations in which a person considers a 
proposition but takes neither pleasure nor pain in it? The answer is ‘yes.’ When I consider 
the proposition that the Philadelphia Athletics won the World Series in 1911, I take neither 
pleasure nor pain in it. I’ve considered it, and I believe it, but I don’t care. There’s no team I 
would rather have won that series; it was too long ago for it to matter to me one way or the 
other. We can tentatively conclude, therefore, that pleasure and pain satisfy the formal and 
structural criteria necessary and jointly sufficient for ratio measurability: there exists an 
empirical order of episodes of pleasure and pain from least to greatest according to the 
amount of pleasure or pain the episode contains, and this ordering admits of genuine 
intervals, and contains a natural, non-arbitrary zero point.  
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